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Preface
The efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) is still the most prominent theory on price
formation in asset markets. According to this hypothesis, asset prices reflect all available
information. Thus, it is impossible to beat the market consistently. However, the efficient
market hypothesis is explicitly based on the existence of rational actors who maximize
expected utility based on rational expectations. Any mispricing would be exploited by
such traders and irrational subjects would be pushed out of the market. Implicitly, such
a mechanism assumes no trading constraints on rational market participants, who can
thus borrow money and short sell assets to the degree necessary to correct mispricing (cf.
Barberis and Thaler, 2003).
Since the emergence of the efficient market hypothesis, there has been a longstanding
discussion on its empirical validity. Researchers have documented a variety of stock market
anomalies which are inconsistent with the traditional finance paradigm of ‘rational’ agents
(Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Several scholars provide evidence that ‘seemingly irrelevant
factors’ (Thaler, 2015) affect aggregate market outcomes. For example, stock returns are
positively correlated with the amount of sunshine in the location of the stock market
(Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003). On the individual level, investors are less willing to
sell stocks whose price has dropped since purchase compared to those whose price has
increased; this regularity is referred to as the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985;
Odean, 1998). Higher degrees of the disposition effect are correlated with inferior trading
performance due to suboptimal trading with regards to tax considerations, but also due
to subsequent underperformance of unsold ‘loser’ stocks which continue to underperform
due to medium-term return momentum (Odean, 1998; Seru et al., 2010).
Many of such departures from rationality can be explained by incorporating behavioral
principles from psychology, sociology and anthropology into financial research (Shiller,
1999). This research area is commonly referred to as ‘behavioral finance’. Several ex-
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planations for market behavior originate from psychology, such as those treated in this
dissertation – self-control and peer effects.
Motivated by psychological research, this dissertation experimentally investigates expla-
nations for financial decision making outside of the ‘rational’ expected utility framework.
Chapters 1 and 2 consider the role of self-control for financial decision making in different
contexts. Chapter 3 looks at peer effects – the impact of social influence on risky decision
making. All the chapters are based on economic experiments, which allow drawing causal
inferences from exogenous treatment variations in the decision environment. The two
chapters examining the effect of self-control on financial decision making are based on
laboratory experiments. In such a context, the experimenter can temporarily reduce self-
control abilities due to the close control over the decision environment. The last chapter
studies how peers affect risky decision making and how social distance can account for
heterogeneous effects. It is based on a lab-in-the-field experiment (Charness et al., 2013)
in German lower tier high schools, because in this environment more distant peers (i.e.
acquaintances) and less distant peers (i.e. friends) occur naturally.
Over the last years, self-control has attracted considerable interest in the field of behav-
ioral economics – a trend mainly motivated by the existing psychological literature. Even
though empirical evidence from behavioral finance is rather limited, practitioners and in-
vestment guides often stress the importance of self-control for financial decision making.
For example, investment legend Warren Buffett sees “[...] the temperament to control
the urges that get other people into trouble in investing [...]” as necessary for successful
investing1. The psychological definition of self-control seems to match Warren Buffet’s
statement quite closely: self-control is the ability to override or inhibit undesired behav-
ioral tendencies such as impulses and refrain from acting on them (Tangney et al., 2004).
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I aim to fill this research gap by investigating
the effects of state self-control on financial decision making – a) in a market environment
in chapter 1 and b) on individual decision making in chapter 2.
Psychologists differentiate between two kinds of self-control: trait self-control (disposi-
tional self-control) and state self-control. Trait self-control was popularized by the marsh-
mallow experiments of Walter Mischel and coauthors (e.g. Mischel and Ebbesen, 1970).
High dispositional self-control is correlated with many forms of behavior that contribute
1Source: http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_27/b3636006.htm (accessed on March 15, 2016)
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to a successful and healthy life, while low self-control is correlated with problematic be-
havior including impulsive buying and procrastination (Mischel et al., 1989; de Ridder
et al., 2012). From an economic perspective, trait self-control can be considered as cap-
turing some stable preference. On the other hand, an extensive body of research shows
that self-control can be temporarily weakened, thus self-control can also be considered as
a time varying state. Following up on the work of Roy Baumeister and coauthors (e.g.
Baumeister et al., 1998), this research has proliferated in recent years.
Economics complements the psychological perspective of self-control by formalizing the-
ories in mathematical models. Economists have traditionally focused on intertemporal
decision making as a manifestation of self-control. People often behave in time inconsis-
tent ways, i.e. they might change their mind about previous plans once the moment of
action arrives. For example, a student might postpone studying to the next day in order to
indulge in binge watching the latest Netflix series, even though she had previously planned
to study on that day (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Such behavior is hard to reconcile
with rational intertemporal decision making – i.e. discounted expected utility maximiza-
tion – and explanations have been modeled in various ways. One popular explanation is
referred to as (quasi-) hyperbolic discounting (see e.g. Laibson, 1997). Compared to the
benchmark of exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting involves overweighting of
present utility relative to future utility, which is also referred to as ‘present bias’. Notable
exceptions to this static view of self-control are Ali (2011), Fudenberg and Levine (2012)
and Ozdenoren et al. (2012), who model temporary changes in the resource self-control
based on psychological findings.
Even though anecdotal evidence suggests that present biased preferences are widespread
among individuals (e.g. Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), hyperbolic dis-
counting is unlikely to impact prices on asset markets since higher short-term discount
rates could be spotted and exploited easily by either unbiased market participants or
algorithms. It is therefore unlikely to find direct evidence for hyperbolic discounting in
financial markets. On the other hand, temporary fluctuations of self-control resources or
stable aspects of self-control that are not directly related to intertemporal decision making
could influence financial decision making and consequently outcomes on financial markets.
To the best of my knowledge, there has been little research on the relationship between
investment behavior and self-control. Most of the existing evidence is correlational and
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thus cannot provide causal inferences. For example, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011) find
pronounced differences in emotion regulation strategies between different groups of traders
based on interviews with traders and senior managers at investment banks in London.
Similarly, in Lo et al. (2005a), day traders with more intense emotional reactions to gains
and losses exhibit significantly worse trading performances. Additionally, day traders’
self-assessed strengths and weaknesses suggest self-control as a highly relevant factor for
investment success.2
In this dissertation, I focus on the temporary state self-control by using established treat-
ments from psychology of weakening self-control (Hagger et al., 2010) in financial decision
making experiments. This approach enables me to identify causal effects of self-control
on financial decision making. However, it is noteworthy that research comparing state
and trait self-control usually finds both concepts to impact behavior in similar ways (e.g.
Schmeichel and Zell, 2007).
Besides self-control problems, there is a variety of other factors that may affect financial
decision making. In the last chapter of my dissertation, my coauthors and I consider
one such factor – peer effects – in a stylized risky decision making experiment. We pay
particular attention to social distance as a factor explaining heterogeneity in peer effects.
Traditional economics abstracts from social interactions and considers decision making as
determined by the individual. However, more recent findings suggest that social inter-
action might play a bigger role than previously thought, because decision makers often
rely on the opinions or actions of others when evaluating alternatives. Nobel prize winner
Robert J. Shiller already pointed this out in the 1980s: “Investing in speculative assets is
a social activity.” (Shiller et al., 1984, p. 457). Peer effects3 on decision making can be
characterized as differences in behavior of an individual in isolation compared to a social
setting where some interaction with others or observation of others is possible (Lahno,
2014).
Social psychologists have studied the effect of social interactions on decision making for
a considerably longer time than economists. Leon Festinger’s theory of social comparison
for instance has been very influential in social psychology (Festinger, 1954). The main
2See table 3 in the working paper Lo et al. (2005b).
3In the following I use this expression interchangeably with the effects of social interaction.
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idea of this theory is that human beings use social comparisons in order to evaluate own
opinions and abilities in the absence of objective criteria.
Manski (2000) outlines an economic framework to conceptualize peer effects. Peer effects
between two agents can occur if the action of one agent affects preferences, expectations or
constraints of another agent. Preference interactions might arise due to direct influence
of someone else’s payoff on one’s own utility, e.g. because of altruism, or due to the
effect of social comparison on utility, e.g. because of jealousy or pride. Such preference
interactions are for instance present in the outcome based social preference models of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) along with Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), where decision makers can
derive additional utility from the payoffs of others or disutility from lagging behind others.
Information exchange between agents can be thought of as either affecting expectations,
e.g. by influencing another agent’s belief about the likelihood of a certain state of the
world, or as affecting constraints, e.g. by enlarging another agent’s consideration set by
introducing her to a new choice option (Manski, 2000). Both of these channels can be
considered as forms of social learning.
Peers have been shown to exert considerable influence on financial decision making in
several real world applications, including social interaction in the case of enrollment in
retirement savings accounts and the level of retirement savings (Duflo and Saez, 2002,
2003; Beshears et al., 2015), the decision to participate in the stock market (Brown et al.,
2008), asset allocation in stocks (Ivković and Weisbenner, 2007; Bursztyn et al., 2014),
and insurance decisions (Cai et al., 2015).
The role of social distance for peer effects in financial decision making has received little
attention, even though there are clear differences in peer relationships between studies.
In the economic laboratory, peer effects are usually studied by grouping participants who
have never interacted before with each other4 (e.g. Falk and Ichino, 2006; Lahno and
Serra-Garcia, 2015). Meanwhile field experiments and field studies usually consider the
interaction between pairs of friends or family members (e.g. Bursztyn et al., 2014; Dahl
et al., 2014). It seems plausible that the channel of peer effects might work quite differently
depending on the relationship with the peer, e.g. choices of more distant acquaintances
4Manski (2000) criticizes this in the following way: “(...) the groups whose interactions are observed
are formed artificially for the sake of the experiment. This raises obvious questions about the credibility
of extrapolating findings from experimental settings to populations of interest.”
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could convey more information than those of closer peers. Similarly, people might care
less about the payoffs of socially more distant peers.
My dissertation consists of one single-authored paper and two joint research projects.
The first chapter is a joint project with Martin Kocher and David Schindler. Together,
we explore the impact of a self-control reducing manipulation (Baumeister et al., 1998)
on prices and behavior on experimental asset markets, since increased impulsivity could
reinforce bubble formation. We contribute to the literature exploring the psychological
foundations of the results on overpricing in the experiments by Smith et al. (1988).
In three experimental treatments either no, all, or half of the traders in a market are
exposed to the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) before trading commences. This is one of the
most widely used methods to weaken individuals’ self-control (Hagger et al., 2010). We
refer to these different treatments as HIGHSC, LOWSC, and MIXED markets respec-
tively. Ten experimental participants then interact on an asset market that is known
for its basic tendency to exhibit overpricing. It features a dividend-bearing asset with
decreasing fundamental value. Additionally, we collect measures of risk attitudes and
cognitive abilities to detect the channels through which individual self-control problems
might translate into overpricing on the aggregate level.
We find significantly higher levels of overpricing on markets where traders’ self-control
abilities have been depleted compared to markets where no one’s self-control has been
depleted. Meanwhile, there is no direct effect of the manipulation on risk attitudes or
cognitive abilities. Self-control depleted traders also do not trade significantly less than
non-depleted participants. However, in MIXED markets, we find three patterns that
suggest reasons for the increase in overpricing: first, traders with low self-control engage
in more speculative behavior early on and others jump on this bandwagon. Second, our
measure of cognitive abilities loses its predictive power for profits of traders with low self-
control indicating that their behavior is based on controlled decision making processes
to a lower degree. Third, traders with low self-control report higher levels of emotional
arousal during the market, suggesting that they were driven by impulses more strongly.
Our study is the first to show a causal effect of a temporary depletion of self-control on
overpricing and behavior in asset market experiments. We show that already a moderate
number of participants with low self-control is sufficient to nearly double the extent of
overpricing. Our findings have important implications: first, with differences in self-
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control levels, we add a new explanation for overpricing in asset markets to the literature.
Second, our results are indicative of the role of self-control in real world markets, either
due to temporary reductions in self-control or due to differences in dispositional self-
control. Based on our results, investment decisions should not be taken in a state of
reduced willpower. If such conditions are unavoidable, commitment devices might be a
powerful tool to avoid potentially negative consequences of reduced self-control.
In the second chapter, I explore how reduced self-control affects individual investment
behavior in two laboratory experiments. In the first experiment, I examine the effect
of reduced self-control on the disposition effect, i.e. the tendency to be more willing to
sell stocks that have gained in price after purchase than stocks that have lost in price
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985). In the second experiment, I look at the effect of the same
manipulation on myopic loss aversion, i.e. the inclination to shy away from investing
money in an asset when its price fluctuations are evaluated more frequently (Benartzi and
Thaler, 1995). I contribute to the literature by looking for explanations and exploring the
heterogeneity of these two behavioral patterns.
I exogenously reduce subjects’ self-control using the letter-e-task (Baumeister et al., 1998).
In experiment 1, this is followed by an individual trading environment with multiple stocks
where the disposition effect can be measured (Weber and Welfens, 2007). In experiment
2, an investment task follows where the investment horizon of participants is exogenously
varied to explore myopic loss aversion (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). In each experiment,
I additionally obtain measures of cognitive abilities, risk preferences and dispositional
self-control or impulsivity.
In each experiment, I find no significant main treatment effect, but rather subtle secondary
effects, which are in line with findings on self-control from other studies. In experiment
1, I find no significant change in the disposition effect following the self-control manip-
ulation. However, treated participants concentrate on trading fewer different shares per
round which is purely driven by subjects with high cognitive abilities. In experiment
2, I investigate the effect of self-control on myopic loss aversion by implementing a 2×2
design varying investment horizon and self-control between subjects in a repeated lottery
environment. While lowered self-control seems to reinforce framing effects directionally,
I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal investment levels between the self-control
treatments within each investment horizon. Analyzing the dynamics of decision making
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in more detail, I find that investment experiences drive behavior of participants with low
self-control with the short investment horizon more strongly. On average, these subjects
consequently reduce their investment levels over the course of the experiment. Finally, I
find no significant impact of the self-control manipulation on the experimental measures
of cognitive abilities and risk preferences in either experiment.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to experimentally reduce self-control in order to
look at the impact of this treatment on individual investment biases. The combined results
of experiments 1 and 2 provide some indication that a reduction in self-control causally
results in an increase in narrow framing, while the previous literature has identified a
limited number of correlates of a person’s tendency to frame repeated risky decisions
narrowly. Furthermore, experiment 1 indicates that particularly those participants who
are similar to financial traders in terms of cognitive abilities (cf. Thoma et al., 2015) are
influenced by the self-control manipulation. Thus, despite selecting into markets based on
high trait self-control, market participants might be particularly sensitive to temporary
fluctuations in self-control state.
Chapter 3 is a joint project with Melanie Lührmann and Joachim Winter. In a field
experiment, we study the role of peer effects in risky decision making among adolescents
in the age range of 13 to 15. More specifically, we explore how the heterogeneity in peer
effects might be moderated by social distance. We randomly allocated school classes to
two interaction treatments in which students were allowed to discuss their choices with
a natural peer – either a friend or a randomly selected classmate – before individually
making choices in an incentivized lottery task that is comprised of both pure and mixed
prospects. In a control group, adolescents made choices without being able to discuss
them with a peer. We contribute to three strands of literature. Firstly, we complement
the literature that documents how the typical patterns of risky choices develop during
childhood and adolescence. Secondly, we document how the heterogeneity of peer effects
is moderated by social distance and thus contribute to the literature on peer effects.
Finally, we add to the scarce evidence on assortative matching based on risk preferences,
i.e. whether friends are more similar to each other in terms of risk preferences.
We gave adolescents two incentivized choice lists eliciting risk preferences and attitudes
towards losses adapted from the design of Tanaka et al. (2010). We randomly allocated
12 classes to one of three treatments – one control treatment, in which adolescents made
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decisions without interaction, and two interaction treatments, in which students were
allowed to discuss their choices with one peer. In the interaction groups, we induced two
different types of peers: endogenously chosen friends and randomly allocated classmates.
Our first finding is that a large majority of adolescents are both risk and loss averse (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). Second, we find no evidence of assortative matching on (or
convergence in) risk preferences – neither with respect to risk nor to loss aversion. In con-
trast, we do confirm the expected matching of friends based on observable characteristics,
such as age, gender and family background. Third, peer communication increases choice
similarity markedly in both treatment arms and in both types of lotteries. Increased
similarity mainly arises due to perfect alignment of choices. Fourth, by investigating a
private and a public signal of financial competency, we can investigate social learning.
Our findings indicate that social learning effects differ according to social distance – ran-
domly paired classmates with a high private signal are less likely to perfectly coordinate
their choices, while larger differences in the public signal negatively predict perfect coor-
dination. However, no such effects exist among paired friends. Finally, randomly paired
participants become significantly more loss averse (and weakly more risk averse) compared
to the control group, while there is no such effect among pairs of friends.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically establish the presence
of loss aversion among adolescents. Contrary to our initial hypotheses, we did not find
that social interaction reduces the level of risk and loss aversion among adolescents, but
quite the contrary: it may increase loss aversion if peers are less familiar with each other.
Our study is the first to create experimental peer interaction among natural peers, while
recognizing the need to account for assortative matching. This leads to a new finding
about the nature of matching: we find no evidence that relationship formation is driven
by similarity in risk preferences. Finally, we systematically document heterogeneity in
peer effects according to social distance, both in social learning as well as in the direction
of the effect on choices.
Each chapter of this dissertation is self-contained, as each includes its own introduction
and can be read independently. The appendices of each chapter are collected in the last
section of this dissertation arranged in the same order as the individual chapters. They
contain additional analyses referred to in the main body, as well as the instructions of the
respective experiments included in each chapter.
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CHAPTER 1
Unleashing Animal Spirits – Self-Control and
Overpricing in Experimental Asset Markets1
1.1 Introduction
“Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability
due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our pos-
itive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical
expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of
our decisions to do something positive (...) can only be taken as the result of
animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not
as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by
quantitative probabilities.”2
John Maynard Keynes
Keynes famously saw “animal spirits” at the root of many (financial) decisions, potentially
causing price exaggerations on the aggregate market level. As often in Keynes’ work, the
term “animal spirits” is not well-delineated. It alludes to optimism, instincts, urges,
emotions, and similar concepts. In this paper we assess the notion that a lack of self-
control abilities may lead to price exaggerations on asset markets, and we analyze how the
lack of self-control abilities is associated to emotions and trading behavior. In psychology,
self-control abilities and willpower are defined as the capacities to override or inhibit
undesired behavioral tendencies such as impulses and to refrain from acting on them
1This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Kocher and David Schindler.
2Source: Keynes (1936), p. 136.
12 Unleashing Animal Spirits
(Tangney et al., 2004). Self-control is necessary to guard oneself against undue optimism,
actions motivated by emotional responses, and impulsive decisions. Furthermore, self-
control is required in order to stick to plans made in the past.
That self-control is considered relevant for investor success is also evident from statements
of investors and from popular guidebooks on the psychology of investing. For instance,
Warren Buffet emphasizes that “success in investing doesn’t correlate with I.Q. once
you’re above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is
the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.”3
Similarly, anecdotal evidence from rogue traders show that they completely lost their
self-control abilities at some stage. In a study by Lo et al. (2005a) involving day traders
from an online training program participants stated attributes related to self-control as
the most important determinants of trading success.4 In a similar spirit, Fenton-O’Creevy
et al. (2011) report distinct differences in emotion regulation strategies among traders of
different experience and performance levels from qualitative interviews with professional
traders. Therefore, correlational evidence suggests that self-control matters for trading
success on an individual level.
This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on the causal effect of a variation
in self-control abilities on trading outcomes.5 The major challenge to overcome is to
exogenously vary self-control abilities in order to obtain causal inference on the impact
of self-control abilities on behavior and market outcomes. A first step is to use the
experimental laboratory and affect state self-control levels of traders. Most of the available
techniques draw on the concept of self-control depletion or exhaustion. Our experimental
identification rests on the assumption that self-control is a limited resource and that it
is variable over time on the individual level. Evidence for these two characteristics is
abundant (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998; Gailliot et al., 2012), although it has also been
questioned lately (Carter and McCullough (2013)). While validated survey measures for
trait self-control exist, they can only provide correlational inference.
In the spirit of Keynes we concentrate on aggregate market outcomes in a first experiment
and extend our analysis to individual behavior and performance in a second experiment.
3http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_27/b3636006.htm
4They quote attributes such as persistence, tenacity, perseverance, patience, discipline, planning,
controlling emotions, and (lack of) impulsivity as crucial (Lo et al., 2005a, table 3).
5However, there is a quickly growing empirical literature on the effects of self-control abilities on
decision making in other domains relevant to economists (see, for instance, Beshears et al. (2015).)
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We use a well-established financial market setup in the experimental laboratory (Smith
et al., 1988; Kirchler et al., 2012; Noussair and Tucker, 2013; Palan, 2013; Eckel and
Füllbrunn, 2015) to investigate whether an exogenous variation in self-control abilities
of traders leads to overpricing. This experimental asset market is known for its basic
tendency to exhibit overpricing; it features a dividend-bearing asset with decreasing fun-
damental value.
In order to deplete self-control abilities before the start of the market, we employ the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), which is one of the most commonly used tasks in psychology
experiments for modulating self-control (Hagger et al., 2010). It is easy to administer,
it can be implemented in an exhausting/depleting version and in an easy version (i.e. a
placebo version), and it allows for additional controls. The majority of studies that use
both survey measures and behavioral measures of self-control conclude that the effects
of state self-control interventions are qualitatively similar to those of trait self-control
levels (e.g. Schmeichel and Zell, 2007). Hence, even if our experiment is confined to the
laboratory setting and to a variation in state self-control, it is likely that it extends to
situations outside the laboratory in which also trait self-control matters.
A drop in self-control abilities can increase the extent of overpricing on a market through
different channels. One psychological transmission mechanism runs through an increased
influence of the impulsive decision making system. A consequence could be that traders’
behaviors become more easily swayed by observing others’ behaviors on the market (for
instance, a more pronounced tendency to momentum trading). Another behavioral mech-
anism relates to an heightened influence of emotions (for instance, the excitement after
seeing the prospect of making more money, or a stronger psychological reward of interim
gains). Yet another option, potentially related to impulsivity, would be a stronger role
of biases in decision making such as myopia, limiting the ability to correctly foresee the
declining fundamental value and thus creating histories of overpricing on the market.
Our main finding is a significantly higher level of overpricing on markets where traders’
self-control abilities have been depleted, compared to markets with traders whose self-
control abilities have not been depleted. If markets are populated by both depleted and
non-depleted traders the effect is similar in size and also highly significant. Obviously,
having some self-control depleted traders on a market suffices to create the additional
over-pricing effect.
14 Unleashing Animal Spirits
Behavior on markets is path-dependent, choices are endogenous to other choices, and
traders imitate each other. Nonetheless, we are able to provide robust evidence from
control variables, from trading and from survey questions that can explain the additional
overpricing with depleted self-control abilities. First, there is no direct effect of self-
control depletion on risk attitudes or cognitive abilities of traders, which could explain
our findings. Second, self-control depleted traders do not trade significantly less than
non-depleted traders, ruling out a simple exhaustion effect. Third, several indicators
show that self-control depleted traders follow stronger speculative motives earlier on when
trading. In other words, they contribute more to the creation of overpricing histories, and
non-depleted traders jump on this bandwaggon. Fourth, stronger emotional arousal of
individuals on the market is related to being self-control depleted. In short, traders
become more impulsive and potentially rely less on cognitive skills, when they cannot
resort to their full self-control resources.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 gives an overview of the related
literature, and in section 1.3, we explain and motivate our experimental design. Conse-
quently, section 1.4 presents the results from our main experiment, and section 1.5 reports
on an additional experiment that allows us both to test the robustness of our initial results
and to better understand how self-control depletion translates into overpricing and how
traders’ behavior and decision processes might be affected by the treatment. We discuss
potential channels explaining our findings in section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes the paper.
1.2 Related Literature
Our literature overview focuses on the two aspects in the economics and psychology litera-
ture that are most relevant for our study: self-control and experimental asset markets. As
already said, self-control abilities and willpower are defined as the capacities to override
or inhibit undesired behavioral tendencies such as impulses and to refrain from acting
on them. There are different theoretical approaches in psychology and in economics that
take self-control abilities and potential self-control problems into account.
First, self-control can straightforwardly be related to dual-systems perspectives of decision
making. As outlined by Kahneman (2011), these perspectives share the general assump-
tion that structurally different systems of information processing underlie the production
of impulsive, largely automatic forms of behavior, on the one hand (system 1), and de-
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liberate, largely controlled forms of behavior, on the other hand (system 2). System 2
is effortful and requires self-control resources.6 Thus, if resources are low, reflective op-
erations may be impaired, leading to a dominance of impulsive reactions that could be
in conflict with objective reasoning. From this perspective, reducing self-control abilities
can be interpreted as increasing the role of the (impulsive) system 1 in decision making
(Hofmann et al., 2009).
Second, and very much related to dual-system perspectives, economists have used dual-
self models of impulse control (see, for instance, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Fudenberg
and Levine (2006)) in order to describe self-control problems. These models study the
interaction of two selves, a rational (long-term) and an impulsive (short-term) self. Such
models can account for time inconsistent behavior (for instance, in connection with quasi-
hyperbolic discounting) and for the fact that cognitive load makes temptations harder to
resist. Third, willpower as a depletable resource has been modeled directly in economics.
Ozdenoren et al. (2012) look at a consumption smoothing model that views willpower as
a depletable resource, and Masatlioglu et al. (2011) consider lottery choices.
Is there empirical evidence for self-control abilities or willpower to be indeed limited or
depletable resources? Many researchers in psychology have shown that exerting self-
control consumes energy and consequently diminishes the available resources for other
acts that require self-control.7 Self-control can involve either cognitive control, or affective
control, or both (Hagger et al., 2010). Self-control abilities regenerate through rest, can
be trained, and differ between people (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1999;
Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Tangney et al., 2004; Muraven, 2010).
Our experimental identification relies on self-control depletion. We reduce self-control
abilities by exposing experimental participants to a self-control demanding task before
the main task (known as the dual task paradigm). Such setups have been used in other
domains in economics, mainly in the context of individual decision making. For example,
the consequences of self-control variations in decision making under risk have been stud-
ied. Several papers report increased risk aversion following self-control depletion (Unger
and Stahlberg, 2011; Kostek and Ashrafioun, 2014). However, a number of studies also
6Note that the division of system 1 as automatic and system 2 as controlled describes a tendency; there
are both automatic and conscious processes involved in exerting self-control and giving in to temptation,
respectively (cf. Kotabe and Hofmann, 2015).
7For recent overviews about the ongoing discussion in psychology and models of the underlying pro-
cesses involved in self-control see Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) and Kotabe and Hofmann (2015).
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reveal an increase in risk taking following similar manipulations (Bruyneel et al., 2009;
Freeman and Muraven, 2010; Friehe and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2014). Both Stojić et al.
(2013) and Gerhardt et al. (2015) find no significant effect of self-control manipulations
on risk preferences elicited from choice lists. Bucciol et al. (2011, 2013) show in field
experiments with children and adults that self-control depletion leads to reduced pro-
ductivity in subsequent tasks. De Haan and Van Veldhuizen (2015) find no effect of a
repeated Stroop task on the performance in an array of tasks in which framing effects –
such as anchoring effects and the attraction effect – are typically observed.
Recently, experiments have looked at the effects of self-control variations on other-regarding
preferences. Achtziger et al. (2016) report a strong but heterogeneous impact of reduced
self-control on offers and accepting behavior in ultimatum games, presumably depend-
ing on what an individual’s more automatic reactions are. In a similar vein, Achtziger
et al. (2015) provide evidence for reduced dictator giving after a reduction in self-control
abilities.8
Existing studies also suggest a relationship between self-control abilities and financial
decision making. However, we are not aware of experimental studies in this context.
Using survey evidence, Ameriks et al. (2003, 2007) consider the connection between wealth
accumulation and trait self-control in a sample of highly educated US households. Ameriks
et al. (2003) attribute differences in savings among households to differing “propensities
to plan” – i.e. different individual costs of exerting self-control. Ameriks et al. (2007) use
the difference between planned behavior and expected behavior in a hypothetical scenario
as a measure for self-control problems. They find a positive correlation between better
self-control abilities and wealth accumulation, in particular for liquid assets. Gathergood
(2012) conducts a similar study in the UK with a representative sample. He reports a
positive association between lower levels of self-control and consumer over-indebtedness.
Our asset market is based on the seminal paper by Smith et al. (1988), who were the
first to observe significant overpricing in an experimental double auction market. Many
studies have followed up on these early findings.9 Trader inexperience and confusion
have been considered as one of the aggravating factors of overpricing (Dufwenberg et al.,
8Martinsson et al. (2014) analyze the relationship between self-control and pro-sociality in an indirect
way, but their findings are also in line with the idea that pro-social behavior requires self-control. A
similar result is provided by Kocher et al. (2016b).
9Recent surveys can be found in Noussair and Tucker (2013) and Palan (2013).
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2005; Kirchler et al., 2012), and Bosch-Rosa et al. (2015) for example show that grouping
traders by cognitive skills leads to increased overpricing for groups with low cognitive
sophistication. Nadler et al. (2015) provide evidence that giving testosterone to a group
of male participants significantly increases prices, and Petersen et al. (2015) find that
inducing stress decreases overpricing.
Since emotion regulation is correlated with self-control abilities (Tice and Bratslavsky,
2000), the influence of emotions on prices in asset markets is also relevant to our research
question: Andrade et al. (2015) find that inducing excitement before trading triggers
overpricing in asset markets stronger in magnitude and higher in amplitude than other
emotions and a neutral condition. In a similar study, Lahav and Meer (2012) show that
inducing positive mood leads to higher deviations from fundamental values and thus more
overpricing. The role of emotions in experimental asset markets has also been evaluated
using self-reported emotions on Likert scales (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2011) and face
reading software (Breaban and Noussair, 2013), instead of inducing specific emotions
exogenously. Results from these experiments indicate that excitement and a positive
emotional state before market opening are correlated with increased prices relative to
fundamental values. Moreover, fear at the opening of the market is correlated with lower
price levels.
Finally, Smith et al. (2014) analyze neurological correlates of asset market behavior us-
ing fMRI. They show that aggregate neural activity in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc)
tracks overpricing and that aggregated NAcc activity can predict future price changes
and crashes. In their study, the lowest-earning traders exhibited a stronger tendency to
buy as a function of NAcc activity. They also report a signal in the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) in the highest earners that precedes the impending price peak and that is
associated with a higher propensity to sell. These findings might be related to our experi-
ments, since ACC activation functions can work as an internal “alarm bell” (Smith et al.,
2014) that triggers subsequent adjustment, i.e. ACC activation might be a requirement
for exerting self-control (Kotabe and Hofmann, 2015).
1.3 Experimental Design
Our paper reports the results from two experiments. The design of Experiment I is
described in this section. Experiment II is a natural extension of Experiment I and
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Figure 1.1: Treatment Differences in the Stroop Task
described in greater detail in section 1.5. Experiment I consists of four independent parts:
(i) instructions and dry runs of the asset market without monetary consequences and
without the possibility to build reputation for the parts to come; (ii) the main treatment
variation in self control, the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) in two treatment versions; (iii)
elicitation of risk attitudes and cognitive abilities, both incentivized; and (iv) a fully
incentivized experimental asset market.
Our identification of the effects induced by a variation in self-control abilities on market
prices relies on the comparison of behavior on markets following two different versions of
the Stroop task. A tough version lowers self-control abilities, whereas a placebo version
should leave self-control abilities largely unaffected. We implement a condition in which
all market participants are subjected to the tough version of the Stroop task (henceforth
LOWSC for low self-control) and a condition in which all participants were subjected to
the placebo version (henceforth HIGHSC for high self-control). Except for this treatment
variation in part (ii), the two experimental conditions are identical in all other parts.
The Stroop task follows a simple protocol: participants are instructed to solve correctly as
many problems as possible within five minutes. An example of such a problem is displayed
on the left-hand side of Figure 1.1. The task is to select the color of the font the word
is printed in. A selection of six color buttons – always the same and in the same order
– is given on the bottom right of the screen, and subjects are instructed to click on the
correct one. As soon as they make a selection, the next word-color combination appears.
Consecutive word-color combinations always differ from each other. The difficulty of this
task is that the words always describe one of the six colors; the incongruence between the
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color of the word and the word itself causes a cognitive conflict, since reading the word
is the dominant cue. Common explanations for the conflict are automaticity of reading
the word or relatively faster processing of reading than color perception (MacLeod, 1991).
The conflict has to be resolved, and resolution requires self-control effort. Applying this
effort depletes self-control resources and leaves participants with lower levels of willpower
and/or self-control resources after the five minutes.
The Stroop task is one of the most commonly applied methods to deplete self-control
resources (Hagger et al., 2010). It can be easily implemented in a computer laboratory, is
straightforward to explain, requires only basic literacy skills, and generates additional data
on the number of correctly solved problems and the number of mistakes. The difference
between the Stroop task in LOWSC andHIGHSC is the frequency with which a conflicting
word-color combination occurrs.10 All screens in LOWSC exhibit such a conflict, while
in HIGHSC only every 70th screen does. Experimental participants do not receive any
information on the frequency of such a conflict, and the instructions for the two versions
of the task are identical. By having an occasional word-color incongruence in HIGHSC
we are able to ensure that subjects take the task seriously. If anything, our setup reduces
the potential treatment difference, because in HIGHSC some self-control depletion might
still take place, making the potential result of a significant difference between the two
conditions more difficult to obtain.
We decided to provide participants with a flat payment of e 3 for the Stroop task in order
to signal that we were interested in their performance. We do not use a piece-rate or any
other competitive payment scheme because it might create different wealth levels after
the treatment variation, and wealth differences might be correlated with the treatment.
Hence, treatment differences might potentially be confounded with wealth effects.11 Upon
completion of the five minutes, we ask experimental participants how hard they perceived
the task on a six-point Likert scale.
Self-control resource depletion can influence several relevant variables for the subsequent
experimental asset market. We control for two mechanisms directly: cognitive ability and
10The right-hand side of Figure 1.1 shows an example of congruence between font color and word, as
we use it in the placebo Stroop task in HIGHSC.
11Achtziger et al. (2015) find no differences in depletion effects between flat payments and incentivized
versions of a related self-control manipulation. We are confident that subjects took the task seriously;
only two participants in Experiment I tried less than 114 screens and one answered less than 110 items
correctly. Most of our subjects answered many more – see appendix A.3 for details.
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risk attitudes.12 Eliciting control variables takes place after the self-control manipulation
but before the experimental asset market for two reasons: Firstly, if these measures were
to follow the asset market, there might be spillover effects due to experiences during
the asset market and secondly the effect of our self-control manipulation might wear off
since the asset market part of the experiment lasts a considerable amount of time during
which self-control could start to regenerate (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000). In order to
avoid that the self-control variation wears off before the asset market interaction starts,
it is a requirement that measuring the control variables does not take much time. Two
tasks that fit this requirement are the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) for measuring
individual cognitive abilities (Frederick, 2005) and a simple multiple price list lottery
design for eliciting individual risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2011).
First, our subjects answer the three questions of the standard CRT. It is well-known that
CRT responses are correlated with more time-consuming measures of cognitive ability,
risk and time preferences (Frederick, 2005), as well as with decisions in a wide array
of experimental tasks such as entries in p-beauty-contest games (Brañas-Garza et al.,
2012) and performance in heuristics-and-biases tasks (Toplak et al., 2011). Furthermore,
Corgnet et al. (2014) and Noussair et al. (2014) find that the CRT is a good predictor
of individual trader’s profits in asset market experiments.13 Subjects are paid e 0.5 for
every correct answer but do not learn their CRT results and thus earnings until the end
of the experiment.
Second, we elicit individual certainty equivalents (CE) for a lottery using a multiple price
list as a measure for individual risk attitudes. Differences in risk attitudes can be a rational
reason for trade (Smith et al., 1988) and might explain initial underpricing of assets on
the market, thus sparking off later price increases and overpricing (Porter and Smith,
1995; Miller, 2002). Furthermore, Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) find that more risk
averse individuals trade less frequently. On a single computer screen, our experimental
participants have to choose ten times between a lottery that pays either e .20 or e 4.20
with equal probability and increasing certain amounts of money that are equally spaced
12For evidence of potential effects of self-control depletion on complex thinking see Schmeichel et al.
(2003). As mentioned in the previous section, evidence on the relationship between self-control abilities
and risk attitudes is rather inconclusive. Emotions as a potential transmission mechanism will be assessed
in Experiment II.
13The CRT is regarded as a measure of cognitive ability and thinking disposition (Toplak et al., 2011).
We will discuss the CRT results and their implications in more detail when we discuss our results in
section 1.6.
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between the two outcomes of the lottery. Subjects are allowed to switch at most once from
the lottery to the certain amounts. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly
picks one of the ten decisions of each individual as payoff-relevant and implements the
preferred option, potentially simulating the lottery outcome.
Immediately after risk elicitation the main part of the experiment, the asset market,
opens. The asset market featurs a dividend-bearing asset with decreasing fundamental
value over ten trading periods (lasting 120 seconds each) in a continuous double-auction
market design with ten traders and with open order books, following Kirchler et al.
(2012).14 This is a simplified version of the markets in Smith et al. (1988). Before the
first trading period, five subjects in a given market receive 1000 experimental points in
cash and 60 assets, and the other five receive 3000 points in cash and 20 assets as their
initial endowment. Assignment to the two initial asset allocations is random.
During each trading period, traders can post bids and asks as well as accept open bids and
asks. Partially executed bids and asks continue to be listed with their residual quantities
and inactive orders remain in the books until the end of the current period. At the end
of every period, the asset pays a dividend of either ten or zero experimental points with
equal probability. The dividend payment is added to each trader’s cash holdings. Assets
have no remaining value after the last dividend payment, i.e. they display a declining
(expected) fundamental value. This design feature is explicitly stated and highlighted
in the instructions. To make things clear, the instructions provide a detailed table with
the sum of remaining expected dividend payments per unit of the asset at any point in
time. Assets and cash are carried from period to period. Short selling and borrowing
experimental points are not allowed. After every period, the average trading price as
well as the realizations of the current and all past dividends are displayed on a separate
feedback screen. At the end of the ten periods, experimental points are converted into
euros, using an initially announced exchange rate of 500 points = e 1 .
At the end of the experiment, subjects learn about their payoffs from all parts of the
experiment. We ask them to fill in a short questionnaire concerning demographics and
background data. We also ask participants how tired they feel after the experiment and
how hard they have perceived decisions over the course of the entire experiment on a
14Appendix A.7 provides the experimental instructions, including a screen shot and a description of
the trading screen.
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6-point Likert scale. Then, all earnings are paid out in private, and the subjects are
dismissed from the laboratory.
Experiment I was conducted in October 2013. 160 participants took part in ten experi-
mental sessions. Hence, we obtained 16 independent observations, eight for each of our
treatment conditions. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007),
and recruitment was done with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Experimental ses-
sions lasted for about 90 minutes, and participants earned e 18.18, on average. We only
invited students who had never participated in an asset market experiment before. We
also excluded students potentially familiar with the CRT or the Stroop task.15 Prior
to the start of the experiment, subjects received written instructions for all parts of the
experiment. These were read aloud to ensure common knowledge. Remaining questions
were answered in private.
1.4 Experimental Results
1.4.1 Manipulation Check
The data suggest that our treatment manipulation was successful: First of all, during
the Stroop task participants attempted fewer problems, achieved fewer correctly solved
problems and made more mistakes in the LOWSC condition than in the HIGHSC con-
dition (all Mann-Whitney tests p < 0.01).16 Participants perceived the Stroop task as
significantly more demanding in the LOWSC condition than in the HIGHSC condition
(Mann-Whitney test p < 0.01). Finally, we do not find any differences in background
characteristics such as field (p = 0.416) and year of study (p = 0.9162), age (p = 0.1709)
and gender (p = 0.9558) between our two treatments (Mann-Whitney tests and Pear-
son’s χ2 test for field of study), suggesting that random assignment to treatments was
successful.
15Of our 160 subjects, one suffered from some form of dyschromatopsia, i.e. a color vision impairment.
We asked for it in the post-experimental questionnaire in order to make sure that it is not a common
phenomenon.
16Detailed distributions on these variables can be found in section A.3 of the appendix. All tests
reported in this paper are two-sided unless stated otherwise.
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1.4.2 Definitions and Measures
In order to calculate mean prices one can use either an adjustment that takes trading
volumes into account (henceforth: volume-adjusted prices) or an adjustment that takes
the number of trades into account (henceforth: trade-adjusted prices). The former is
an average price per asset, whereas the latter is an average price per trade. Our results
remain unaffected by the choice of adjustment; in line with the literature, we mainly
display results based on volume-adjusted prices in the following.
In order to quantify the tendency of markets to exhibit irrational exuberance we compare
trading prices with the fundamental value of the asset. In the following we adopt the
approach of Stöckl et al. (2010) and assess the market price developments using Relative
Absolute Deviation (RAD) (in equation 1.1) and Relative Deviation (RD) (in equation
1.2) as measures for general mispricing and overpricing, respectively.
RAD = 1
T
T∑
t=1
|Pt − FVt|
F¯ V
(1.1)
RD = 1
T
T∑
t=1
Pt − FVt
F¯ V
(1.2)
Pt is the volume-adjusted mean price in period t, FVt is the fundamental value of the
asset in period t, and F¯ V denotes the average fundamental value of the asset over all
periods.
RAD is constructed as the ratio of the average absolute difference of mean market price
and fundamental value, relative to the average fundamental value of the asset. RD is the
ratio of the average difference between mean market price and fundamental value, relative
to the average fundamental value. The difference between the two measures is how the
difference between mean market price and fundamental value enters the calculation: For
RAD the difference enters in absolute terms, thus all deviations from the fundamental
value – overpricing and underpricing – increase RAD, making RAD a measure of average
mispricing. For RD the wedge between market price and fundamental value retains its
sign, thus periods with overpricing and underpricing can cancel each other out. Hence, RD
provides the dominant direction of mispricing, making it, in effect, a measure of average
overpricing.
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Both measures are straightforward to interpret: A RAD of .1 means that prices are on
average 10% off the fundamental value, while a RD of .1 indicates that prices are on
average 10% above the fundamental value. Both measures are independent of the number
of periods and the fundamental value.
1.4.3 Aggregate Price Development
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Figure 1.2: Mean (Volume-adjusted) Trading Prices in the Two Treatments
Figure 1.2 shows how average market prices in LOWSC and HIGHSC evolve over the ten
trading periods. In both conditions, average market prices start out at a similar level,
displaying a moderate level of underpricing. However, from the third period onwards,
average prices in both conditions exceed the fundamental value. Eventually, average
market prices drop sharply, but do not drop below the fundamental value again.
The most conservative comparisons between the two treatments are based on market
averages over all traders and over all ten periods. This is the approach we apply for all non-
parametric tests regarding aggregate market outcomes. These averages are statistically
independent in the strict sense, and test statistics are based on eight observations for
each treatment. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test confirms the impression from eyeballing,
i.e. that market prices in both conditions are significantly different from the fundamental
value (HIGHSC : p = 0.0929, LOWSC : p = 0.0173). Figure 1.2 suggests more pronounced
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overpricing in the LOWSC condition than in HIGHSC, which is confirmed by a Mann-
Whitney test (HIGHSC : R¯D = 0.1885, LOWSC : R¯D = 0.4990; p = 0.0742)17. A
comparison of RD tells us that while in HIGHSC overpricing is on average 19%, in LOWSC
prices exceed the fundamental value by almost 50%. Thus, trade among individuals with
low self-control leads to overpricing which is more than twice as high as in the baseline
HIGHSC.
Furthermore markets in the LOWSC condition exhibit higher levels of mispricing (HIGHSC :
¯RAD = 0.3253, LOWSC : ¯RAD = 0.5890; Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.0460). According
to RAD, prices in the HIGHSC condition deviate by about 33% from the fundamental
value, whereas they deviate by about 59% from the fundamental value in the LOWSC
condition.
Figure 1.3 displays the price evolution of single markets in the two conditions. There
is a high degree of path-dependence and endogeneity in price evolution in the markets
and a lot of heterogeneity among markets in the same condition. Therefore, finding a
significant difference between the two conditions for the most conservative test in terms
of statistical independence is the more striking. The left panel represents the markets
from the HIGHSC condition, while the right panel shows the LOWSC markets. Price
paths in HIGHSC markets often follow a rather flat or declining development, while
in LOWSC a number of markets display a hump-shaped price evolution that initially
increases and peaks in later trading periods. The emergence of overpricing oftentimes
can be attributed to constant prices despite decreasing fundamental values (Huber and
Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler et al., 2012) – a description that fits price paths in our HIGHSC
markets better than those in LOWSC markets.18
1.4.4 Potential Transmission Mechanisms of the Treatment Ef-
fect
Having established a significant treatment effect, the next step is to look at potential
channels via which self-control variations could have had an effect on market outcomes.
Detailed descriptive results on the variables considered in this section can be found in
sections A.4ff. of the appendix.
17Both measures are significantly different from zero for both conditions.
18Section A.1 in the appendix shows a comparison of overpricing measures across treatments for each
period separately. Overpricing in LOWSC significantly exceeds overpricing in HIGHSC in periods 6-9.
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of Individual Market Prices in HIGHSC and LOWSC
Cognitive Abilities and Risk Attitude
Self-control depleted participants might not be willing to think as hard and thus provide
the (wrong) intuitive answers in the CRT. The average number of correct answers in the
CRT was 1.05 in HIGHSC and 1.14 in LOWSC. The difference in CRT score between
the two conditions is not significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.7223).
We conclude that the Stroop task did not have an impact on our incentivized version
of the CRT.19 Risk attitudes might be affected by self-control depletion. The average
certainty equivalent we elicited is close to the lottery’s expected value: 2.2 in HIGHSC
and 2.15 in LOWSC. Like the literature exploring the effect of reduced self-control on
risk attitude that has come to inconclusive results (e.g. Bruyneel et al., 2009; Unger and
Stahlberg, 2011; Gerhardt et al., 2015), we also find no significant effect (Mann-Whitney
19If we include the observations from our second experiment, the CRT scores of the two groups become
1.0875 and 1.1375 respectively with p = 0.7442 from a Mann-Whitney test.
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test, p = 0.4083) of our treatment variation on risk attitudes as measured by the multiple
price list certainty equivalent elicitation.20
Trading Activity
An additional channel through which our results could be explained is changes in trading
activity, i.e. the number of traded shares per trading period. People low in self-control
have been reported to become more passive (Baumeister et al., 1998, Experiment 4).
Increased passivity and thus a thinner market in LOWSC, where few trades could drive
overpricing, could be responsible for our results. Thus we compare the number of shares
traded in the two conditions. Figure 1.4 illustrates the evolution of average shares traded
per period. Traders in HIGHSC traded slightly more overall: while the average trader
traded 13.02 shares per period in HIGHSC, only 11.39 shares changed hands on average
per trader in each period in LOWSC. However, according to a Mann-Whitney test, there
is no significant difference between amounts traded between the two conditions (p =
0.3446).21 When analyzing the results of Experiment II, we shall take a closer look at
trading strategies of self-control depleted traders versus non-depleted traders.
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of Average Shares Traded per Trader by Condition
20Including observations from Experiment II does not provide significant differences between the two
groups.
21An additional regression analysis in Table A.2 in appendix A.2 reinforces this conclusion.
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Regressions Controlling for Potential Channels
Although our control variables seem unaffected by our treatment, they could still possess
explanatory power for the difference in overpricing that we observe. We therefore run
regressions, including controls as indepedent variables. To avoid endogeneity problems
across trading periods and between subjects, respectively, we aggregate overpricing mea-
sures over all ten periods on the individual level and use robust standard errors clustered
at the market level. We do this separately for sales and purchases, since selling above
fundamental value results in an expected profit, while buying above fundamental value
results in an expected loss. We define measures for individual overpricing for purchases
and sales, which we call IndRDpurchases and IndRDsales, respectively. Similar to the mea-
sure RD they are defined as the percentage of buying (selling) prices exceeding the asset’s
fundamental value pooled over all periods, but for each subject’s buying (selling) activity
separately instead of on the market level as before. We report results on IndRDpurchases
as the dependent variable in the regressions in Table 1.1. In appendix A.2, we provide
robustness checks for our chosen approach for sales and both aggregated sales and pur-
chases.
In all four models we are interested in the effect of the explanatory variables on IndRDpurchases,
our measure of an individual’s overpricing tendency. Throughout all specifications, we ob-
serve a significant treatment effect: Being in LOWSC increases an individual’s propensity
to buy at excessive prices. In specification (2), our measure of risk attitude is not sig-
nificant, but if we also include interactions with our treatments in specifications (3) and
(4), relative risk seeking is correlated with lower individual overpricing when self-control
capabilities are reduced. Performance on the CRT has the expected effect of reducing
the tendency of buying at prices above fundamental value in all specifications where it is
included, and its effect does not significantly differ between participants in LOWSC and
HIGHSC markets. The models show results based on an exclusion criterion for the CRT.
We excluded subjects that indicated knowledge of CRT questions in the post experimen-
tal questionnaire. Our results are very similar without excluding those subjects. Hence,
introducing measures for risk aversion and cognitive skills and their interactions with our
treatments do not reduce the size or significance of the treatment coefficient. We conclude
that neither changes in cognitive skills nor in risk preferences after self-control depletion
can explain our main result of excess overpricing after self-control depletion.
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Table 1.1: Determinants of Individual RD Based on Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndRDpurchases
LOWSC 0.400** 0.390** 0.816*** 0.843***
(0.140) (0.134) (0.131) (0.125)
CRT -0.0708* -0.0952 -0.0912
(0.0392) (0.0558) (0.0547)
CE -0.0188 0.0684 0.0719
(0.0459) (0.0441) (0.0455)
CRT × LOWSC 0.0612 0.0628
(0.0821) (0.0831)
CE × LOWSC -0.224*** -0.237***
(0.0712) (0.0709)
Female 0.0666
(0.0690)
Constant 0.0933 0.194 0.0255 -0.0353
(0.0971) (0.120) (0.0597) (0.0682)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.275 0.307 0.364 0.370
Note: OLS regression, dependent variable is Individual Relative Deviation
(IndRD) for purchases, an individual equivalent to market level Relative
Deviation (RD) restricted to purchases only. LOWSC is a dummy where
1 stands for LOWSC and 0 for HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty
equivalent. CRT denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT.
Subjects who indicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions
before were excluded. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered
at market level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.5 Experiment II: Mixed Markets
1.5.1 Motivation and Design
The results reported in section 1.4 referred to markets, in which either all market partici-
pants underwent the tough Stroop task or none of them, i.e. either everyone’s self-control
resources had been reduced or no one’s. In this section we report results from markets, in
which only half of the participants’ self-control resources were depleted. Each market con-
sisted of five participants randomly assigned to the easy (placebo) Stroop version from the
HIGHSC condition and five participants randomly assigned to the tough Stroop version
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from the LOWSC condition. We call this new condition MIXED and for simplicity refer
to traders facing the tough version of the Stroop task as MIXLO traders and to those
facing the easy version of the Stroop task as MIXHI traders. The motivation for this
additional experiment is twofold. First, asset market experiments are zero sum games
and behavior is highly path-dependent and endogenous to market prices, which makes
it technically impossible to analyze differences in behavior resulting from reduced self-
control in our homogeneous markets. Therefore, we wanted a condition in which traders
under both conditions are active at the same time. It allows us to assess differences in
trading behavior and performance between MIXLO traders and MIXHI traders. Second,
since in real-world settings – either due to dispositional differences or due to differential
previous demands on self-control resources – it is likely that individuals high and low in
self-control interact, we want so see whether the effect of reduced self-control observed in
LOWSC markets can be replicated with a smaller share of depleted traders in MIXED
markets.
We conducted eight additional sessions with 16 markets in April 2014 and November 2015.
In the last four sessions we added several questions to the experimental questionnaires
dealing with participants’ emotions. We were interested whether our variation of self-
control had taken effect via changes in emotional states. In order to reduce experimenter
demand effects and as is common in experiments analyzing emotions, we confronted sub-
jects with several emotions of which some were not relevant at all to our question of
interest. Apart from the assignment to the respective version of the Stroop task within
a market and the additional questions in the questionnaires of the last four sessions,
the experimental protocol remained exactly the same as in Experiment I. Experimental
participants were not aware of the different versions of the Stroop task, i.e. they were
unaware of the fact that half of the traders performed the tough version and half of the
traders the easy version.
1.5.2 Aggregate Price Evolution
Figure 1.5 shows the evolution of average trading prices in all three treatments of Ex-
periment I and II. Interestingly, the effect of reduced self-control on mispricing and over-
pricing does not seem to be changed if only part of the trader population is self-control
depleted. Both LOWSC and MIXED on average display more overpricing than HIGHSC.
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Figure 1.5: Trading Price Evolution Including MIXED
For MIXED we observe an average RAD of 0.551 and an average RD of 0.430. A Mann-
Whitney test confirms that the mispricing measure RAD in MIXED is significantly dif-
ferent from HIGHSC (p = 0.0500) but cannot be statistically distinguished from LOWSC
(p = 0.8065). This result also holds for our overpricing measure: RD in MIXED differs
significantly from HIGHSC (p = 0.0864), but not from LOWSC (p = 0.5006).22
Figure 1.6 illustrates the evolution of mean trading prices for the 16 individual markets
in the MIXED condition. Qualitatively, we get similar results as in LOWSC. That is, in
some of these markets prices exhibit a hump-shaped development, initially increasing and
peaking in some intermediate period. Thus already the presence of a moderate share of
traders with depleted self-control abilities is sufficient to reproduce the excess overpricing
we observed when all traders’ self-control levels were depleted.
1.5.3 Differences in Trading Behavior and Outcomes
Trading Behavior
Differences in market outcomes in the MIXED condition compared to HIGHSC markets
must result from different actions of MIXLO traders. However, when analyzing trading
22The results of these comparisons also hold when looking at quantity- or trade-adjusted mean prices.
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Figure 1.6: Price Evolution in Individual Markets in MIXED
behavior, distinguishing cause and effect is particularly difficult, as already mentioned
earlier. A particular deviation in behavior by some traders in the early phases of a market
might shift behavior of other (non-depleted) traders. We therefore start by focusing on the
very first trading period, where dependencies are less relevant than in later periods. Table
1.2 compares several variables concerning trading activity between MIXLO and MIXHI
traders. Remember that we conduct all statistical tests based on the most conservative
definition of independence (the market level), and hence significant effects are usually
associated with large absolute differences.
According to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests MIXLO traders make significantly lower bids
initially (p = 0.035) and post these bids earlier than their non-depleted peers (p = 0.017).
They are also quicker in posting their first bid at the beginning of the period (p = 0.048).
While not significant, there also seems to be the tendency that MIXLO traders (while
bidding low) ask for a higher price than the MIXHI traders (p = 0.196). After period one,
these differences vanish, suggesting that non-depleted traders start imitating the behavior
of self-control depleted traders.23 The averages in Table 1.2 suggest an initially stronger
activity of MIXLO traders, trying to buy lower and sell higher than MIXHI traders. From
23Results for period two are reported in table A.8 of the appendix indicating that these initial trading
differences disappear, while MIXLO traders display significantly higher asking prices in period 2.
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Table 1.2: First Period Differences in Trading Behavior
Group Mean
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
pbid 36.377 28.487 0.035**
pask 49.931 54.478 0.196
qbid 16.109 17.788 0.660
qask 14.389 15.202 0.796
timebid 60.425 47.000 0.017**
timeask 50.230 50.383 0.796
firsttimebid 51.517 39.846 0.048**
firsttimeask 34.635 34.435 0.959
Note: Variables starting with a p denote prices, q
quantities and time variables refer to the time passed
in the current period, thus lower values indicate be-
havior earlier on. bid and ask refer to posted bids
and asks, p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
with data collapsed on market and treatment level,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
trading period two on, however, their behavior has incited non-depleted traders to behave
similarly and hence set many markets on an entirely different trajectory.
Table 1.3: Rank Correlations of First Period Behavior with Overpricing
ρ p-value
pbid 0.436 0.104
pask 0.488 0.055*
qbid 0.486 0.066*
qask -0.229 0.393
timebid -0.607 0.016**
timeask 0.262 0.327
firsttimebid -0.421 0.118
firsttimeask 0.079 0.770
Note: Rank correlations of average first-period be-
havior over all market participants with average rela-
tive deviation over periods 2-10 for MIXED markets,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.3 presents evidence that the observed differences in first period behavior between
our treated and non-treated traders are also those behaviors that are correlated with later
overpricing. While Table 1.2 has shown that low-self control traders bid earlier in period
one and also post their first bid significantly earlier, Table 1.3 shows that markets in
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which bidding occurs early in period one, are those that exhibit more overpricing over the
course of the experiment.
Profits
On average, MIXLO traders earned e 8.16, and MIXHI traders earned e 7.84 on the
experimental asset market – a difference that is not significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.9794). We consider this as evidence that inhibited self-control abilities af-
fect overpricing, but that depleted traders are not necessarily driven out of the market.
Instead, as shown previously, they might goad non-depleted traders into speculative be-
havior, making everyone end up with similar profits. While this suggests that a lack of
self-control abilities is not necessarily detrimental to trading performance, it shows how
negative the effect can be for markets on which traders potentially imitate each other’s
behavior.
1.5.4 Increased Emotional Reactivity
In the experimental sessions that we conducted in November 2015, we asked participants
a number of questions relating to their emotional experience during the asset market. In
particular, we asked participants to rate how strongly they felt a number of emotions at
the beginning of the first period and at the end of the last period, respectively. We asked
participants at the end of the experiment, requiring them to recollect their emotions.24
Table 1.4 reports the results for those emotions that have previously been connected to
overpricing in experimental asset markets (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2011; Andrade
et al., 2015; Lahav and Meer, 2012; Breaban and Noussair, 2013). Note that we collapsed
all the emotional measures on the treatment group level within each market and test
for differences with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Strikingly, the intensity of every single
measure of experienced emotions is higher in the MIXLO than in the MIXHI group, with
many measures being statistically significant. At the beginning of period 1, MIXLO par-
ticipants report to feel borderline significantly more surprise (p = 0.103) and significantly
more joy (p = 0.058). Remember that Lahav and Meer (2012) found that inducing pos-
itive mood before trading leads to higher deviations from fundamental values and thus
24We also provided participants with a questionnaire regarding their trading behavior which we do not
report here. The average responses to all the emotion-related questions and the test statistics can be
found in Table A.4 of the appendix. Average values for changes in emotions over time can be found in
Table A.5.
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larger levels of overpricing and that correlational studies also suggest such a relationship
(Breaban and Noussair, 2013; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2011). Furthermore, at the end
of the final trading period, MIXLO traders report significantly higher levels of excitement,
fear and surprise than MIXHI participants (all p < 0.05).
We also asked participants in the post-experimental questionnaire explicitly about how
strongly they felt their behavior was driven by emotions and how much they had tried
to suppress the influence of emotions on their trading behavior (see final panel of 1.4).
Even though the difference in averages goes in the expected direction, given the responses
to the questions on experienced emotions, they fail to reach significance on conventional
levels. The results indicate that the behavior of the traders with depleted self-control
abilities might have been driven by emotional factors to a larger degree than they were
aware of themselves.
Table 1.4: Ex-post Reported Emotions of Traders in MIXED
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
Beginning of the First Period
Excitement 4.200 4.500 0.400
Fear 2.100 2.175 0.395
Surprise 3.600 4.050 0.103
Joy 3.625 4.375 0.058*
End of the Last Period
Excitement 3.425 4.200 0.042**
Fear 1.900 2.575 0.014**
Surprise 2.450 3.400 0.030**
Joy 3.375 4.125 0.207
Self-Evaluation of Emotional Reactivity
Emotion driven 2.475 2.725 0.362
Suppressed emotions 5.300 4.950 0.205
Note: Data collapsed on the treatment level per market; responses
were on 7 point Likert scales; test results fromWilcoxon Signed Rank
tests; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.5.5 Reduced Cognitive Control
Experiment I did not show a direct effect of the Stroop task on incentivized CRT perfor-
mance. Condition MIXED gives us the possibility to look at the issue again, in particular
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at the association between CRT, the treatment (MIXLO and MIXHI ), and performance
in terms of profits.
Previous research has shown that CRT scores correlate positively with individual partici-
pants’ profits in similar experiments (Corgnet et al., 2014; Noussair et al., 2014). Toplak
et al. (2011) find that CRT scores are correlated with measures of cognitive ability, think-
ing disposition and executive functioning. Thus, we can interpret the CRT score as a
measure of cognitive control. In order to check whether the effect of CRT performance
on profits is similar here, we ran additional regressions which we report in table 1.5. Note
that we excluded participants who had indicated that they knew at least one of the CRT
questions at the end of the experiment. The knowledge of CRT questions before the
experiment might have driven up correct CRT responses and might thus obfuscate any
interaction effects between treatment and CRT scores.25
In specification (1) we reproduce the finding that there is no statistically significant dif-
ference between the profits of traders in MIXLO and MIXHI. Specification (2) confirms
findings from earlier studies that higher CRT scores are positively related to higher overall
profits for both MIXLO and MIXHI. However, when we separate this effect by treatment
by including an interaction of the MIXLO dummy with the CRT score, we obtain a larger
effect of the CRT score on profits for MIXHI traders, while for MIXLO traders the ef-
fect of CRT scores on profits is significantly smaller (p < 0.05) and in fact cannot be
distinguished from zero overall (post-estimation Wald test, p = 0.43).
Thus, MIXLO subjects’ trading seems to be relying less on their underlying ability for
cognitive control. Together with the results indicating higher emotional valence and
reactivity, this suggests an interpretation of trading behavior of MIXLO participants
as relatively more relying on impulsive system 1 processes than on reflective system 2
processes (Kahneman, 2011).
1.6 Discussion
We observe a strong main effect of self-control depletion on overpricing in both experi-
ments. The difference in overpricing cannot be explained by a change in risk attitudes or
a simple change in cognitive abilities. Experiment II gives us additional power to assess
potential explanations for the excess overpricing after self-control depletion.
2572 subjects in MIXED markets reported to know at least one of the CRT questions.
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Table 1.5: Determinants of Profits in MIXED
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profit
MIXLO 1.036 1.040 4.342* 4.301*
(0.770) (0.795) (2.222) (2.215)
CRT 1.084** 1.882*** 1.757**
(0.497) (0.621) (0.691)
CE 0.473 0.867 0.685
(0.550) (0.768) (0.753)
CRT × MIXLO -1.660** -1.547**
(0.642) (0.690)
CE × MIXLO -1.031 -1.051
(1.125) (1.098)
Female -1.381
(0.888)
Constant 7.035*** 5.302*** 3.936*** 5.326***
(0.441) (1.097) (1.323) (1.638)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R2 0.016 0.079 0.120 0.145
Note: Participants who indicated to know at least one of the CRT ques-
tions excluded; robust standard errors clustered on the market level in
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
First, there are differences in trading behavior. Self-control depleted traders trade slightly
less on average, and their initial trading behavior shows potential patterns of speculative
trading. For instance, the fact that self-control depleted traders post bids significantly
earlier supports the notion that their behavior is driven by a higher degree of impulsivity
than the behavior of non-depleted traders. In an environment in which early activity
and speculation is potentially imitated by others on the market, not much is needed
to set a market on an overpricing trajectory. Notably, trading behavior is strongly path-
dependent in experimental asset markets, and the evolution of prices follow different forms
and different timings on different markets. We could have presented additional empirical
evidence for effects of self-control depletion on trading behavior and trading strategies,
but such evidence requires assumptions that are somewhat arbitrary. Hence, we decided
to present fewer analyses and only those in whose robustness we are confident.
Second, there are differences in the reported intensity of emotions and relevance of emo-
tions. Due to existing findings, initial differences before the opening of the asset market
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(and after the Stroop task) are one channel via which depleted self-control could have
affected overpricing. Apart from the pre-market emotional state, differential emotional
reactions during the market could be driving our results. Emotion regulation has been
shown to draw on self-control resources (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010). We
have evidence that participants displayed more intense emotional states, in particular at
the end of the asset market. We interpret our treatment effect as the result of an increased
sensitivity towards emotions triggered by self-control depletion. Our effect is in line with
the literature on self-control depletion. For example, Bruyneel et al. (2006) have shown
that people whose self-control has been reduced rely more on affective and less on cogni-
tive features in product choice. Similarly, in our setting traders with low self-control levels
could rely more heavily on affective features of the asset, e.g. the thrill from its recent
price increase or from speculation, than on cognitive features, e.g. the knowledge that
the fundamental value of the stock is decreasing. Thus emotional responses could be re-
sponsible for more myopic decision making, a higher level of overconfidence/overoptimism
(Michailova and Schmidt, 2016), and more speculative trading.
Third, cognitive abilities could be different after the two versions of the Stroop task.
However, the issue is not as straightforward as we expected. For our sample, we cannot
provide evidence on a direct impact of the treatment on CRT performance. This might
be because the monetary incentives to do well in the CRT are relatively high, and it is
well-known that people can temporarily overcome self-control problems if the motivation
is sufficient (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003; Vohs et al., 2012). However, there is evidence
in our data for an indirect effect of self-control depletion on cognitive abilities. We find
that the CRT carries predictive power for traders’ profits, but only if their self-control
has not been depleted previously.
There are additional explanations that we cannot pin down fully and have to leave for ver-
ification in future research. Self-control depleted traders, for instance, report significantly
higher levels of surprise after the last period of the market. This could be an indication for
a reinforcement of myopic behavior when being self-control depleted. Another candidate
explanation for our treatment effect is a problem to stop, i.e. to sell early enough and
not to stick too long to the expectation of a future price rise. Self-control depletion could
lead to a reluctance to sell an asset whose price is rising. Similarly, it could lead to undue
overoptimism.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide causal empirical evidence for the notion that a lack of self-
control can fuel overpricing on asset markets. We consider experimental continuous double
auction markets for which Smith et al. (1988) first reported a tendency for overpricing. We
exogenously reduce market participants’ ability to exert self-control using a tough version
of the Stroop task, which has previously been shown to deplete people’s ability to exert
self-control in subsequent tasks (Baumeister et al., 1998). Comparing two market settings
in which either everyone’s or no one’s self-control was reduced, we observe significantly
more mispricing and overpricing as the result of a reduction in self-control abilities than
without this reduction.
Self-control depletion affects trading behavior and the perception of the trades and market
outcomes. We provide evidence that in markets populated by self-control depleted and
non-depleted traders initial trading strategies of the former show more signs of speculative
behavior than of the latter. However, the evidence is not entirely conclusive. Trading is
path-dependent on experimental asset markets, and it is difficult to pin down the ex-
act reasons for overpricing to emerge without making arbitrary assumptions. We do not
observe a performance difference between traders with depleted self-control and traders
with full self-control abilities, suggesting that low self-control traders might not be driven
out of the market, but rather incite other traders to engage in speculative trading. In
addition, we have evidence for an emotional channel that explains our main result. Self-
control depleted traders show stronger emotions, in general, but in particular stronger
emotions that have been linked to overpricing in previous studies that induce emotions
or that measure emotions while trading. Finally, we find that our measure for cognitive
skills loses predictive power for the profits of low self-control traders. This might indicate
that even though cognitive skills seem unaffected by self-control depletion (as are risk
attitudes), different cognitive processes play a role in traders with low self-control levels.
These results are in line with a dual systems perspective of self-control: self-control de-
pleted participants seem to have acted more on the basis of emotions and less on the basis
of cognition, thus driving up prices.
Our findings have relevant implications: First, with differences in self-control levels, we
add a potentially important explanation to the existing explanations for overpricing on
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asset markets. We have shown that already a moderate number of participants with
low self-control levels are sufficient to more than double the extent of overpricing in
terms of relative deviation from fundamental value. Second, our results can be regarded
as indicative of the role of self-control in markets outside the laboratory – there, both
temporary reductions in self-control as well as the personality trait self-control might play
an important role in determining trading behavior and perception. Self-control might also
be an important attribute on which individuals self-select into trading. However, low self-
control traders might not be as easily exploitable by high self-control traders as one would
think. In our case, they would not have been driven out of the market quickly. Several
practical implications of our results for investing and trading activities come to mind.
Given our findings, investment decisions should not be taken under limited self-control
or willpower conditions. For instance, cognitive load, food or sleep deprivation, and
self-control effort in unrelated domains have been shown to be correlated with limited
self-control abilities. If such conditions are unavoidable, decision aides to sustain self-
control such as commitment devices should prove useful to circumvent the potentially
negative consequences. This might be particularly relevant in fast-paced markets.
Our experiment opens up interesting paths for future research: It would be interesting
to see to what extent our results are robust to changes in alternative market mechanisms
such as call markets and to changes in the fundamental value process such as a constant
fundamental value process, which has been shown to reduce overpricing (Kirchler et al.,
2012). Finally, the role of self-control for traders in markets outside the laboratory re-
mains largely unexplored. One can imagine field experiments or using quasi-experimental
variations of self-control abilities to study decisions of traders on real markets.
CHAPTER 2
The Impact of Self-Control on Investment Decisions
2.1 Introduction
“Success in investing doesn’t correlate with I.Q. once you’re above the level of
25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament
to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.”1
Warren Buffett
Investment guru Warren Buffett regards the ‘temperament to control (...) urges’ as neces-
sary for investing sucessfully. Warren Buffett’s statement matches psychologists’ definition
of self-control: the ability to override or inhibit undesired behavioral tendencies, such as
impulses (Tangney et al., 2004). Interpreted in this way, Warren Buffett seems to suggest
a relationship between self-control abilities and investment behavior.
This paper looks at the causal relationship between state self-control, i.e. temporary
changes in self-control, and two investment biases on the individual level. I find no signif-
icant main effect of exogenously reduced self-control on neither the disposition effect (DE,
cf. Shefrin and Statman, 1985) nor myopic loss aversion (MLA, cf. Benartzi and Thaler,
1995). However, reduced self-control increases traders’ focus on trading fewer different
stocks in the DE task and amplifies framing effects due to MLA. Looking at the dynamics
of investment in the MLA task, behavior under reduced self-control becomes significantly
more dependant on previous outcomes but only if subjects invest and receive feedback
more frequently. Consequently, frequently investing subjects whose self-control has been
depleted become more cautious over time. This finding suggests that a broad investment
1Source: http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_27/b3636006.htm (accessed on March 15, 2016)
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frame, i.e. investing infrequently, can serve as a shield against the influence of short lived
emotions. The evidence in this paper contributes to the growing literature investigating
determinants of heterogeneity in investment biases and indicates that fluctuations in state
self-control have an effect on investment behavior.
The findings of Roy Baumeister and coauthors (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998) indicate that
an initial act of self-control can impair performance in succeeding tasks if these tasks
also require self-control. Based on these findings, subjecting participants to a self-control
demanding task in a first stage allows researchers to assess the effects of self-control
on behavior in a second task. Self-control is needed to regulate behavior in different
dimensions ranging from affective behavior to cognition (Hagger et al., 2010; Kotabe and
Hofmann, 2015). Many of these dimensions are also relevant for financial decision making.
Temporary fluctuations in self-control in financial markets could arise endogenously from
making choices as part of normal market activities or from suppressing emotions connected
with price fluctuations. Alternatively, they could arise exogenously from unrelated private
demands. Psychological studies differentiate between state self control, i.e. temporary
changes in the level of self-control in a person, and trait self-control, i.e. the relatively
stable disposition to exert self-control. Besides the effect of state self-control studied in
the present paper, self-control may also be relevant due to differences in personality traits
between market participants. Schmeichel and Zell (2007) show that both state and trait
self-control have similar effects on behavior.
However, to the best of my knowledge there has been little research into the relationship
between investment behavior and self-control; most of the existing evidence is correla-
tional. Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2011) conduct interviews with traders and senior man-
agers at investment banks focusing on emotions and emotion regulation strategies. They
find pronounced differences in emotion regulation strategies between inexperienced, low-
performing and high performing traders. Similarly, Lo et al. (2005a) conduct a survey on
personality and emotions among participants in an online day trading course. In their
study, traders with more intense emotional reactions to gains and losses exhibit a signif-
icantly worse trading performance. Furthermore, self-assessments of their participants’
strengths and weaknesses suggest self-control as a highly relevant factor for investment
success. The only other experiment which tests the role of self-control in a financial en-
vironment is the study by Kocher et al. (2016a), who manipulate traders’ self-control in
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the bubble market paradigm introduced by Smith et al. (1988). They observe a higher
degree of overpricing in markets if either all or only half the participants’ self-control is
reduced. From these results it seems as if reductions in self-control can have an effect
on aggregate market outcomes possibly by being reinforced through the interaction of
market participants.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2.2 takes a deeper look at the
literature related to the current studies both from economics and psychology, section 2.3
considers experiment 1, while section 2.4 covers experiment 2. I discuss the findings from
both experiments in section 2.5 and conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 Related Literature
The present paper relates to the literature on self-control from economics and psychology.
At the beginning of the sections on each experiment, I summarize research that relates
to each experiment more specifically. Most studies in psychology and many papers in
economics that use the same paradigm refer to the manipulation of self-control used in
this paper as ‘ego depletion’, ‘willpower depletion’ or simply ‘depletion’. I use these terms
interchangeably.
2.2.1 Self-Control in Economics
In recent years, self-control has received considerable attention in behavioral economics,
often as an explanation for time inconsistent decision making. Economic theory has mod-
eled self-control in a number of ways in order to explain observations which are hard to
reconcile with the rational model of (discounted) expected utility maximization (Samuel-
son, 1937; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 2007).2 In these models, a lack of self-control
may cause decisions counteracting long-run interests of an individual, such as addictive
behavior, under-saving and procrastination (Bucciol et al., 2010). Self-control features
prominently in several models: in dual-self models of decision making, where multiple
internal selves with diverging interests interact (e.g. Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Fudenberg
and Levine, 2006), models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, i.e. relative overweighting of
present utility (Laibson, 1997), and the temptation model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001),
2Some of the main departures from this rational decision making view are for example small stakes risk
aversion (Rabin, 2000) and time-inconsistent behavior (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).
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which models self-control failures as cue-triggered mistakes (see also Benhabib and Bisin,
2005; Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Kim, 2006). Lack of self-control may also be connected
with overspending (Heidhues and Koszegi, 2010). More recently, willpower has been ex-
plicitly modeled as an internal depletable resource (see Ali, 2011; Fudenberg and Levine,
2012; Ozdenoren et al., 2012).
Meanwhile, the empirical literature in economics has considered the impact of self-control
on decision making using two sets of methods: 1) self-reported survey measures of self-
control and 2) experiments manipulating self-control. Ameriks et al. (2003) and Ameriks
et al. (2007) look at the connection between wealth accumulation and the ‘propensity to
plan’ and self-control respectively. Both studies attribute heterogeneity in savings and
wealth among households to differences in these measures. Similarly, Gathergood (2012)
uncovers a positive association of lack of self-control and consumer over-indebtedness
in a UK sample. Various areas of economics have adopted the experimental paradigm
of Baumeister et al. (1998) in recent years to evaluate the impact of ego depletion on
economic outcomes, ranging from the impact of self-control on productivity (e.g. Bucciol
et al., 2011, 2013), via time preferences (e.g. Burger et al., 2011; Kuhn et al., 2014) to
social preferences (e.g. Achtziger et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2012).
More closely related to the current paper, self-control manipulations have been found to
have mixed effects on risky decision making. Several studies find increased risk aversion
following ego depletion, in particular in dynamic situations where losses are experienced
immediately (De Langhe et al., 2008; Kostek and Ashrafioun, 2014)3 or when the role of
responsibility for decision making is stressed (Unger and Stahlberg, 2011). On the other
hand, several studies also find an increase in risk taking following ego depletion. This
pattern seems to be in particular present in one shot choices (Bruyneel et al., 2009; Friehe
and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2014), questionnaire results and the balloon anaolgue risk task
(both in Freeman and Muraven, 2010). Both Stojić et al. (2013) and Gerhardt et al.
(2015) find no significant effect of ego depletion on risk preferences elicited from choice
lists based on the procedure by Holt and Laury (2002). Finally, considering the interaction
of framing effects with ego depletion, De Haan and Van Veldhuizen (2015) do not detect
an effect of ego depletion on performance in several framed tasks: a prisoner’s dilemma,
an attraction effect task, a compromise effect task, and an anchoring task.
3Note that none of these studies systematically look at the effect of ego depletion on loss aversion.
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2.2.2 Ego Depletion in Psychology
An extensive body of research in psychology shows that self-control is needed to keep
a check on certain impulses. This ability deteriorates after self-control effort has been
exerted. Research on self-control was sparked off by Walter Mischel and coauthors (see e.g.
Mischel et al., 1989) and has recently experienced a surge in attention, partly motivated
by the work of Roy Baumeister and co-authors (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998). Baumeister
et al. (1998) introduced the dual task paradigm to look at the effect of an initial ‘depletion’
stage on a dependent measure in a second stage. Following up on these results, research
considering ego depletion has mushroomed in recent years.4 Initially, the ‘strength model’
of self-control, which posits that self-control works like a muscle, seemed to be a good fit
due to a number of findings: self-control regenerates through rest (Tyler and Burns, 2008),
can be trained by regular exercise (Muraven et al., 1999), considerably differs between
individuals (Tangney et al., 2004) and can be replenished via glucose intake (Masicampo
and Baumeister, 2008).
However, this model cannot accommodate a number of more recent findings: first of all,
ego depletion can be overcome by giving financial incentives (Muraven and Slessareva,
2003) and by inducing positive mood (Tice et al., 2007). Furthermore, merely gurgling
a glucose laden drink is already sufficient to reverse the effects of ego depletion (Molden
et al., 2012). Finally, believing that self-control acts as a limited resource predicts whether
participants are susceptible to the ego depletion effect (Job et al., 2010). Due to this recent
evidence, the ‘process model’ of self-control has emerged which distinguishes between
motivational and attentional factors as responsible for ego depletion effects (Inzlicht and
Schmeichel, 2012).
However, apart from increasing support for the concept of state self-control, studies on
ego depletion effects have received a considerable amount of criticism recently. Carter
and McCullough (2014) found evidence for publication bias in studies on ego depletion
by correcting for small study effects. Xu et al. (2014) fail to replicate the depletion effect
using a typical dual task setting in four separate studies.
4Inzlicht and Schmeichel (2012) mention more than 100 experiments; for an overview, see the meta
study by Hagger et al. (2010) which is based on 198 experiments.
46 Self-Control and Investment Decisions
2.3 Experiment 1: The Disposition Effect
The disposition effect (DE) can be defined as the propensity to sell winners – i.e. stocks
that have gained in price relative to some reference price – too early and to ride losers –
stocks that have lost in price – for too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). It constitutes
a violation of expected utility maximization, since the historical price at which an asset
was acquired should not play a role for the decision to sell it. Shefrin and Statman (1985)
explain the presence of the DE with four major elements – mental accounting, regret
aversion, self-control and tax considerations.
The possible impact of self-control on the DE can be illustrated with the help of the
idea of realization utility formalized by Ingersoll and Jin (2013) and Barberis and Xiong
(2012): investors receive bursts of utility (disutility) right at the moment of selling an
asset for a gain (loss) additionally to consumption utility. The DE arises from trading
off long-run portfolio performance and short-term realization utility, e.g. realizing a loss
is painful in the short-term, but pays off in the long-run because an inferior asset is sold.
In this framework, self-control problems can affect discounting or the relative strength
of utility vs. disutility bursts, i.e. loss aversion. In the former case, participants become
more present-biased or more impatient in a state of low self-control, in other words they
care more about present utility bursts and therefore speed up realizing gains and postpone
realizing losses. In the latter case, a state of low self-control increases loss aversion due
to more pronounced emotional reactions, or to put it differently it reinforces the negative
utility bursts from realizing losses relative to the utility bursts from realizing gains, making
realizing losses more aversive and postponing their realization more attractive.
2.3.1 Related Literature
Shefrin and Statman (1985) provide the first formal presentation of the DE hypothesis
and suggest a theoretical framework. Three influential papers are among the first to
convincingly confirm the DE: Odean (1998) rigorously analyzes the DE establishing its
presence in a sample of 10.000 accounts from a large discount brokerage, while Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001) find strong evidence for the DE in a comprehensive sample of all
stock market investors in Finland. Weber and Camerer (1998) develop the experimental
task for the DE that I use in the current experiment. In their setting, Bayesian updating
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of expectations would imply holding on to winning stocks and selling off losers. Thus,
displaying the DE is a clear mistake. Nevertheless, subjects in this study behave in line
with the DE. However, when shares are automatically sold after each period, the DE is
greatly reduced.
Several studies have looked at factors responsible for heterogeneity in the DE, both exper-
imentally and using market data. Professional investors seem to suffer from the DE to a
lower degree (Shapira and Venezia, 2001), which is in line with the finding that measures
of a trader’s sophistication correlate negatively with the DE (Feng and Seasholes, 2005;
Dhar and Zhu, 2006). Trading experience reduces the DE both in repeated trading ex-
periments (Weber and Welfens, 2007) as well as following repeated investment decisions
in real stock markets (Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006). Frydman and
Rangel (2014) experimentally show that the DE is responsive to the saliency of a stock’s
purchasing price. Finally, commitment devices in the form of stop loss and take gain or-
ders can reduce the scope of the DE (Fischbacher et al., 2015), which can be interpreted
as indirect evidence that (lack of) self-control plays an important role for the disposition
effect.
2.3.2 Design
First, participants are randomly allocated to participate in two different versions of the
letter-e-task5 (Baumeister et al., 1998). I refer to participants with the difficult version
of this task as Low SC participants and to participants with the easy version as High SC
participants respectively. In what follows participants trade assets in the DE task (Weber
and Camerer, 1998). Finally, they fill out a number of control tasks including: the
cognitive reflection test (CRT, cf. Frederick, 2005), choice lists to elicit risk preferences
and loss attitude (Tanaka et al., 2010), financial literacy questions (Van Rooij et al.,
2011), the short self-control scale of Tangney et al. (2004) and a number of socioeconomic
questions.
The Letter-E-Task
The letter-e-task (Baumeister et al., 1998) is one of the most commonly used and most
effective tasks in the literature on ego depletion (Hagger et al., 2010). We use a com-
puterized German version lasting 7.5 minutes closely resembling the one in Sripada et al.
5A translation of the instructions can be found in appendix B.3.
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(2014). Participants are shown one word on a screen for 3 seconds and have to classify it
according to a specific rule into one of two categories. They do so by pressing or refraining
from pressing the ‘e’ button on their keyboard within the 3 seconds. In the no-regulation
version, participants have to press the ‘e’ button if the word contains the letter ‘e’. Par-
ticipants in this condition are referred to as High SC participants, as their self-control
capacities should not be impacted by the task (Baumeister et al., 1998). In the regulation
version, participants are given a more complicated rule: they have to press the ‘e’ button
if the word contains the letter ‘e’, but only if the ‘e’ is not either immediately next to
or one more letter away from another vowel. Therefore, when participants see the letter
‘e’ they have to override their first impulse to press the ‘e’ button and check, whether
there is another vowel up to two letters away from the ‘e’. This exertion of self-control
to override a dominant impulse impacts their ability to exert self-control in the exper-
iment later on (Baumeister et al., 1998). Participants in this treatment are referred to
as Low SC participants in the following. Participants from both treatment groups are
shown exactly the same words in a fixed random order: 30 words containining no ‘e’,
60 containining an ‘e’ but with another vowel closeby, and 60 containing an ‘e’ with no
other vowel closeby. Table 2.1 gives a hypothetical example for the classification of three
English words for each treatment. Directly after the letter-e-task, participants have to
evaluate as how strainful and difficult they perceived the task and how frustrated and
tired they feel on a 7-point Likert scale. To avoid wealth effects, participants receive a
flat payment of e 3.00 for this task.6
Table 2.1: Examples of Classifications in the Letter-E-Task
High SC Low SC
plastic 7 7
business 3 7
trouble 3 3
Note: 3(7) corresponds to (not)
pressing the ‘e’ button
The Disposition Effect Task
Our DE task closely resembles the adaptation of Weber and Welfens (2007) of the DE
task in Weber and Camerer (1998). Participants are given an initial endowment of 2,000
points – equivalent to e 10.00 – and observe the price movements of six different goods
6Note that Achtziger et al. (2011) test whether different incentive schemes during the depletion stage
have a differential effect on ego depletion and find no difference between flat and piece rate incentives.
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over three initial periods. Subsequently, they can buy and sell these goods over 14 periods.
In the last period, subjects see their final portfolio of goods which is then automatically
sold at its current price. The proceeds are added to the cash holdings and paid out to
the participants at the end of the experiment.
The prices of goods move from period to period according to a random process. The
price of every good either increases by 6% or decreases by 5% each period. This upward-
moving price path incentivizes participants to actively trade goods (Weber and Welfens,
2007). Short selling and borrowing are not allowed. In the initial period, all goods start
off at the same price of 100 points. Goods differ only by their underlying probability of
a price change, which is held constant. Each good i is given exactly one of the following
probabilities of a price increase: pi ∈ {65%, 55%, 50%, 50%, 45%, 35%}. The order of
the probabilities as well as the actual price realizations are randomly allocated to goods
across pairs of subjects. Thus, two subjects in each session – one Low SC and one High
SC subject – always receive the same price path, so that we can directly compare their
behavior, but at the same time we avoid finding an effect which might be specific to a
specific price path. The mechanics of the price movements are common knowledge, but
subjects need to infer each good’s probability of a price increase by observing the realized
price paths.
In order to determine which asset has the highest probability of a price increase, Bayesian
updating requires subjects to count the number of price increases of each good, which
corresponds to ordering goods according to their current price. Therefore, a risk neutral
agent’s optimal strategy would lead to the opposite of the DE – selling off assets that have
previously lost in value and keeping assets that have previously gained in value. Hence,
the DE is a mistake in this environment (Weber and Camerer, 1998).
Our design differs fromWeber andWelfens (2007) in a couple of points: First, subjects give
their expectations about the probabilities of a price increase of each good at the beginning
of three periods – the first trading period, the 7th trading period and the last trading
period. They allocate each of the six probabilities to exactly one good and receive 20 points
for each correctly allocated expectation at the end of the experiment. Due to missing
responses for a number of participants who failed to make an input within the allowed
time at least once, the answers from the expectations subtask are not further evaluated
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here.7. Secondly, in order to avoid long waiting times and to prevent the depletion effect
from differentially wearing off across subjects, participants proceed automatically to the
next period after the time allocated to the current period runs out. Participants have 20
seconds time to observe prices in non-trading periods, 40 seconds in trading periods and
an additional 90 seconds for entering their expectations. Thirdly, to ensure understanding
of the trading environment, participants complete three practicing tasks without a time
limit and have to answer 7 multiple choice questions about the goods market correctly
before the self-control manipulation in part 1 starts.
Additional Measures
After part 2, further experimental measures8 are collected: First, participants answer the
three questions of the CRT (Frederick, 2005) without incentivization. Then participants
receive two sets of incentivized choice lists on two separate screens to measure risk pref-
erences and loss aversion adapted from Tanaka et al. (2010). The switching point to the
right option among the 11 choices on the first screen identifies risk preferences and the
switching point to the right among the seven choices on the second screen identifies loss
aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) with later switches to the right option on each
screen implying higher degrees of risk aversion and loss aversion respectively. One of these
18 choices is randomly determined for payout and simulated at the end of the experiment.
Thirdly, subjects answer five financial literacy questions adapted from Van Rooij et al.
(2011) receiving e 0.20 for each correct response. At the end of the experiment, subjects
fill out two sets of questionnaires: first the 13 items of the brief self-control scale on a
7-point Likert scale (Tangney et al., 2004) and then a number of socio-economic questions.
Procedure and Sample Size
In order to avoid restoration of self-control capacities on the one hand (Tyler and Burns,
2008) and information overload on the other hand, instructions to the experiment are
handed out and read to participants in two blocks: first we do so for the letter-e-task
and the disposition effect task and then, after the completion of these two parts of the
761 out of 142 participants missed at least one expectation elicitation, 25 in the Low SC condition and
36 in the High SC condition. This difference is significant according to a χ2 test (p = 0.062) Comparing
the sum of absolute differences between the prescription of Bayesian updating and the actual expectation
inputs for those subjects who made all inputs yields no significant differences between the treatments
(Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.8899).
8The interested reader may refer to appendix B.1 for a more extensive explanation of these measures
and for the rationale behind including them.
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experiment, for the rest of the experiment. After each part of the instructions, participants
can ask questions in private.
Sessions were implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We conducted the sessions in December 2014 and January
20159 at MELESSA in Munich. Both treatments were conducted within the same session
by giving different on-screen instructions for the letter-e-task. Sessions lasted about 90
minutes and participants earned e 20.55 on average including a show-up fee of e 4.00.
A total of 142 participants equally split between the two treatments took part in six
experimental sessions. This sample size allows me to detect the average effect size d = 0.62
(Cohen’s d) of studies on ego depletion contained in the meta analysis of Hagger et al.
(2010) with 95.6% probability and an effect of size d = 0.474 with 80.0% probability.
Only 6 of the 198 studies contained in Hagger et al. (2010) exceed this sample size, which
might help to alleviate small-study concerns (e.g. in Carter and McCullough, 2014).
2.3.3 Results
Table B.3 in the appendix reports manipulation checks of the treatment by comparing cor-
rrectly classified words in the letter-e-task and the subjective measures asked immediately
after the letter-e-task and at the end of the experiment between treatments. According to
Mann-Whitney U-Tests (MWU) participants in the Low SC condition classified about 10
words less than those in High SC correctly (MWU, p < 0.01), experienced the task to be
significantly more straining, more difficult and were more frustrated after the task (MWU,
all p < 0.01). Neither tiredness nor measures for mood were significantly impacted by the
task.10
The Disposition Effect
I apply the measurement of the disposition effect according to Odean (1998) based on the
number of each asset sold at a gain or a loss with respect to a reference price. For this
purpose, I relate actual sales to selling opportunities at a gain or loss, where gains and
losses are measured with respect to the weighted average purchase price (WAPP) of an
9The times of each session are summarized in table B.2 of the appendix.
10One of the subjects in Low SC seems not to have complied with the letter-e-task having pressed
the ‘e’ button only 14 times throughout the task. All the results reported in this section are robust to
excluding this participant from the analysis.
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asset.11 This ensures that the results are not affected by a lack of selling opportunities
at a gain or loss. Proportion of gains realized (PGR), proportion of losses realized (PLR)
and the disposition effect measure (DE) are calculated in the following way:
PGR = # of sales at gain# of selling opportunities at gain (2.1)
PLR = # of sales at loss# of selling opportunities at loss (2.2)
DE = PGR− PLR (2.3)
DE is the difference between the percentage of gains realized and the percentage of losses
realized and lies in the interval [−1, 1]. If an investor sells every position as soon as the
price exceeds the purchasing price, i.e. PGR = 1, and keeps all the assets that have lost
in value, i.e. PLR = 0, DE will take the value of 1. If an investor immediately exits every
losing position and keeps all the positions that have gained in price, the DE measure will
take the value of −1. Higher values of DE thus correspond to an investor displaying the
disposition effect to a higher degree.
First, I reproduce the presence of the disposition effect. Figure 2.1 shows the DE measures
including 95% confidence intervals for each treatment. Table 2.2 tests the presence of the
disposition effect by comparing the DE measure to 0 indicating that there is a weakly
higher tendency in the overall sample and in the two treatment groups to sell winners
more frequently than losers. Note that due to Bayesian updating a risk-neutral investor
should sell losers more frequently than winners. Depending on the specific price path,
rationality implies a negative optimal value of DE. Thus, comparing the DE measure to
0 is a conservative test of the presence of the disposition effect.
Secondly, I compare the size of DE between High SC and Low SC participants. Figure
2.2 compares the individual DE measures of the two participants that saw an identical
11Results are not sensitive to using the alternative reference prices of highest purchase price, lowest
purchase price, first purchase price or most recent purchase price. Additonally, results are not sensitive
to using amounts of each asset traded or just the number of times an investor sells at gains or losses (i.e.
quantity weighted or trade weighted measures).
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price development, thus controlling for heterogeneous effects of price paths.12 If the Low
SC treatment had a positive impact on the DE measure, the points in figure 2.2 would
lie to the right of the 45◦ line more frequently, which is not the case. Wilcoxon signed-
rank (WSR) tests reported in table 2.3 confirm for each of the components of the DE
measure as well as for the number of shares traded that there are no statistically significant
differences between Low SC and High SC participants.
Heterogeneity:
There is no evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects on different subgroups: Regres-
sions of the DE measure on various explanatory variables and their interaction term with
a dummy for the Low SC treatment in table B.5 of the appendix, as well as MWU tests
for subgroups in table B.6 and table B.7 confirm that there is also no heterogeneity in the
treatment effect based on CRT scores of participants or based on the Self-Control-Scores
(SCS) of participants. Thus, this null result is not driven by opposing effects for different
subsamples.
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Figure 2.1: Disposition Effect Measure by Treatment
Table 2.2: Presence of the Disposition Effect
Mean PLR Mean PGR Mean DE #DE > 0 #DE ≤ 0 p-value
All 0.166 0.239 0.078 82 57 0.023**
High SC 0.173 0.235 0.062 43 28 0.096*
Low SC 0.158 0.244 0.095 39 29 0.154
Note: p-values from binomial tests with H0 : p(DE > 0) = 0.5; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
12For 3 participants – all of them in the Low SC treatment – no DE measure could be calculated,
because they never had any loss opportunities, thus the data for three pairs of participants is lost when
I look at the paired data.
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Figure 2.2: Paired Disposition Effect Measures across Treatments
Table 2.3: Effect of Self-Control Manipulation on Disposition Effect Measures
High SC Low SC p-value
PLR 0.173 0.158 0.925
PGR 0.235 0.244 0.733
DE 0.062 0.095 0.625
shares traded 46.197 48.901 0.470
Note: Disposition Effect measures based on weighted
average purchase price (WAPP); p-values from two-
sided paired Wilcoxon Signed Rank (WSR) tests
with participants matched by price path
Trade Clustering
In the exploratory analysis reported here, I consider the trade clustering (TC ) measure
suggested as a measure of endogenous narrow bracketing by Kumar and Lim (2008).
Using discount brokerage data they find that investors who execute trades in a more
clustered way exhibited weaker disposition effects and held better diversified portfolios,
presumably because they consider trades executed on the same day together rather than
separately. I look at a measure of narrow bracketing because some of the previous effects
of ego depletion on economic outcomes (e.g. Kocher et al., 2016a) could be the result of
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an increase in narrow bracketing, i.e. of a higher tendency to consider decisions separately
from each other. TC can be calculated by using the following equation:
TC = 1− # of trading periods# of distinct trades (2.4)
I define trading periods as periods in which participants execute trades and distinct trades
as the sum of the number of distinct assets that a subject traded per period over all periods.
Here, TC can lie in the range13 [0, 56 ]. If a subject executes distinct trades only in separate
periods, i.e. # of distinct trades = # of trading periods, this measure takes the value 0.
The more distinct trades a subject executes per trading period on average, the higher TC
will be. Given the presence of risk aversion, it is impossible to compare TC to its optimal
level and to compare deviations from this optimal level between participants. Therefore,
I concentrate on the raw measure.14
Figure 2.3 displays mean TC and 95% confidence intervals by treatment on the left and
TC measures paired by participants with the same price path on the right. The left part
of this figure suggests that there is a slight treatment effect, i.e. TC is reduced by the
treatment. The paired graph on the right does not display a clear pattern, even though
the points seem to have a tendency to lie above the 45◦ line. The analyses contained in
table 2.4 confirm that there is a weakly significant difference of nearly 5 percentage points
in TC between High SC and Low SC traders (MWU, p = 0.077), which however becomes
insignificant when exploiting the grouping of traders by price path (WSR, p = 0.226). Low
SC insignificantly reduces the number of distinct trades by roughly 2 (MWU and WSR,
p > 0.1), while the number of trading periods is slightly reduced, but again insignificantly
(MWU and WSR, p > 0.1). Thus, the effect of Low SC on TC seems to be driven by the
combined effect on distinct trades and number of trading periods.
Heterogeneity
Table 2.5 displays results from MWU tests, where participants have been split into three
groups, according to their CRT responses, following the classification suggested in Cueva
13Due to the maximum of 14 trading periods and the maximum of 6 distinct trades that can be executed
per period, I get ¯TC = 1− 1414×6 = 56 for the upper limit.
14In the present context, the optimal level of the TC measure for a risk neutral Bayesian updater is
path dependent and can be easily obtained. Details can be found in appendix B.1. Since the assumption
of risk neutrality is clearly not given in the data and precludes the diversification motive in trading, I
consider it an implausible comparison and do not follow this approach.
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et al. (2016). Participants who gave at least two of the incorrect impulsive15 responses in
the CRT were classified as impulsive, participants who gave at least two correct responses
were classified as reflective, while the third group consists of the residual. It turns out
that the effect of Low SC on TC is only present and significant for the reflective group of
participants, whose TC drops by nearly 14 percentage points from 0.510 to 0.373 (MWU,
p < 0.01), while for the other two groups the effect goes in the opposite direction and is
statistically insignificant.
Table 2.6 reports the results of a similar subgroup analysis for participants who were
grouped according to their tercile in the self-control questionnaire. Directionally, it seems
as if only the participants in the lowest and middle tercile of SCS responses are affected
negatively by the self-control manipulation, while this effect is only marginally significant
for the 2nd tercile (MWU, p = 0.058).
To corroborate these findings and to explore the explanatory value of the additional
measures, I conduct tobit regressions which I report in table 2.7. I use the dummy
variable Low SC taking the value 1 for participants in the Low SC treatment as the main
explanatory variable in these regressions and control for the heterogeneity in price paths
by including price path dummies.16 Furthermore I successively add control variables,
some of which I interact with the Low SC dummy:
• female: dummy taking the value 1 for females
• ln(age): the natural logarithm of age
• CRT : number of correct responses to the CRT questions
• SCS : self-control score from the brief self-control scale
• FLQ score: number of correct responses to the financial literacy questions
• switch LA: switching point on the screen measuring loss aversion
• switch RA: switching point on the screen measuring risk aversion
These regressions confirm the negative effect of the treatment on TC on average (p < 0.05
in specification 1) and furthermore replicate the result that the negative effect of the
15Impulsive responses are 10 for the ball question, 100 minutes for the machine question and 24 for the
water lily question.
16The results are qualitatively similar when excluding the price path dummies.
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treatment on TC is driven by subjects with a higher CRT score: Higher CRT scores are
significantly related to higher degrees of TC in the High SC group (p < 0.1 in specifications
3, 5 and 6, p < 0.05 in specification 4) and significantly negatively correlated with TC in
the Low SC group (p < 0.01 for post estimation Wald tests of H0 : βCRT +βCRT×lowSC = 0
in specifications 3 to 6). SCS and its interaction with the Low SC dummy are not
significantly correlated with TC in these regressions. Similarly, none of the coefficients of
FLQ, switch LA or switch RA is significant.
Overall, there is a weakly significantly negative effect of the self-control manipulation on
trade clustering which seems to be primarily driven by a strong negative effect on highly
reflective individuals.
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Figure 2.3: Trade Clustering Measures across Treatments
Table 2.4: Effect of Self-Control Manipulation on Trade Clustering and Related Measures
p-values
High SC Low SC MWU WSR
TC 0.492 0.447 0.077* 0.226
distinct trades 20.986 18.972 0.357 0.412
trading periods 9.338 9.239 0.910 0.986
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U Tests (MWU)
comparing columns and paired Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests
(WSR) with participants matched by price path respectively;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity of Effect of Self-Control Manipulation on Trade Clustering by
Cognitive (Ir)Reflection
High SC N High Low SC N Low p-value
impulsive 0.490 18 0.500 27 0.926
residual 0.459 19 0.522 12 0.273
reflective 0.510 34 0.373 32 0.001***
Note: impulsive individuals had at least 2 impulsively wrong responses
in the CRT, reflective individuals had at least 2 correct responses; p-
values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
Table 2.6: Heterogeneity of Effect of Self-Control Manipulation on Trade Clustering by
Self-Control Score
High SC N High Low SC N Low p-value
1st tercile 0.470 27 0.428 26 0.407
2nd tercile 0.528 27 0.443 16 0.058*
3rd tercile 0.468 17 0.465 29 0.882
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests; *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Effect on Additional Measures
Finally, in line with the results in Kocher et al. (2016a) and the null results of the effect
of ego depletion on risk preferences elicited from choice lists (Stojić et al., 2013; Gerhardt
et al., 2015), there was no significant effect on the CRT score (MWU, p = 0.485), risk
aversion (MWU, p = 0.616 for switches in the gains list) or loss aversion (MWU, p = 0.352
for switches in the mixed list).17
17Appendix B.1 analyzes the impact of the self-control manipulation on these additional measures in
more depth.
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Table 2.7: Tobit Regressions of Trade Clustering on low SC and other Explanatory
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TC
Low SC -0.0462** -0.0427* 0.0903** -0.0820 -0.0832 -0.0843
(0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0411) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138)
female 0.0308 0.0299 0.0329 0.0340 0.0333
(0.0310) (0.0307) (0.0303) (0.0313) (0.0314)
ln(age) -0.0306 -0.113 -0.131 -0.131 -0.132
(0.0997) (0.0974) (0.0959) (0.0959) (0.0984)
CRT 0.0359* 0.0396** 0.0389* 0.0402*
(0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0197) (0.0204)
CRT × Low SC -0.0941*** -0.0902*** -0.0898*** -0.0911***
(0.0245) (0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0247)
SCS 0.00116 0.00112 0.00116
(0.00176) (0.00178) (0.00180)
SCS × Low SC 0.00296 0.00297 0.00303
(0.00240) (0.00240) (0.00241)
FLQ score 0.00123 0.000909
(0.00946) (0.00954)
switch LA -0.00134
(0.0111)
switch RA 0.00142
(0.00530)
Constant 0.685*** 0.744** 0.928*** 0.890*** 0.890*** 0.883***
(0.0926) (0.315) (0.306) (0.314) (0.314) (0.317)
Price Path Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
σ 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120***
(0.00801) (0.00798) (0.00755) (0.00741) (0.00741) (0.00740)
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142
Note: Low SC is a dummy variable taking te value 1 for the low SC treatment and 0 otherwise; ln(age)
is the natural logarithm of age; SCS stands for self-control score; FLQ stands for financial literacy
questionnaire; switch LA and switch RA denote switching points on the list measuring loss aversion
and risk aversion with later switches (higher values) indicating higher degrees of loss and risk aversion
respectively; standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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2.4 Experiment 2: Myopic Loss Aversion
Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) can arise in dynamic decision making environments, e.g.
when repeatedly deciding whether to invest in an asset or a gamble. It consists of loss
aversion and myopia, and implies that (temporary) losses are weighted more strongly when
presented in a more disaggregated way (cf. Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Thus, presenting
investment decisions in a more disaggregated way (or giving feedback more frequently)
typically results in lower investment levels. Gneezy and Potters (1997) show that people
who repeatedly invest in a specific binary mixed lottery invest higher amounts if they
receive feeback and make their choices less frequently.
Since MLA is a combination of loss aversion and myopia, either of these aspects might
be impacted by self-control: either subject’s negative utility from losing money might be
more pronounced or subject’s tendency to evaluate gambles separately or jointly might
be affected, i.e. subjects might be less likely to think about alternative viewpoints of their
choice. The findings from experiment 1 suggest the latter explanation ex ante.
In the following, I refer to the reduction of decision frequency as a broad (investment)
frame, and to more frequent decisions as a narrow (investment) frame.
2.4.1 Related Literature
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) introduce Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA) consisting of loss
aversion and myopia as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and
Prescott (1985): Salient price drops when frequently evaluating one’s portfolio might cause
stock owners high levels of discomfort. For such disutility, they need to be compensated
by higher equity premiums than suggested by the simple model in Mehra and Prescott
(1985). From an intuitive viewpoint, myopia or narrow bracketing is a prerequisite for
loss aversion in a dynamic context to affect behavior and market prices, since if gambles
would be considered as part of a larger portfolio or integrated with wealth, there would
be hardly any scope for experiencing losses (see also Barberis et al., 2001).
The idea of narrow bracketing builds on the findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
who show that people may make dominated choices when evaluating two pairs of lottery
choices separately rather than jointly. There seems to be a somewhat artificial distinction
in the literature between narrow bracketing and MLA, with the former usually referring to
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a situation of simultaneous decision making and the latter to a dynamic decision making
context. However, MLA can be considered as a special case of narrow bracketing (Read
et al., 1999). Read et al. (1999) provide an overview about narrow bracketing showing that
choice bracketing is an important determinant of behavior in a wide range of contexts.
They discuss factors that determine whether people bracket broadly or narrowly and
assert that there is a lack of knowledge of such factors. Thaler et al. (1997) and Gneezy
and Potters (1997) first experimentally test MLA. In the following, I concentrate on
factors influencing narrow bracketing that have emerged with a focus on the experimental
paradigm of Gneezy and Potters (1997).
There is a number of studies that consider how MLA correlates with subject characteris-
tics. It seems that there is considerable heterogeneity in MLA among different groups of
people, but only few factors that affect the degree of narrow bracketing have been identi-
fied. According to Haigh and List (2005) professional investors react more strongly to an
exogenous change in investment frames than students, which Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010)
replicate using a sample of financial advisers. Glätzle-Rützler et al. (2015) do not detect
the typical MLA pattern in a sample of adolescents.18 Van der Heijden et al. (2012) con-
duct MLA experiments with a large representative sample in the Netherlands and reveal
significantly larger framing effects for more impatient individuals using a measure of time
discounting. The authors speculate that accessibility of information accounts for the con-
nection between the MLA measure and impatience, i.e. that intuitive thinkers both think
less about less accessible consequences in the future as well as about less accessible char-
acteristics of a repeated lottery such as the diversification it entails. Surprisingly, Van der
Heijden et al. (2012) also find larger MLA effects for participants with a CRT score of
at least 2. In the study by Hilgers and Wibral (2014), low maths grades and impulsivity
as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995) are predictive of an
increased MLA effect.
Outside the Gneezy and Potters (1997) paradigm, Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) study
the theoretical and empirical generality of the narrow bracketing result in Tversky and
Kahneman (1981). The data from their experiments indicates a rather unifrom tendency
18One could speculate that these differences might be connected to differences in cognitive abilities,
motivation of the subjects and timing of the experiments: the sessions in schools were always conducted
in class in the morning, while those with traders in Haigh and List (2005) were conducted in the evening
after trading (both from personal communication).
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towards narrow bracketing that does not vary much with observable background charac-
teristics.
Other studies have directly manipulated features of the MLA task. Some authors dis-
entangle the increased investment in the broad investment frame and attribute it to the
effects of feedback frequency and investment horizon. However, they reach somewhat
different conclusions: Fellner and Sutter (2009) find that both feedback frequency and
investment horizon play similar roles, while Langer and Weber (2008) (using a multiplica-
tive version of the MLA task) and Bellemare et al. (2005) attribute the more important
role to investment horizon and feedback frequency respectively. Fellner and Sutter (2009)
also analyze the effect of an endogenous choice of investment frames and how participants
can be ‘nudged’ to remain in the broad investment frame. They find no effect of infor-
mation provision about performance of previous participants, but default setting works
to make subjects remain in the broad frame. Hilgers and Wibral (2014) consider the role
of learning in the MLA paradigm by subjecting participants to two sets of MLA tasks
with a potential switch of investment frame. In their setting, a broad frame increases
investments, but switching to the narrow frame does not reduce them, thus making initial
framing differences disappear in the second set of MLA tasks, if subjects had previously
been in the broad frame. This learning effect is particularly strong for participants clas-
sified as impulsive and for individuals with high cognitive skills.
Using an unincentivized variation of the Gneezy and Potters (1997) paradigm and only
considering the narrow investment frame, De Langhe et al. (2008) find a reduction in
investment levels following ego depletion. Some of the results in Benjamin et al. (2013)
might also indicate a factor impacting narrow bracketing: differences in risk aversion over
small stakes are related to heterogeneity in cognitive abilities. The task they use involves
multiple choices between safe payoffs and 50:50 lotteries and between two 50:50 lotteries.
Importantly, unlike in the standard procedure for choice list experiments (e.g. Holt and
Laury, 2002), all the choices of a participant are paid out. In another part of their study,
Benjamin et al. (2013) manipulate subjects’ cognitive load, which reduces the number of
risk neutral choices.19 It is possible that this effect is driven by the reduced tendency of
participants to jointly evaluate choices under cognitive load.
19Hofmann et al. (2009) propose that cognitive load and ego depletion tasks have a similar effect on
decision making.
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2.4.2 Design
I apply a 2 × 2 between subjects design: in one dimension, participants’ self-control
is manipulated by subjecting them to the letter-e-task, resulting in the two treatments
High SC and Low SC. The investment frame is varied independently between frequent
investments in the Narrow frame and infrequent investments in the Broad frame.
In the first part of the experiment, the participants work on the same self-control depleting
task as in experiment 1, which is followed by the MLA task (Gneezy and Potters, 1997).
The third part contains a variety of background measures.20
The MLA task
I use a computerized version of the original task by Gneezy and Potters (1997) based
on the implementation by Fellner and Sutter (2009). In each of 18 rounds, participants
are endowed with 100 experimental currency units (ECU) (with 100 ECU corresponding
to e 0.50) out of which they can invest an arbitrary integer amount X from the interval
[0, 100] into a risky lottery. The outcome of the risky lottery depends on the throw of a
simulated six-sided die and is independently drawn for each round. The 24 realization
paths from the first session are used for all the following sessions, thus eight participants
(two in each treatment) observed the same realization path. If the die shows the numbers
1 or 2, participants win the lottery and receive 100 + 2.5×X as earnings for that round.
If the die shows any other number, participants lose the lottery and receive 100 − X.
Earnings for the individual rounds are added up to obtain earnings for the task.
There are two investment frames which impact the way participants make investment
decisions and receive feedback. In the Narrow frame, participants make their investment
choices X for each round separately and receive immediate feedback on each choice. In
the Broad frame, participants decide about their investment X for the next three rounds.
When they have made their choice, the same X is invested in each of the three rounds.
Participants in this treatment receive feedback for all three rounds at once and are only
shown their aggregated earnings over the three rounds.
Directly after finishing the investment task, participants receive four computation ques-
tions21 on their screen. These are meant to test the participants’ mathematical abilities
20A translated version of the instructions can be found in appendix B.3.
21See appendix B.2 for the wording and correct answers of these questions.
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to perform the calculations needed to discover the diversification properties given by the
repeated investment in independent lotteries. All these questions require entering an
integer and participants receive e 0.25 for each correct response.
Additional Measures
Following the computation questions, participants take part in a number of background
measures: the loss aversion task from Trautmann and Vlahu (2013), which consists of 6
choices out of which one is implemented in the end, the extended CRT from Toplak et al.
(2014) for which participants receive a flat payment of e 2.50, an abbreviated version
of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) (Spinella, 2007; Stanford et al., 2009) and a
number of socio-economic background measures. Please refer to appendix B.2 for detailed
descriptions of these tasks and the rationale for including them.
Procedure and Sample Size
I handed out and read instructions to participants in two blocks: first for the letter-e-
task and the MLA task and then – after finishing these two parts of the experiment –
for the rest of the experiment. After each part of the instructions, I gave participants
the opportunity to ask questions in private. Sessions and recruitment were implemented
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) respectively. I conducted
the sessions for this experiment in July 201522 at MELESSA in Munich. Sessions lasted
roughly 60 minutes and participants earned e 19.97 on average including a show-up fee
of e 4.00.
A total of 191 participants took part in eight sessions – two sessions for each treatment
cell. Each treatment cell thus has 48 observations, apart from Low SC×Narrow which has
47 observations. This sample size allows me to detect the following effect sizes between
two cells of my treatments: the average effect size of studies on ego depletion in Hagger
et al. (2010) of d = 0.62 is detected with power 85.2% and an effect of size d = 0.58
with power 80.0%. Only 2 of the 198 studies contained in Hagger et al. (2010) exceed
the overall sample size of my study. Note however that the effective sample size of the
current study is only 95.75 for comparisons between two treatment cells, which is still
comparably high and is exceeded by only 16 of the 198 studies contained in Hagger et al.
(2010).
22Refer to table B.9 of the appendix for the timing of each session.
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2.4.3 Results
The manipulation checks – reported in table B.10 of the appendix – yield very similar
results as in experiment 1. Furthermore, appendix B.2 provides evidence that there was
no significant impact of the self-control manipulation on the background measures that
were collected in experiment 2, apart from a borderline statistically significant increase
in loss aversion (MWU, p = 0.103).
Myopic Loss Aversion
Now, I turn to the main measure of interest of experiment 2 – the investment levels
in the four different treatment cells. I am interested in whether the framing interacts
with the self-control manipulation, i.e. whether the investment levels between the Broad
and Narrow frame is significantly impacted by the self-control manipulation. Figure 2.4
displays the investment levels for the four treatments including 95% confidence intervals
and table 2.8 tests the presence of the MLA effect by comparing investments beween
Broad and Narrow within each self-control treatment and between High SC and Low
SC within each investment frame using MWU tests. I obtain the expected effect that
there is a larger wedge between the investment levels in the different frames within the
Low SC participants (more than 17 ECU difference) than within the High SC participants
(roughly 9 ECU difference). The MLA effect is only statistically significant within the Low
SC treatment (MWU, p = 0.007 and p = 0.135 for Low SC and High SC respectively).
However, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal investment levels between High SC
and Low SC within each investment frame (MWU, p = 0.425 and p = 0.557 for Narrow
and Broad respectively).
Heterogeneity:
In appendix B.2, I report results that are obtained when I divide the sample at the median
impulsivity score (BIS). In line with Hilgers and Wibral (2014), I find that the framing
effect is larger for more impulsive individuals who seem relatively unaffected by the Low
SC treatment. Furthermore, the effect seems to be (insignficantly) larger for less impulsive
individuals in Low SC compared to High SC, which seems to be primarily driven by a
higher investment in the Broad frame. Thus, it seems as if Low SC participants who are
usually not impulsive behave more similarly to impulsive individuals.
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Finally, splitting the sample by CRT terciles, which I report in appendix B.2, indicates
that the effect of the Low SC treatment is rather uniform across the CRT distribution
with the spread being (insignificantly) larger for the Low SC treatment than the High SC
treatment for every single tercile.23
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Figure 2.4: Average Investment by Treatment Condition
Table 2.8: Average Investment over all Periods by Treatments
Narrow Broad
mean N mean N p-value (CvC)
High SC 40.470 48 49.642 48 0.135
Low SC 35.612 47 53.056 48 0.007***
p-value (RvR) 0.425 0.557
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; RvR stands for
tests comparing rows i.e. depletion effects within frame, CvC stands for
tests comparing columns i.e. comparing framing effects within each self-
control manipulation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Dynamics of Investments
Figure 2.5 displays the average evolution of investment levels by treatment condition over
rounds. It seems like the differences between the frames within the Low SC treatments
is driven by later investment rounds. Subjects in the Low SC × Narrow treatment were
the only ones to reduce their investment levels over the course of the experiment.
23Similar results are obtained if subjects are divided into groups according to the CRT classification
into impulsive, reflective and residual used in experiment 1, either based on CRT scores or on CRT7
scores.
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Figure 2.5: Average Investment per Round by Treatment Condition
Paneled tobit regressions can yield insights into what kind of investment experiences drive
this divergence. I investigate different specifications of a tobit panel regression in table
2.9. The construction of my sample in these regressions differs from related studies that
use a similar approach: Haigh and List (2005) include the investment of every round
in their Infrequent treatment, i.e. even when participants did not make an active choice.
Fellner and Sutter (2009) aggregate blocks of three choices per subject, even when subjects
made three separate choices, and skipped the first block for each subject. I include all
observations when a decision was made, i.e. for participants in the Broad treatments I
only consider the first choice of each block, and do not leave out the first block of choices.
My rationale for doing so is to maximize the number of active choices included per subject
in order to increase the power of the regressions. For each subject in the Narrow (Broad)
treatments I thus obtain 18 (6) observations.
The dependent variable in these regressions is the invested amount per round. The main
explanatory variables are defined as follows:
• Low SC : dummy taking value 1 for observations in Low SC
• Broad: dummy taking value 1 for observations in Broad
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All the regressions include dummies for the realization paths, since 2 subjects in each
treatment observed the same realizations of the lotteries over the 18 rounds24. Throughout
specifications 2–5, I successively add the following variables:
• female: dummy taking value 1 for female observation
• ln(age): natural logarithm of age
• CRT7 : extended CRT score
• BIS : Barratt Impulsivesness Score, higher values indicate more impulsivity
• accepted lotteries: number of accepted lotteries in the loss aversion task, higher
values indicate lower loss aversion
For CRT7 and BIS, I also add interaction terms with the treatment Low SC, since I hy-
pothesized that these variables might interact with the treatment. Finally, in specification
6, I add the variables reflecting the investment history suggested by Fellner and Sutter
(2009) and their interaction terms with the Low SC dummy:
• previous wins: number of all previous lottery wins
• wins last 3 : number of wins in the three previous lotteries
• wealth: accumulated wealth over all previous periods in ECU
The coefficients of the treatment dummies have the expected direction throughout speci-
fications 1–5, while they usually fail to reach significance. Women invest significantly less
money in the MLA task than men, which has often been found in experiments involving
risky decision making (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Furthermore, the extended CRT score
is significantly positively correlated with investment levels throughout specifications 3–6,
while its interaction term with Low SC as well as both the variable BIS and its interaction
with Low SC fail to significantly predict investment levels. Finally, a higher number of
accepted lotteries – an indicator of lower levels of loss aversion – is also highly positively
correlated with investment levels.
24Results are not sensitive to excluding these dummy variables.
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Within High SC, only the number of wins during the last three rounds is significantly
correlated with investment levels (p < 0.01) – more wins in the previous three rounds cor-
relate negatively with investment levels. Fellner and Sutter (2009) find strikingly similar
results for the three history variables as I do within the High SC treatments. However,
in the Low SC treatments, the effect of all these variables is more pronounced and signif-
icantly different from High SC. The number of previous wins in the Low SC treatments
is more strongly correlated with the investment levels compared to High SC (p < 0.05),
the number of previous wins during the last three rounds is more strongly negatively cor-
related (p < 0.1) and the current wealth level is significantly more negatively correlated
(p < 0.01) with investment levels.25 I report the same set of regressions separately for
each investment frame in appendix B.2. In line with figure 2.5, the difference in effects
of outcome history on investment levels for Low SC participants is exclusively driven by
the behavior of subjects in the Low SC × Narrow treatment. This result supports the
interpretation that the Broad investment frame shields participants from the negative
effects of emotions on their investment decisions, which are in turn enhanced for Low SC
participants. A Broad investment frame might thus be regarded as a commitment device.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Low Baseline Behavioral Effects
Compared to previous experimental studies collecting similar measures (e.g. Weber and
Welfens, 2007), the DE measures in experiment 1 seem quite low.26 Similarly, in the MLA
task the differences between the two investment frames are low compared to other studies
(e.g. Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Haigh and List, 2005). This indicates that participants
25Note that coefficients of the interactions of previous wins and wins last 3 with Low SC become
marginally insignificant (p = 0.136 and p = 0.132) if I exclude the first block of three choices. All
the variables indicating the lottery realization history and their interaction terms with Low SC become
insignificant if I apply the more conservative aggregation of choices applied by Fellner and Sutter (2009).
Results including significance levels are qualitatively the same as those reported here if I apply the method
of Haigh and List (2005).
26Figure B.1 in the appendix compares the DE measures from experiment 1 to those in Weber and
Welfens (2007) whose participants repeated the disposition effect task twice. Our DE measures seem to
be very close to the DE measure in their second repetition. Expectations elicitation and waiting times
were not the root of the low average DE measure: we ran two more sessions in February 2015 without
these features. In these sessions, average DE is 0.0765 and cannot be distinguished from the rest of the
sample (MWU, p = 0.9511).
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Table 2.9: Tobit Panel Regressions of Lottery Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
investment
Low SC -18.69 -20.65* -13.97 -15.42 -10.41 1.146
(13.03) (12.28) (21.50) (21.43) (20.89) (21.42)
Broad 18.60 20.66* 16.93 18.17 19.89* 20.08*
(13.12) (12.38) (12.20) (12.15) (11.85) (12.03)
Broad × Low SC 22.89 22.99 27.48 25.58 19.24 20.05
(18.59) (17.47) (17.19) (17.15) (16.80) (17.07)
female -48.31*** -40.08*** -39.80*** -35.05*** -36.46***
(9.592) (9.819) (9.751) (9.583) (9.741)
ln(age) 0.157 10.13 7.456 0.405 0.278
(30.46) (30.04) (29.89) (29.18) (29.64)
CRT7 7.577** 6.912** 5.738* 5.631*
(3.106) (3.119) (3.053) (3.101)
CRT7 × Low SC -2.428 -1.690 -1.202 -1.227
(4.454) (4.475) (4.355) (4.423)
BIS 1.295 1.456 1.464
(0.964) (0.939) (0.954)
BIS × Low SC -1.758 -1.884 -1.864
(1.373) (1.337) (1.358)
accepted lotteries 15.44*** 15.38***
(4.929) (5.005)
previous wins 2.259
(2.313)
previous wins × Low SC 7.038**
(3.497)
wins last 3 -4.978***
(1.886)
wins last 3 × Low SC -4.745*
(2.727)
wealth -0.00367
(0.00732)
wealth × Low SC -0.0314***
(0.0113)
Constant 44.73* 86.34 22.92 -10.49 -36.56 -32.59
(23.53) (99.99) (100.4) (102.9) (100.6) (102.1)
Price Path Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
σu 61.34*** 57.29*** 55.99*** 55.57*** 53.96*** 54.91***
(4.112) (3.848) (3.764) (3.743) (3.642) (3.709)
σe 35.98*** 35.99*** 35.99*** 35.99*** 35.98*** 35.34***
(0.841) (0.841) (0.841) (0.841) (0.840) (0.825)
Observations 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,286
Number of Subject 191 191 191 191 191 191
Note: Low SC is a dummy variable taking te value 1 for the low SC treatment and 0 otherwise;
Broad is a dummy taking the value 1 if decisions were made in blocks of three; ln(age) is the natural
logarithm of age; SCS stands for self-control score; CRT7 stands for the number of correct responses
in the extended CRT; BIS stands for the score in the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; accepted lotteries is
the measure of loss aversion based on Trautmann and Vlahu (2013); Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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behave in a relatively rational and controlled manner. Potentially, such low baseline
effects make finding an impact of the self-control manipulation more difficult.
The differences in both experiments to previous experiments might have been driven by
details of the instructions or by a higher degree of sophistication in our participants. One
indicator for the relevance of the latter interpretation is that average CRT scores for the
original three CRT questions of the participants in experiment 1 (experiment 2) were 1.42
(1.64) which is in the close neighborhood of the mean scores for Harvard and Princeton
students reported in Frederick (2005). However, the distribution of self-control scores and
scores on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale in the present samples are very close to those
reported in Tangney et al. (2004) and Spinella (2007) respectively.
2.5.2 Null Effects on Cognitive Abilities and Risk Attitudes
It might be surprising that the Low SC manipulation has no effect on CRT scores in either
experiment, as it did in Kocher et al. (2016a). In the experiments here this cannot be
the result of direct incentivization (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003). However, participants
might be motivated to perform well due to intrinsic motivation or social pressure from the
experimenter. Also, it is known that self-control resources replenish with rest (Tyler and
Burns, 2008) and the time delay between the depletion task and taking these measures
might have been enough for a recovery. Furthermore, the CRT might not be suitable
to evaluate the effect of a relatively subtle self-control manipulation, because the goal of
obtaining the correct response is clear and there is little scope for distraction.
Similar arguments might hold for the null effects of the self-control manipulation on the
risk and loss aversion measures. Additionally, since these preference measures are derived
from choice lists rather than in a spontaneous way and one by one, they might trigger
a more rational response mode in subjects, even though their behavior in the following
dynamic investment task might be driven by spontaneous urges to a larger degree. One
indicator supporting this interpretation is the difference in the effect of the self-control
manipulaton on the different measures of loss aversion between experiment 1 and 2: while
differences in loss aversion were not detectable in the relatively more complex task in
experiment 1 (p = 0.352), they became more pronounced and borderline significant in the
arguably more spontaneous loss aversion elicitation in experiment 2 (p = 0.103).
72 Self-Control and Investment Decisions
2.5.3 The Effects of Low Self-Control on Trading Behavior
The presence of a treatment effect on trade clustering exclusively for reflective individuals,
can be considered from two perspectives. Firstly, this is in accordance with the interpreta-
tion of Hofmann et al. (2009) that depletion affects the rational system in a dual systems
perspective of decision making (see also Kahneman, 2011). Unreflective participants are
unlikely to be affected by a treatment that reduces reflective thinking. Secondly, this het-
erogeneity highlights the possible relevance of the results, since professional participants
in real world financial markets display high scores on tests such as the CRT (Thoma et al.,
2015). However, note that there are no similar heterogeneous treatment effects based on
CRT in experiment 2.
The Low SC treatment increases the degree of history dependence of investments in the
MLA task exclusively in the Narrow investment frame. These patterns suggest that the
emotional reactivity towards past experiences is increased following reductions of self-
control.27 Additionally, these findings are in line with interpreting the Broad investment
frame as a ‘shield’ against the influence of emotions on investment levels, since in this
frame the outcome history variables and their interaction with the Low SC treatment
have no significant impact on investment levels. A Broad investment frame might thus
constitute some kind of a commitment device.
The interaction of emotions with the depletion effect might offer an explanation for the
lack of a main treatment effect in both experiments reported here: self-control might play
a larger role for tasks that induce a relatively higher emotional activation in participants,
such as a ‘social’ trading environment, such as the market in Kocher et al. (2016a). Such an
environment might induce stronger emotions e.g. due to feelings of competition. Similarly,
it could be the case that reduced self-control makes participants more attentive to social
cues in general and thus more likely to follow other persons’ behavior. Thus relatively
small effects on the individual level could be reinforced when traders interact leading to
larger effects on aggregate. Taking one more step towards the real world, traders low in
27The current setup only allows for speculations why this might be the case: possible explanations could
involve an increased tendency to display the gambler’s fallacy for the more pronounced negative effect of
the last three gamble wins on investment levels, and a larger role of regret for the coefficients of previous
wins × Low SC and wealth × Low SC. More positive lottery realizations predict higher investment levels
in the Low SC treatment, while higher actual positive investment experiences positively impact wealth
levels and thus reduce investment levels.
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self-control might be more likely to follow social information such as rumours of a hot
investment opportunity or a coming market crash than information about fundamentals.
The secondary effects reported here are in line with the more recent process view of self-
control (Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012), which suggests that a reduction of self-control
temporarily shifts both attention and motivation. The results from experiment 1 and 2
suggest that a reduction in self-control results in a more narrow focus of participants,
i.e. a more narrow attention to the facts at hand. Additionally, the enhanced history
dependence of participants’ investment decisions in experiment 2 indicates a stronger
reliance on emotions for decision making, which is in line with the increase in reported
emotional activation following ego depletion in Kocher et al. (2016a). These effects can
also be related to a dual-systems perspective of self-control and decision making (Hofmann
et al., 2009). The fact that in experiment 1 only subjects with high cognitive abilities
were impaired by the self-control manipulation and the enhanced history dependence in
experiment 2 suggest a shift from rational processing to emotions in decision making (cf.
Kahneman, 2011).
Taking a bird’s eye view, one might hypothesize that the effect of lowered self-control
might be stronger when experimental instructions are less clear, when impulsivity and
emotionality within a task are more important, or when market participants interact.
2.6 Conclusion
Even though the effects on individual investment decisions seem to be relatively small in
the present paper, the results in Kocher et al. (2016a) suggest that such effects can be
reinforced when traders interact resulting in larger effects on the market level. Besides the
possible relevance of self-control on real world markets, the effects of the self-control ma-
nipulation can be a factor contributing to the heterogeneity often found in experiments on
financial decision making due to previous cognitive engagements or self-control demands
of experimental subjects. Similarly, dispositional differences in self-control between par-
ticipants can contribute to the heterogeneity commonly found, even though they had no
explanatory power in the present research.
The findings reported here and in Kocher et al. (2016a) might indicate the relevance of
self-control state for real world financial markets. In experiment 1, in particular those
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participants who are similar to financial traders in terms of CRT scores (Thoma et al.,
2015) were the ones whose trade clustering was negatively affected by the self-control
manipulation. It seems easier to argue that participants with low trait self-control or
low CRT scores might be pushed out of the market over time, but then potentially the
behavior of the remaining market participants might be the most sensitive to temporary
fluctuations in self-control. Thus, state self-control might be particularly important for
explaining real world financial market behavior. Furthermore, the presence of (tempo-
rary) self-control problems might also suggest reasons for the existence of commitment
devices such as automatic selling devices (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Fischbacher et al.,
2015), internal rules of trading and traders’ supervision (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011) in
financial markets.
The present paper opens up a number of directions for future research. Looking into ex-
planations for the increase in history dependence in investments uncovered in experiment
2 might be a fruitful path. Further interesting research questions are how the effect of re-
duced self-control impacts the processing of social information, how enhancing self-control
impacts financial decision making, what commitment devices can alleviate the negative
effects of ego depletion on financial markets and how temporary reductions in self-control
might be identified in real world stock market data.
CHAPTER 3
Peer Effects in Risk Preferences among Adolescents1
3.1 Introduction
Taking risks is an important part of teenagers’ everyday life. There is a concern that
teenagers take excessive risks and also that their risk-taking is exacerbated by peer inter-
action.2 This paper develops an experimental strategy to assess the importance of peer
effects in risk- and loss-taking among adolescents.
A fundamental challenge to the identification of peer effects is unobserved endogenous
selection into social relationships. Laboratory experiments on social interaction address
this concern by randomly allocating subjects to peer groups. One criticism of this ap-
proach is that “(...) the groups whose interactions are observed are formed artificially
for the sake of the experiment. This raises obvious questions about the credibility of
extrapolating findings from experimental settings to populations of interest.” (Manski,
2000) Carrell et al. (2013) present empirical evidence supporting this view. They show
that social interaction patterns can vary substantially in spite of a random assignment
process due to endogenous friendship formation after the assignment. In this paper, we
1This chapter is based on joint work with Melanie Lührmann and Joachim Winter.
2Strong peer influences among adolescents and youth have been found in several domains. Sacerdote
(2001) emphasizes their influence on university students’ educational performance, Card and Giuliano
(2013) highlight social interaction effects in risky behaviours such as sexual initiation, smoking, marijuana
use, and truancy (for similar results, see also Arnett, 1992; Brown et al., 1986; McPhee, 1996)). Gardner
and Steinberg (2005) argue that peer pressure in risk-taking is larger in adolescence than in adulthood.
Psychologists suggest that “risk taking [in adolescence] is the product of a competition between the
socio-emotional and cognitive-control networks, and adolescence is a period in which the former abruptly
becomes more assertive (i.e., at puberty) while the latter gains strength only gradually, over a longer
period of time” (Steinberg, 2007). Hence, increased susceptibility to peer influences may arise from
the heightened role of socio-emotional networks in the adolescent brain (cf. Galvan et al., 2006, 2007;
Steinberg, 2008; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010; Reyna et al., 2011). Additionally, adolescence is a period of
increasingly independent decision-making, in which the influence of (more risk-averse) parents on choices
weakens and the influence of same-age peers becomes stronger.
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randomly match individuals with naturally occurring peers; these are either randomly
selected classmates or friends. In previous experimental studies, social interaction usually
took place between random, anonymous peers (e.g. in Lahno and Serra-Garcia, 2015), or
between participants with no common history (e.g. in Falk and Ichino, 2006).
Non-experimental approaches often rely on data on endogenous peer relations alone to
account for selective peer interaction. These studies face the challenge that “true social
interaction effects are difficult to distinguish from unobserved background factors that are
correlated across friends.” (Card and Giuliano (2013); a similar point is made by Manski
(1993) and Moffitt (2001)). This also applies to the natural peers in our experiment who
have been previously assigned to classrooms and have already formed friendships (or not).
While subjects are randomly exposed to peer interaction in our experiment, unobserved
background factors may have led to assortative matching of friends and classmates. We
thus randomise individuals into controlled social interaction conditions – among randomly
assigned natural peers –, and collect additional data on peer relations in the control
group. First, this enables us to analyse whether subjects match assortatively on risk
preferences which may lead to a strong positive correlation in choices.3 Second, it allows
us to distinguish between peer similarity that arises through assortative matching and the
impact of social interaction in the choice situation.
We conduct an experiment among adolescents in the age range of 13 to 15 years that
attend the lowest tier of the German high school system. These are in an age group
close to graduation, where they are about to face many important (financial) decisions
involving risk. In this crucial period, they decide whether to continue education, engage
in vocational training or directly start their working career.
We randomly allocated 12 classes from 5 schools to one of three treatments: In control
classes, teenagers make choices in the absence of social interaction. In the two treatments
conditions, they communicate with a natural peer and then make individual choices re-
garding risk and loss. The two treatment conditions vary the degree of peer closeness in
the stable environment of the classroom experimentally; teenagers are either randomly
paired up with a classmate (in the first treatment arm) or with a friend (in the second
treatment arm). Risky choices are taken individually in all conditions, using lists of lot-
3While assortative matching on socio-demographic characteristics has been widely documented for
many peer relationships, matching on preferences has received less attention, mostly because preferences
are difficult to observe for the researcher (and potentially for the peer).
3.1 Introduction 77
teries with pure and mixed prospects as in Tanaka et al. (2010). They are designed to be
perfectly correlated across individuals to avoid scope for strategic interaction. Our design
thus creates random variation in whether and with whom subjects can interact in a choice
situation involving risk and potential loss.
Our experiment has the following additional features. We use a between-subjects design
with simultaneous peer choices. The between-subjects design avoids experimenter demand
effects that appear when choices are repeated under different interaction conditions (see
Zizzo (2010) for a detailed discussion of such demand effects). We use a simultaneous
choice setting where peers make individual decisions while communicating with each other,
as opposed to the more frequently used sequential designs with a first and a second
mover, effectively closing down feedback between peers (see, e.g. Bursztyn et al. (2014)
and Harbaugh et al. (2002)). The latter design allows to identify who influences whom
in a peer group and thus to address the reflection problem (Manski, 1993). However, the
second mover then faces a simple binary choice – to follow the first mover or not. In a
simultaneous setting, peers interact dynamically (and communicate naturally), so that
we can study (near continuous) changes in the degree of risk (and loss) taken in a social
interaction situation.
The following two key findings emerge. First, we find no evidence of assortative matching
on (or convergence in) risk preferences, neither on risk nor loss aversion. As expected,
however, friends (and classmates) match on observable characteristics such as age and
gender (as well as on family background characteristics). Overall, there is large variation
in risk preferences among natural peers (i.e. friends and classmates) in the absence of
social interaction.
Our second finding is that peers influence each other’s risky decisions strongly when
they are allowed to interact dynamically. Peer communication increases choice similarity
markedly in both treatment arms – i.e. regardless of whether they interact with friends
or random classmates – and in both types of lotteries – those with positive and mixed
payoffs. To demonstrate these effects, we use prospect theory to infer risk and loss aver-
sion parameters as if decisions were taken independently. Communication reduces the
difference in risk and in loss aversion within pairs by about 45%. Increased similarity
mainly arises from perfect alignment of lottery choices. 59% of those paired with random
classmates choose the same switchpoints in lotteries with positive payoffs, and 67% make
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identical choices in mixed lotteries. Qualitatively similar effects are found when friends
are allowed to discuss their choices before making decisions – communication reduces
differences in risk aversion by 57%, and differences in loss aversion decrease even more
strongly, by 85%. Again, this is mainly due to the increase in identical choices.
Our study contributes to a body of literature that documents how the typical patterns
of risky choices develop during childhood and adolescence (Reyna and Ellis, 1994; Har-
baugh et al., 2002; Levin and Hart, 2003; Levin et al., 2007a,b). Most studies find that
risk aversion increases with age after adolescence in both experimental and self-reported
survey measures (see, e.g. Gardner and Steinberg (2005); Dohmen et al. (2011)). We
find that teenagers in our sample share one common feature: a large majority are risk
and loss averse, i.e. display σ < 1 and λ > 1 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). 59.4% of adolescents in the control group are risk averse, and the
large majority of 79.7% are loss averse. We compare the risk choices of our sample of
teenagers from relatively low SES backgrounds with those of undergraduate students at a
top-ranked university in Germany using the same choice task. Teenagers are significantly
less risk- and loss-averse than undergraduate students. Our results are consistent with
previous results regarding risk aversion among teenagers, and present new results on their
reaction to downside risks. A notable exception is Glätzle-Rützler et al. (2015) who found
no evidence of myopic loss aversion in individual decision of youth between age 11 and
18. Yet, even among teenagers, only a small fraction is risk-loving or risk-neutral, so that
the source of their risk-taking is still open to debate. Tymula et al. (2012) suggest that
lower levels of ambiguity aversion in adolescents lead to higher risk taking.4
We explore the impact of peer interaction on adolescents’ risky choices in a school-based
field experiment. Our design has several features that offer new insights: we introduce
controlled experimental variation in social interaction, and randomly pair individuals
with partners whose relation is observed through additionally collected data. We thus
bridge the gap between experimental studies that often rely on artificial peers, and non-
experimental approaches who face the challenge of endogenous natural peer groups.
A few experimental studies also use naturally occurring peers. For example Bursztyn
et al. (2014) consider adult peer effects among friends and family members. These studies
4In parallel, recent evidence from neuroscience shows that brain maturity is reached later than previ-
ously thought, i.e. in early adulthood up to age 25, so risk-taking in ambiguous situations may provide
important learning opportunities and thus foster neurodevelopment (Steinberg, 2007).
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abstract from the endogenous nature of these links that were formed prior to the exper-
iment. Our experimental design allows the separate identification of social interaction
effects. Additionally, we add to the scarce evidence on assortative matching based on
risk preferences. Attanasio et al. (2012) find evidence of assortative matching on risk
preferences, but in a group lending context where sorting into groups by risk preferences
is economically beneficial (for risk-pooling arrangements).5 In a recent study, Ahern et al.
(2014) showed in a sample of MBA students that peer effects lead to a convergence of
risk attitudes over the course of one academic year. We find different results.6 In our
study, individuals in the control group do not interact during the risk task, so we use
their choices to obtain an estimate of assortative matching on (or realised convergence of)
risk preferences. We use a dyadic approach similar to Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) with
symmetric undirected matches to model matches among friends or classmates. We find
no evidence of assortative matching on risk preferences – neither on risk nor loss aver-
sion. Unsurprisingly, friends and classmates do match on observable socio-demographic
characteristics such as age and gender (as well as on family background characteristics).
The social interaction effect towards increased similarity in risk aversion (but not in loss
aversion) has been found in previous studies among adults, and a few mechanisms have
been suggested. Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) provide evidence consistent with confor-
mity as a reason for increased choice similarity. In other words, peer effects arise from
anchoring effects of peers’ choices to which individuals conform due to relative payoff con-
cerns (Festinger, 1954). In contrast, Bursztyn et al. (2014) investigate social learning and
social preference mechanisms in an experiment that allows to test for these mechanisms
explicitly. They find both channels to be empirically important for investment decisions.
Social utility, in the form of a “keeping up with the Joneses” effect, arises when learning
about the peer’s actual (rather than intended) investment.7 Relatedly, Fafchamps et al.
(2015) find that in a repeated game subjects try to keep up with the winners.8 Social
learning effects in the Bursztyn et al. (2014) study are greatest when the first (second)
investor is financially sophisticated (financially unsophisticated). Dahl et al. (2014) find
5Lahno et al. (2015) find in a sample of villagers from Uganda that differences in individual risk
attitudes are larger among peers in interpersonal conflict, in particular among kin.
6One reason for the differences in the results may be that in Ahern et al. (2014), peer influences
may interact with learning on the course, as financial risk is one of the major components of the MBA
curriculum.
7First movers make investment choices but receipt of the chosen investment product is randomised.
8See Trautmann and Vieider (2012) for a discussion of social utility aspects regarding behaviour under
uncertainty.
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that the dynamics of social learning increase participation in paid paternity leave schemes
over time more than would otherwise be expected. We investigate social learning effects
in our simultaneous setting, and use a private and a public signal of financial competency.
We find that randomly paired classmates with a high private signal seem less prone to
peer influence, i.e. less likely to coordinate their choices perfectly. We find that differences
in peer quality predict the likelihood of coordination only if they are publicly visible, while
we find no such effect for the private signal. These differential effects are suggestive of
social learning effects between peers.
Previous studies have also documented increased choice similarity (among adults) between
the first and second mover, but they have been silent about the impact of peer interaction
on the nature (or level) of risk-taking.9 In our simultaneous design with multiple choices,
we can examine whether adolescents make more or less risk- and loss-averse choices under
social interaction. We find mixed results that depend on the type of peer: communication
with a less close peer leads to a higher degree of coordination, and results in more loss
averse (and weakly more risk-averse) choices. The percentage of loss averse choices among
randomly paired, interacting classmates is with 92.6% significantly higher than when
teenagers decide alone (79.7%). In contrast, we do not find evidence of increasingly loss
averse choices in social interaction with friends (76.2% loss averse choices).
This leads to an important conclusion on the nature of peer influences: our results sug-
gest that there are strong adolescent peer effects in risk-taking, that arise from social
interaction (not from assortative matching). We re-examine the hypothesis of Carrell
et al. (2013) that the nature of the peer relation matters, and find evidence in its favour.
We experimentally vary the degree of peer closeness between randomly paired classmates
and self-selected friends into discussion groups of two. We find that while social learning
appears to be an important driver of peer effects among classmates, there is no evidence
of social learning among paired friends – leading to mixed results regarding the level of
peer-induced risk- and loss-taking.
9For the analysis of the mechanisms through which peer effects arise, sequential designs which allow
the experimenter to control the feedback mechanism, and – as done in Bursztyn et al. (2014) – the peer
signals that the second-mover receives, are important. They are also useful to understand who influences
whom as they address the reflection problem. However, to understand the nature of individual risky
choices that result from peer interaction, a simultaneous design seems more appropriate, as it replicates
the natural interaction between peers, and allows for dynamic feedback. Dahl et al. (2014), for example,
emphasize the multiplicator effect of social learning among peers by documenting snowballing spillovers
across individuals in the context of a paid paternity leave scheme.
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The remaining chapter is organized as follows: In section 3.2, we explain and motivate
our experimental design. Section 3.3 presents the results from our experiment and section
3.3 discusses our findings. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Experiment
We conducted the experiment in 7th and 8th grade classes in lower tier schools around
Berlin in June 2014.10 First, students were given an incentivized experimental task in-
volving lottery choices. Second, they completed individual surveys on cognitive ability,
and socio-demographic characteristics.11
Before the visits, we randomly allocated each class to the control group or one of the
two treatment arms. In control classes (short: CONTROL), students completed the task
alone, without any communication among students. In the treatments, RANDOM and
FRIENDS, students were allowed to discuss their choices with one partner who was seated
next to them. They then made individual choices. We used this between-subjects design
to avoid experimenter demand effects that may arise in a within-subjects design from
repeating the same lottery choices under different conditions.
Peers within treatment classes are allocated in two ways: In classes in the RANDOM con-
dition, students drew a random number at the beginning of the session. Classmates with
the same number were seated together. In the FRIENDS condition, we asked students
to self-select a friend.12
10These schools belong to the lower track of the German high school system whose students have on
average lower socio-economic status (Dustmann, 2004). Graduation from this track is typically followed
by vocational training.
11All participating schools were part of a larger survey on financial literacy among high school students
that was conducted in June and July 2014 throughout Germany. Therefore, the survey also contains
information on financial knowledge and teenagers’ finances that are not used in this paper. A subsample
of 4 classes in 3 schools received three sessions of a financial literacy training several months prior to
our visit. All results are robust to including dummies for the financial literacy training as an additional
variable in the regressions.
12We framed this as pairing up with a friend by stating: “Choose a friend with whom you would like to
discuss your choices and sit together in pairs. You are allowed to discuss your decisions with your partner
quietly, but you decide only for yourself!” Following common practice for partner tasks in German high
schools, students formed groups simultaneously. 18 students ended up with no partner (due to uneven
class size or lack of parental consent of either partner) and were excluded from the analysis.
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3.2.1 Task Design
The experimental task consisted of 18 lottery choices on two separate decision sheets (A
and B) which we adapted from Tanaka et al. (2010). Each of the eleven choices on sheet
A was between two lotteries with positive payoffs, while the seven lotteries on sheet B
involved gains and losses. This design enables us to assign parameters of prospect theory
utility (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Due to timing13 and complexity constraints,
we abstracted from probability weighting14. All lottery choices involved 50:50 lotteries.
To identify loss and risk aversion, we hence required the two decision sheets (A and B)
which can be found in appendix C.6. The order of the sheets was randomized within each
class. In the treatment groups, we randomized across pairs such that interacting students
received identically ordered decision sheets.
We determine students’ individual utility parameters assuming a prospect theory value
function of the form
v(x) =
 x
σ for x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)σ for x < 0

where σ is the concavity parameter measuring the degree of risk aversion and λ denotes
the loss aversion parameter, i.e. the kink of the value function at payoffs of 0. We insert
each payoff x into the value function v(x), and weight it with the objective probability
of 0.5. The 11 choices on sheet A involve only gains. The first lottery option on the left
hand side of the sheet (L) is the same across choices on sheet A, while we increase the
high payoff in the second lottery (R) across choices. An individual’s switching point in
these 11 choices on sheet A determines a range for her risk aversion parameter σ. E.g.
when person i switched in row 4 from option L to option R, this can be explained by
σi ∈ [0.8, 1]. We assign the midpoint of the range as σi, e.g. in the previous example
σi = 0.9.15 Later switches to the second lottery imply lower σ, i.e. higher risk aversion.
13Sessions usually had to be conducted within the 45-minutes duration of one lesson.
14Typically, probability weighting functions are inversely S shaped and intersect unweighted probability
around p = 13 (Wakker, 2010). For several estimates of probability weighting functions (e.g. Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996) deviations of p = 0.5 from its decision
weight are relatively small. Identifying probability weighting would have required participants to fill out
at least one more decision sheet (Tanaka et al., 2010) and a considerably more complicated and time
consuming mechanism for determining lottery realizations. Thus, we decided against obtaining such a
measure in this study.
15If a participant always chose option L or option R, there is no bound for σ from below and above.
In this case we assign a“midpoint” σ, calculated using the same interval width as in the neighboring
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Then, we assign λ given a participant’s choices on lists A and B. The 7 choices on sheet
B are mixed lotteries, with the first lottery’s (L) expected value deteriorating from row
to row (choices 1, 2, 3, 5), or the second lottery (R) improving from row to row (choices
4, 6, 7). E.g. if a participant switched in row 4 on sheet A and was assigned σi = 0.9,
and switched to option R in row 4 on sheet B, she is assigned the midpoint λi = 2.03 of
the respective range of λ ∈ [1.70, 2.35]. As a consequence there are 11 × 7 = 77 possible
combinations of (σi, λi) in our dataset.16 Later switches to option R on sheet B imply
higher loss aversion λ.
3.2.2 Procedures
In this section, we describe the procedures used to implement lottery choices, such as sat-
isfying the participation constraint and ensuring trust, and the procedures we followed to
match peers and identify friends in this anonymized study. All procedures were explained
in the instructions before the incentivized task was started.
Instructions and experimenters: In each session, the instructions for the lottery task were
read out aloud in front of the class – each time by the same experimenter. Sessions lasted
one lesson (45-60 minutes), of which the instructions and the lottery task usually took
roughly 15 minutes each. All experiments were conducted by one of the authors and an
aide. The instructions can be found in appendix C.5.
Transaction costs and participation constraint: Students received an initial endowment of
e 3.10 to ensure an overall positive payoff regardless of their choices in order to satisfy
the participation condition and to ensure trust. The endowment was placed in front of
each student on her desk at the beginning of the session. Trust was further enhanced
by teachers being present in the class during the experiment and witnessing payment
announcements and payouts.
Task comprehension: Before participants proceeded with the incentivized task, they had
to answer four test questions which can be found at the beginning of appendix C.6.
The experimenters checked each participant’s responses and allowed only students with
correct answers, i.e. those who understood the task, to proceed to making their choices.
interval. I.e. for a person i who always chose option L, we assign σi = 0.05, and for person j who always
chose option R, we assign σj = 1.625.
16Appendix C.4 lists all choices and their associated σ parameters, and an exemplary table for assigning
λ parameters.
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If a participant had made a mistake, the experimenter would explain the calculation of
payoffs again. The lottery task was completed using pen and paper.
Payment method and incentivization: Upon task completion, the experimenters collected
students’ responses. Once the task was completed by all, one participant was selected to
draw one random card, thereby determining which of the 18 choices would be paid out.
Another participant was selected to draw one of 10 colored chips (5 red and 5 blue) from
a bag to determine whether the high or the low payoff had been selected for payout.17
High and low payoffs were colour-coded in blue and red on the sheets to connect students’
lottery choices to the draw, and probabilities were visualized as 5 red and 5 blue chips
at the top of each sheet. Both chance draws were applied to all students in the class,
so that risks were perfectly correlated across students to minimize the scope for mutual
insurance. All payments were made in class at the end of the session. Participants earned
on average e 4.10 with a standard deviation of e 1.81.
Inconsistent choices: We encouraged consistent choices by explaining to participants why
it only makes sense to switch once from option L to option R, and asked for a summary
of choices at the bottom of each sheet (cf. appendix C.6). We allowed participants to
disregard the choice summary and determined payouts from the binary choices at the
top. Participants often left out (parts of the) summary at the bottom of the decision
sheets: of the 235 original observations, 50 participants left out items of the summary on
sheet A and 41 left out items of the summary on sheet B. Therefore, we only analyse the
individual choices.
Identification of peers: All survey questionnaires had a unique running ID number. A
red sticker with the same ID number as the questionnaire was attached to the bottom of
the survey on which participants recorded their choices in the incentivized task. In the
treatment groups RANDOM and FRIENDS, pairs were formed before the task began,
and documented through the exchange of these stickers. CONTROL classes exchanged
stickers at the end of the survey identifying their closest friend in the classroom.18 The
latter procedure enables us to identify similarities due to assortative matching in the
absence of task interaction in the control group.
17For example, if B1 and a red chip were drawn, and the participant had chosen lottery L, the payoff
was -0.40 e .
18Like the pairing in the friends treatment, students had to mutually agree to exchange.
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3.2.3 Sample
Our sample consists of 235 teenagers from 12 classes in 5 schools. All participants included
in the sample provided parental consent to participate in the study. 17 teenagers made
inconsistent choices19 and were therefore excluded from the analysis. 5 participants made
incomplete choices. 18 participants could not be matched with a partner.20 This leaves
us with 198 observations for the main part of our analysis.
Individual characteristics are balanced across the two treatment groups and the control
group, as shown by the χ2 tests presented in Table 3.121, supporting the validity of our
randomization. They include the school grade (7th or 8th), age (in months), gender, and
numeracy (measured as the last math grade relative to the average class grade). We also
include fluid intelligence or cognition which are measured by four of Raven’s progressive
matrices (Raven, 1989), chosen to reflect the variance in cognitive ability among German
teenagers following Heller et al. (1998). Finally, we capture socio-demographics and fam-
ily background variables such as the log of household size, a dummy capturing migrant
background, and the number of books at home22. Since we randomized at the class level,
we cluster standard errors accordingly (Moulton, 1986).
At the end of the survey, all pairs (friends, randomly matched classmates and participants
who exchanged stickers in the control group) were asked about their degree of closeness,
proxied by the frequency of seeing each other outside of class.23 As intended in our design,
the degree of contact is higher among those who were asked to identify a friend as peer (in
CONTROL and FRIENDS) than those in RANDOM who stated their degree of contact
with a randomly allocated classmate. We find that the friends pairs in CONTROL and
FRIENDS report a weakly significant higher contact intensity than the classmate pairs
in RANDOM (MWU test; p = 0.0696).
1912 on decision sheet A, 7 on decision sheet B
20Either because no partner was available due to uneven class size, or because the partner did not fill
out (all) choices, behaved inconsistently or failed to hand in a consent form, which we allowed students
to do late (in these cases, earnings remained with the teachers until the consent form was handed in).
21A similar table for the whole sample can be found in appendix C.1.
22This variable is also used in PISA surveys as a proxy of important family inputs into education. See
also Hanushek and Woessmann (2011)
23This question can be found in appendix C.7.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics Analyzed Sample
TOTAL CONTROL RANDOM FRIENDS p-value
grade 7.768 7.750 7.741 7.800 0.670
age 14.105 13.935 14.114 14.238 0.151
male 0.595 0.594 0.558 0.620 0.775
relmath 0.024 -0.031 0.116 0.009 0.747
stanmath 0.022 -0.048 0.123 0.013 0.626
cogn1 4 0.788 0.672 0.759 0.900 0.400
cognlow 0.823 0.859 0.870 0.762 0.180
risk 3.156 3.190 3.122 3.147 0.863
risklow 0.167 0.172 0.148 0.175 0.911
singleparent 0.301 0.379 0.319 0.231 0.166
hhsize 3.931 3.855 4.061 3.909 0.288
migrantbackground 0.628 0.694 0.542 0.629 0.263
books 2.505 2.705 2.688 2.227 0.207
bookslow 0.449 0.391 0.389 0.537 0.122
contact 2.505 2.828 2.229 2.408 0.012
contacthigh 0.414 0.578 0.296 0.362 0.004
students 198 64 54 80
classes 12 4 3 5
schools 5 3 3 4
Note: age measured in months; cogn1 4 corresponds to number of correct Raven matrices
out of 4; language2 is dummy taking value 1 if student checked box “other language spoken
at home”; contacthigh is a dummy taking the value 1 if the respondent replied to have
contact with the partner at least once per week; p-values are from χ2 tests.
3.3 Experimental Results
We discuss the results of our study in four sections. First, we determine the degree of
risk and loss aversion based on prospect theory from teenagers’ choices, to shed new
light on risk preferences among adolescents (Section 3.3.1). Second, we test whether
friends and classmates (as opposed to random matches among adolescents in our sample)
have matched assortatively on their risk preferences (Section 3.3.2). Third, we separate
assortative matching (that influenced peer group formation, i.e. class and friend matching,
before our experiment) from direct interaction between peers during the risk choice task
to identify the causal effect of peer communication on risky choices. We discuss outcomes
in terms of similarity of lottery choices (see Section 3.3.3), and riskiness of choice (see
Section 3.3.4). We also comment on how similarity among different types of peers affects
teenagers’ choices.
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3.3.1 Adolescents’ Risk and Loss Aversion
In our discussion of risk preferences among teenagers, we first focus on the control group
in which adolescents take individual and independent decisions without peer interaction.
We apply the method derived from prospect theory described in Section 3.2.1. The risk
preferences determined from adolescents’ choices24 show that adolescents are, on average,
risk and loss averse, i.e. display σ < 1 and λ > 1 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). We find a mean risk aversion parameter σ¯ of 0.828, and a mean loss
aversion parameter λ¯ of 2.579 (see upper panel of Table 3.2). One-sided t-tests confirm
the hypotheses of risk and loss aversion of adolescents (see last column of Table 3.2).25
Looking across the distribution of parameters, we find that 59.4% of teenagers in the
control group are risk averse, and the large majority of 79.7% are loss averse.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Individual Parameters: Adolescents and Young
Adults
mean median 5th 25th 75th 95th % risk- (loss-) averse p-valuea
Adolescents’ risk preference parameters (CONTROL)
σi 0.828 0.650 0.150 0.500 1.125 1.625 0.594 0.004
λi 2.579 1.985 0.458 1.548 2.499 7.490 0.797 0.000
Young adult university students’ risk preferenceb
σi 0.613 0.550 0.050 0.350 0.750 1.625 0.775 0.000
λi 2.949 2.023 0.671 1.540 3.141 10.019 0.775 0.000
Note: a p-values from t-tests of H0: σ ≥ 1 or λ ≥ 1 respectively. b Risk preferences are elicited
using the same lottery choices (rounded to one decimal).
The prevalence of risk aversion among adults and adolescents has been established in
previous studies (Glätzle-Rützler et al., 2015; Tanaka et al., 2010; Tymula et al., 2012;
von Gaudecker et al., 2011). Tanaka et al. (2010), for example, report σ¯south = 0.59
(σ¯north = 0.63) for farmers in south (north) Vietnam, while Glätzle-Rützler et al. (2015)
estimate mean risk aversion to be 0.57 among children and adolescents aged between 10
and 18. Our results show a similar degree of risk aversion at the median, but a slightly
lower mean degree of risk aversion compared to these studies.
24For a summary of teenagers’ choices, see Table C.2 in appendix C.2.
25We find adolescents to be risk and loss averse also in the full sample. Average parameter values are
σ¯ = 0.77 and λ¯ = 2.86. We reject the hypothesis that individuals are not risk and loss-averse at p < 0.01
(one-sided tests).
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To cross-validate our lottery instrument, we replicate the individual risk choice task (that
we posed to the control group in our experiment), using the same payoff structure, with
university students26. In a sample of 64 students at LMU Munich, we find risk aversion
among university students at the mean (σ¯ = 0.613; see lower panel of Table 3.2) that
is similar to the parameters found in the previous literature. We test for differences in
risk aversion between teenagers (of lower socio-economic status (SES)) and university
students (who tend to be of high SES), and find teenagers to be statistically significantly
less risk-averse (Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.004).27
Fewer studies provide information on the existence and degree of loss aversion, and all
of these apply to adults. These point to (a large degree of) loss aversion (Abdellaoui
et al., 2008; Etchart-Vincent and L’Haridon, 2011). To our knowledge, we are the first
to measure the degree of loss aversion among adolescents. Relatedly, Glätzle-Rützler
et al. (2015) study myopic loss aversion, i.e. a combination of loss aversion and mental
accounting, in an adolescent sample. They find, in contrast to adults, no evidence for
such myopia among teenagers, but their design does not allow the separate identification
of λ.
We find evidence for the existence of loss aversion among nearly 80% of adolescents.
The average degree of loss aversion among adolescents (λ¯ = 2.579) is similar to previous
estimates for adults. Tanaka et al. (2010) finds λ¯ = 2.63, and Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) provide an estimate of 2.25. Comparing our parameter values to those of adults
in Tanaka et al. (2010) using t-tests, we find no statistically significant differences in loss
aversion λ. However, we do find statistically significant differences between adolescents
and university students, using the same choice task. University students are more risk-
averse (Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.004)28, and more loss-averse (λ = 2.949) than the
26These students completed a computerised lab task using the same lottery choices (with payoffs
rounded to one decimal). Students were paid according to an individual chip and choice draw, compared
to a joint in-class draw in our experiment.
27Correspondingly, we find that teenagers switch to the more risky lottery B earlier (average switching
point: 5.359) than university students (switching point: 6.845, Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.003), and
that a larger percentage of young adults is risk-averse (χ2 test, p = 0.023). This result is consistent
with the findings of Tymula et al. (2012) who report increasing risk aversion between adolescence and
adulthood. Contrary evidence is provided in Glätzle-Rützler et al. (2015) who found the degree of risk
aversion to be stable across age between childhood and adolescence. However, since the two study
populations differ in their socio-economic status, we cannot interpret our findings solely in terms of age.
28Additionally, a statistically significantly higher fraction of students – 77.5 relative to 59.4% of ado-
lescents – is risk-averse (χ2 test, p = 0.023)
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adolescents in this study. However, the latter difference is not statistically significant
(Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.383).
In summary, adolescents have – consistent with previous findings – strongly risk-averse
preferences. We present new evidence that adolescents are loss-averse. In a parallel task
with university students, we find that both risk and loss aversion are heterogeneous across
and within population groups, e.g. by age and socio-economic status.29
Result 1: Risk preferences among adolescents
Adolescents are on average risk and (strongly) loss averse, i.e. σ < 1 and λ > 1.
3.3.2 Assortative Matching on Risk Preferences among Peers
Preference heterogeneity may be reduced among peers. In our experiment, we collect
information about adolescents’ peer networks in all groups which allows us to test whether
individual and independent lottery choices (i.e. those made by the control group) display
similarity with their peers’ risk preferences (in the absence of social interaction during the
task). Two mechanisms may lead to similarity in risk preferences: first, adolescents likely
exhibit assortative matching in their choice of friends. Similarly, there may be selection
in the sorting of adolescents into classes (due to geographic proximity, family background,
and so forth), either by parental or school influence on class assignment (see, inter alia,
Jackson and Rogers (2007) for evidence on social sorting processes). Secondly, attending
the same class or friendship may result in convergence in risk preferences over time (Ahern
et al., 2014). The scope of this paper is not to differentiate between friends assortative
matching (or selective sorting into classes) and subsequent convergence in preferences as
relations deepen. Rather, our aim is to separate the effect of direct social interaction in the
choice situation from the peer sorting processes which took place before our experiment. In
the remainder of the paper, we hence use the term “assortative matching” to characterise
the cumulative effect of the matching, sorting and convergence between peers that take
place before the experiment.
We elicit peer information at two levels: First, we identify each teenagers’ classmates
(and know their choices). Second, we follow the same procedure of identifying (mutual)
29Recent studies by (Alan et al., 2012) and (Zumbühl et al., 2013) emphasize the importance of inter-
generational transmission of risk preferences as the source of heterogeneity in risk preferences
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friends in the control group (via the exchange of stickers with their ID number) as in
the FRIENDS treatment. Using this information, we investigate similarity of choices
in the control group across three dimensions: we compare individual i’s risk preferences
by calculating absolute parameter differences with i) the average risk preferences of all
other individuals in the control group (i.e. across classes and schools, denoted as ∆Sij)30,
ii) of i’s classmates (∆Cij), and iii) with i’s endogenously chosen friend j (∆Fij). None of
these teenagers were allowed to discuss their simultaneously made lottery choices, so all
similarity in choices is due to ex ante similarity.
Under positive assortative matching, risk preferences of friends would be more similar
than those of classmates, and more similar than those among teenagers in the control
group. Based on previous evidence for young adults, we expect preferences among peers
to have converged over the course of their joint school time together. Ahern et al. (2014)
find convergence in risk aversion among MBA students which overall increases average
risk aversion over the course of one study year. McPhee (1996) showed that adolescents
are more likely to exert peer pressure on friends than on acquaintances, hence we expect
stronger similarity in risk preferences among friends. Additionally, friends may match
assortatively, potentially including matching on risk preferences.
Table 3.3 compares the similarity in risk and loss aversion parameters across the three
dimensions described above. Friends’ risk aversion and loss aversion parameters are less
similar to each other than those of adolescents in our control group overall. Adolescents do
not exhibit the expected ranking in similarity by peer closeness. For both – loss and risk
aversion – friends exhibit a significantly larger variance in preferences. In consequence, the
hypothesis of increased similarity among friends is not confirmed. Among classmates, we
obtain mixed results regarding assortative matching. Adolescents in the same class exhibit
larger similarity in risk aversion, but less similarity in loss aversion than adolescents in
the control group (across classes and schools). We reject the Null hypothesis of equal
similarity in a Wilcoxon-Signrank test (p = 0.037 and p = 0.001 for σ and λ respectively,
see Table 3.3). Hence, while we do find some evidence of increased similarity in risk
preferences among classmates, we do not find evidence of assortative matching among
friends on risk aversion or loss aversion.
30Similarity in risk aversion within the control group is e.g. computed as ∆Sij(σ) = |σi − σRos| =
|σi − 1S−1
∑
j 6=i∈S σj |. ∆Sij(λ) is constructed analogously. Similarity measures within classes are con-
structed analogously, but comparing to the mean within the class (j ∈ C) only. Finally, similarity in risk
preferences among friends is, e.g.: ∆Fij(σ) = |σi − σj | where j denotes the friend.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Similarity by Peer Relation within CONTROL
σ λ
mean var mean var
∆F 0.382 0.113 2.094 7.061
∆C 0.354 0.086 1.614 3.584
∆S 0.411 0.071 1.479 3.283
p-values
∆F = ∆C 0.579 0.920
∆F = ∆S 0.482 0.339
∆C = ∆S 0.037** 0.001***
Note: p-values from Wilcoxon-Signrank Tests;
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Individual and family background characteristics of adolescents are likely determinants of
school choice, class assignment and the formation of friendships. To test for assortative
matching on risk preferences (rather than on individual characteristics), we additionally
control for the latter. We follow the dyadic approach outlined in Fafchamps and Gubert
(2007) (see also Arcand and Fafchamps (2011) and Attanasio et al. (2012)). We treat each
possible pair of individuals as one observation. We first consider selection into friendships
and create these dyads within a class, thus creating 335 combinations31. This allows us to
study whether friends’ socio-economic characteristics as well as their (individually elicited)
risk preferences are correlated more strongly (than those who do not consider each other
as friends). Since friendship pairs are formed jointly by exchanging stickers, they are
by construction undirected, so the matches mij and mji are symmetric. Let mij = 1 if
two classmates declare their friendship, and zero otherwise. Since mij = mji, we collapse
identical pairs and adapt a symmetric dyadic approach (see Arcand and Fafchamps (2011);
Attanasio et al. (2012); Fafchamps and Gubert (2007)). We specify the following model:
mij = β0 + β1|σi − σj|+ δ1|λi − λj|+ η1|zi − zj|+ ζ1|yi − yj|
+ β2|σi + σj|+ δ2|λi + λj|+ η2|zi + zj|+ ζ2|yi + yj|+ µi (3.1)
where σ and λ denote elicited risk preferences, z is a vector of individual characteristics,
y are family background characteristics, and µi is a classroom fixed effect. Note that the
specification includes absolute values of sums and differences of each explanatory variable
31The number of possible pairs depends on the class size as friends and classmates can only be matched
within, not across classes.
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within the pair. We use absolute values as the match is undirected. Sums model the
likelihood that individuals with particular characteristics are more likely to have a friend
in the class. Difference terms allow us to test for assortative matching on time-invariant
characteristics (as most of the variables that we include in x and y are, e.g gender).
To be precise, differences reflect (as)sorting and ex ante convergence in preferences (or
characteristics) through previous contact when characteristics are possibly time-variant
(as adolescents’ risk preferences σ and λ may be). As discussed at the beginning of this
section, we do not distinguish between these and test joint hypotheses summarising these
mechanisms. Negative (positive) parameter estimates β1 or δ1 would indicate (negative)
assorting in risk preferences. Parameter estimates for η1 and ζ1 indicate ex ante matching
on individual and family background characteristics.
Since all teenagers enter a pair by experimental design (unless class size is uneven or an
adolescent in a pair did not give consent, in which case one teenager remains unmatched),
there is little source for endogenous participation choice. We estimate the dyadic model
using a logit estimator and cluster standard errors at the class level.
We find no evidence for the joint hypothesis that friendships form based on or converge in
their risk preferences over time (see column 1 of Table 3.4). Controlling for individual and
family background characteristics, such as age, gender and numeracy (measured by the
math grade relative to average class performance), we find, consistent with the matching
literature, strong evidence for positive assortative matching. It is based on age and
gender, but not on numeracy (see column 2). As expected, we find none of the terms
involving sums of characteristics to affect the probability of a friend matching, confirming
the viability of our design and rejecting the hypothesis of endogenous participation choice.
In column 3, we expand the set of characteristics, using family background characteristics
such as household size, whether they live with a single parent, have migrant background,
or have low socio-economic status. Socio-economic status is proxied by a dummy that
takes the value of 1 if there are no more than 25 books in a teenagers’ home. The number
of books is a standard question in PISA that captures important family inputs into a
teenager’s education, or lack thereof (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). We find very
similar parameter estimates for the matching variables age and gender. Additionally,
adolescents are more likely to match on single parent and socio-economic status.32
32In a robustness check, we re-estimate specifications 2 and 3 on a pooled control (CONTROL) and
friends matched treatment (FRIENDS) to check whether both groups have a similar matching on ob-
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Table 3.4: Logit Regressions of Probability of Being Friends on Dyad Level explanatory
Variables within CONTROL
(1) (2) (3)
P (friends = 1) P (friends = 1) P (friends = 1)
DIFFERENCES
σ 0.0647 0.288 0.416
(0.212) (0.550) (0.890)
λ 0.00834 -0.0542 -0.0642
(0.115) (0.183) (0.161)
rel. math grade 0.130 0.157
(0.291) (0.261)
age -0.613** -0.761**
(0.263) (0.304)
male -2.517*** -2.526**
(0.972) (1.110)
household size -0.158
(0.175)
single parent -1.751***
(0.601)
migrant -0.0728
(0.286)
low SES -0.357***
(0.0887)
SUMS
σ 0.216 0.151 0.212
(0.280) (0.300) (0.426)
λ 0.0186 0.0748 0.0982
(0.0637) (0.129) (0.123)
rel. math grade 0.0629 -0.00710
(0.163) (0.221)
age 0.0353 0.0804
(0.0658) (0.133)
male -0.334* -0.348
(0.203) (0.285)
household size 0.0889*
(0.0463)
single parent 0.460*
(0.251)
migrant -0.0466
(0.360)
low SES -0.216
(0.328)
Constant -3.213*** -2.956 -4.128
(0.600) (2.963) (5.332)
Observations 335 335 335
Note: Dependent variable is classmates which is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 for pairs of participants who are classmates; rel. math grade refers to the
math grade of each individual subtracted by the class average; robust standard
errors clustered at the class level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Logit Regressions of Being Classmates on Dyad Level Explanatory Variables
within CONTROL
(1) (2) (3)
P (classmates = 1) P (classmates = 1) P (classmates = 1)
DIFFERENCES
σ -0.637 -0.699 -0.688
(0.742) (0.583) (0.498)
λ 0.0106 0.00426 0.0146
(0.0454) (0.0715) (0.0429)
rel. math grade -0.108 -0.107
(0.140) (0.111)
age -0.612*** -0.615***
(0.156) (0.166)
male 0.163*** 0.163***
(0.0557) (0.0560)
household size -0.0117
(0.0420)
single parent 0.0859
(0.0725)
migrant 0.0385
(0.0835)
low SES -0.0466
(0.130)
SUMS
σ -0.0485 0.00422 -0.00239
(0.454) (0.495) (0.453)
λ -0.0214 -0.0121 -0.0214
(0.0350) (0.0444) (0.0700)
rel. math grade 0.0223 -0.00352
(0.0793) (0.143)
age 0.189 0.207
(0.335) (0.384)
male -0.101 -0.110
(0.120) (0.151)
household size 0.0371
(0.112)
single parent -0.0760
(0.216)
migrant -0.00896
(0.250)
low SES -0.0797
(0.263)
Constant -0.667 -5.273 -5.888
(1.551) (7.967) (9.997)
Observations 1,378 1,378 1,378
Note: Dependent variable is classmates which is a dummy variable taking the value 1
for pairs of participants who are classmates; rel. math grade refers to the math grade of
each individual subtracted by the class average; robust standard errors clustered at the
class level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Finally, we use the dyadic analysis to investigate matching among classmates (Table 3.5).
We form all possible pairs across classes and redefine the dependent variable to take the
value of 1 if two adolescents who are randomly paired in the dyadic analysis are classmates,
and otherwise estimate the same specifications as before. Again, we find no evidence of
pairing based on risk preferences but we do find matching on age and gender which can
be easily explained: positive assortative matching based on age arises because we have
classes from two different cohorts in our sample, thus age differences between classes are
more pronounced than within classes. Negative assortative matching based on gender can
be explained using conditional probabilities: if you consider the gender of one observation
within one classroom, this observation will be more likely to be matched with a classmate
of the opposite gender within the classroom (since she cannot be matched with herself)
than across different classrooms, since the distribution of gender across CONTROL classes
is relatively unaffected by removing one observation from the treatment. Apart from these
mechanical results, we find no evidence of any sorting or systematic matching effects.
Result 2: Similarity of friends in risk preferences in the absence of social
interaction
a Similarity in risk or loss aversion is not larger among friends than among random
peers.
b Adolescents do not assortatively match on loss or risk aversion.
d Friends assortatively match on age and gender, and on living with a single parent
and family socio-economic status.
c Classmates are, however, matched by observable characteristics, i.e. age and
gender.
In summary, we do not find evidence of assortative matching on risk preferences, suggest-
ing that friendships are neither formed nor more likely sustained based on similar risk
preferences. We also do not find matching on risk preferences among classmates.
servables. We find very similar parameter estimates as for the control group alone, so friends match on
the same characteristics in both groups (see Table C.5 in appendix C.3).
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3.3.3 Social Interaction in Risk Choices: Choice Similarity
Peer effects may not only arise from assortative matching but also from direct social in-
teraction, i.e. communication between peers, in a choice situation. We thus introduce
controlled variation in social interaction in our experiment. In the two treatment condi-
tions, we pair each teenager with a random classmate (RANDOM ) or a friend (FRIENDS)
and allow them to communicate. During or after the discussion, each subject makes indi-
vidual lottery choices. We acknowledge the dynamic nature of peer influences by allowing
for bilateral interaction and simultaneous decision-making under random exposure to nat-
urally occurring peers. This comes at a cost: we are not able to identify the direction of
peer influences, as is possible in a sequential design. However, our design does preserve
the innate uncertainty about the actions of one’s peer present in many choice situations,
and allows for dynamic interaction. The latter is ruled out in sequential designs.
Our ability to condition on assortative matching helps us better understand the mecha-
nisms of peer influences, as we can separate it from (dynamic) social interaction in the
choice situation. Since we did find assortative matching on socio-economic characteristics
among classmates and friends, we identify the impact of peer communication on adoles-
cents’ risk choices by comparing the similarity in risk preferences among paired teenagers
in the treatment groups with similarly matched pairs in the control group.
In the RANDOM treatment, our counterfactual is the similarity between an individual’s
choice and the average of the choices of the remainder of her class33. We find that
communication decreases the difference in risk and in loss aversion within pairs by about
45% (for both p ≈ 0, see Table 3.6). The increased in similarity mainly stems from
perfect alignment of lottery choices. 59% of pairs in the treatment group choose the same
switchpoint in the lotteries with positive payoffs (p ≈ 0) relative to 11% in the control
group, and 67% make identical choices in the mixed lotteries (p = 0.002). 56% of subjects
in RANDOM make identical choices in both decision sheets, while only 3% do so in the
control group.
The social interaction effects are similar when friends (rather than classmates) are allowed
to discuss their choices (see Table 3.7). Here, the counterfactual is the similarity of
friends pairs in the control group, identified through a mutual exchange of ID stickers,
33I.e. excluding the individual
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Table 3.6: Similarity of Risk Parameters across Matches for RANDOM vs. CONTROL
CONTROL RANDOM
(individual relative to RoC)
Mean SD Mean SD p-value
∆ij(σ) 0.354 0.293 0.194 0.372 0.000
∆ij(λ) 1.614 1.893 0.907 2.103 0.000
%(∆ij(switchA) = 0) 0.109 0.593 0.000
%(∆ij(switchB) = 0) 0.406 0.667 0.023
%(ident.choice) 0.031 0.556 0.000
Note: i and j refer to matched participants. RoC denotes the rest of class, i.e. excluding
individual i; ∆ij(σ) and ∆ij(λ) refer to the absolute difference in σ respectively λ between
two matched participants; to construct %(∆ij(switchA) = 0) and %(∆ij(switchB) = 0)
in CONTROL the average switching point rounded to the next integer was used; p-values
for ∆ij(σ) = 0 (∆ij(λ) = 0) from Mann-Whitney-U tests and for %(∆ij(switchA) = 0),
(%(∆ij(switchB) = 0)) and %(ident.choice) from χ2 tests.
Table 3.7: Similarity of Risk Parameters across Matches for FRIENDS vs. CONTROL
CONTROL FRIENDS
(friends pairs)
Mean SD Mean SD p-value
∆ij(σ) 0.382 0.336 0.166 0.242 0.002
∆ij(λ) 2.094 2.657 0.290 0.549 0.000
%(∆ij(switchA) = 0) 0.156 0.450 0.008
%(∆ij(switchB) = 0) 0.281 0.750 0.000
%(ident.choice) 0.031 0.425 0.000
Note: i and j refer to matched participants. ∆ij(σ) and ∆ij(λ) refer to the
absolute difference in σ respectively λ between two matched participants; p-
values for ∆ij(σ) = 0 (∆ij(λ) = 0) from Mann-Whitney-U tests and for
%(∆ij(switchA) = 0), (%(∆ij(switchB) = 0)) and %(ident.choice) from χ2
tests.
the same method that we used in the FRIENDS treatment. Differences in the risk aversion
parameter reduce by more than more than half (57%, p = 0.002), and differences in the
loss aversion parameter decrease by 85% (p ≈ 0). Again, this is mainly due to the increase
in identical choices within peer pairs. The fraction of pairs who coordinate their choices
perfectly in the lotteries with positive payoffs increases from 16 to 45%, and from 28 to
75% in the mixed lotteries. 43% of individuals make perfectly aligned choices in both
lottery types, as opposed to 3% in the control group. All increases in coordination are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Result 3: Similarity of choices in the communication treatments
a Similarity in risk preferences among peers who are allowed to communicate
increases (among friends and classmates).
b Social interaction increases the fraction of paired teenagers who make identical
decisions (in both treatments).
In a related study among close peers, Bursztyn et al. (2014) study peer effects in an
investment choice using a design in which information exchange is unidirectional. In their
experiment, second mover adults who receive information about their (first mover) friends’
investment choice are significantly more likely to buy the same asset. Investment take-up
increases from 42% to 71% (respectively 93%), yielding effect sizes that are similar to
those found in our study: close peers choose similar lotteries, and a large fraction makes
identical choices. While they do not consider the role of assortative matching among their
close peers, the authors chose a design which allows them to test two social interaction
mechanisms: social learning and “keeping up with the Joneses” motives. Social learning
describes a situation where the individual interprets her peer’s choice as a quality signal.
“Keeping up with the Joneses” type preferences arise when one’s utility from making a
risky choice depends directly on another individual’s risk choices. Bursztyn et al. (2014)
find that both channels affect investment choices.
We offer new evidence that social learning plays a role in peers’ choice coordination – also
among teenagers. We exploit that peers’ willingness to coordinate choices should then
depend on signals of financial competency. We have two measures of financial competency
at our disposal: our study contains 12 questions on financial literacy (see appendix C.7
for further details)34 and a numeracy measure (the last math grade). Note that as in
Bursztyn et al. (2014), the evidence we present is suggestive, as financial literacy and
numeracy are not randomly assigned. While both could in principle serve as signals of
peer quality, they differ in an important aspect: while math grades (and performance)
are publicly observable in the classroom, our test of financial literacy was conducted
during the experiment and adolescents received no feedback on their own or each others’
34Our measure of financial literacy replicates the interest compounding and risk diversification measure
of Van Rooij et al. (2011), but provides a more comprehensive measurement of financial literacy using
ten questions in which adolescents are asked to choose between differently risky assets, trade off between
risk and liquidity, and so forth.
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test results. Therefore, numeracy is a publicly observed signal of peer quality, while
the financial literacy score remains a private signal. Since peer interaction is bilateral
in our simultaneous setting – unlike in Bursztyn et al. (2014) –, coordination can be
rejected unilaterally but has to be agreed bilaterally. If social learning matters, individuals
who receive a negative peer signal should decide not to coordinate. Individuals with
high financial competency, in contrast, may be more likely to reject coordination, as
high financial literacy may reduce the need for social learning and indicate a stronger
cognitive-control system, thus muting the scope for peer influence. We use perfect choice
coordination in all lottery choices as a conservative measure of peer influence, and examine
this hypothesis.
In Table 3.8, we investigate the determinants of perfect coordination of choices across
both sheets in each treatment condition. We include measures of (own) financial liter-
acy and numeracy and peer differences in these. We find evidence suggestive of social
learning: while there is no association between peer differences in (privately observed)
financial literacy and the probability of coordination, we find that peer differences in
(publicly observed) numeracy reduce the probability of coordination, in line with social
learning effects in a simultaneous choice setting. We also find that high own financial
literacy is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of coordinating, as hypothesized
above. This is again showing that the results for adults in Bursztyn et al. (2014) carry
through to teenagers, and suggests that own competence makes teenagers less prone to
peer influences.
However, Table 3.8 also shows that these effects are statistically significant (and econom-
ically important) only in the RANDOM treatment, so whether social learning takes place
appears sensitive to the type of peer. We find no correlation between numeracy or fi-
nancial sophistication (or peer differences in these) in the FRIENDS treatment, although
interacting friends also display strong increases in coordination. The sensitivity of peer
influence to peer closeness has also been highlighted by Carrell et al. (2013). Our results
would be consistent with the hypothesis that social learning and information exchange as
the mechanisms behind peer interaction may play a stronger role between less close peers.
Given that we did not create exogenous variation in financial competency and since our
sample size shrinks when we split the data by treatment condition and degree of coor-
dination, the robustness of the differential results between these two peer groups should
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Perfect Choice Coordination
RANDOM FRIENDS
Financial literacy -0.239 (1.99)** 0.068 (0.91)
∆(Financial literacy) -0.076 (0.34) -0.110 (1.51)
Math 0.236 (0.88) -0.060 (0.34)
∆(Math) -0.706 (2.11)** 0.269 (1.51)
Male -0.260 (0.55) -0.590 (1.78)*
∆(Male) 0.525 (1.01) -0.564 (1.25)
Constant 2.512 (2.28)** -0.317 (0.45)
Observations 46 74
Note: Probit regressions; estimates are clustered at the class level. t-
statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
be tested in further research. A suitable design for such a test could be to introduce
experimental variation in private and public signals between rounds in repeated lotteries
with mixed and positive prospects.
Result 4: Peer influence and social learning
a Coordination increases in the similarity in publicly observed financial compe-
tency, consistent with social learning effects.
b Coordination among friends is not related to either measure of financial compe-
tency.
3.3.4 Social Interaction in Risk Choices: Level of Risk and Loss
Taking
While sequential peer experimental designs pose a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the second
mover, our simultaneous setting involves several choices between differently risky lotteries.
Thus, we examine the impact of social interaction on the level of risk-taking, using the
prospect theory parameters to give an indication of scale. Under peer influence, choices
are, however, no longer independent and thus do not identify individual preference param-
eters. We therefore also report choices directly, i.e. the switching points in the lotteries
with positive (A) and mixed payoffs (B).
Gardner and Steinberg (2005) found that subjects under peer influence took more risks,
focused more on benefits than costs of risky behavior and made riskier decisions than
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Table 3.9: Risk Parameters per Treatment
p-values
CON RAN FRI RAN vs CON FRI vs CON RAN vs FRI
σ¯ 0.828 0.761 0.727 0.245 0.350 0.681
λ¯ 2.579 3.407 2.724 0.039** 0.906 0.021**
risk-averse 0.594 0.630 0.700 0.692 0.185 0.397
loss-averse 0.797 0.926 0.762 0.048** 0.623 0.014**
Note: Full sample included; p-values are from Mann-Whitney-U tests; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01
when they did not communicate.35 Similarly, we expected participants in the two peer
discussion treatments to take more risk, both in the domain of pure lotteries as well as
in the domain of mixed lotteries. We additionally expected that these effects would be
more pronounced for closer peers, in line with the social comparison theory by Festinger
(1954). He postulated that the tendency to compare oneself with some other specific
person decreases in the differences with that person. Friends (who have assortatively
matched) would be more alike, so we expected stronger effects of discussions towards risk
taking and loss acceptance in the FRIENDS treatment.
We find none of these predictions from previous studies confirmed. Table 3.9 shows
that teenagers make less risky choices in both treatments compared to control, but the
difference is not statistically significantly different from zero. The degree of loss aver-
sion increases in both treatments, among (endogenously) matched friends and randomly
allocated classmates. In the FRIENDS group, this increase is small and not statisti-
cally significant compared to CONTROL, but we detect a large and strongly statistically
significant increase in loss averse choices when classmates are matched randomly (RAN-
DOM vs. FRIENDS ; Mann-Whitney-U test, p = 0.021). The loss aversion parameter
rises throughout the distribution in RANDOM compared to CONTROL (see Table 3.10,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.084), and leads to an increase in the percentage of loss
averse adolescents by 12.9 percentage points, or 16.2%, to over 90%. While the loss aver-
sion parameter among classmate pairs who make different choices, is very similar to mean
loss aversion in the control group, the loss aversion parameter is much higher among
those who coordinate perfectly, i.e. who are more prone to peer influence (∆(λ) = 1.59,
one-sided t-test, p = 0.0271). All these results hold when we look at the raw choices: ran-
domly paired interacting classmates switch later in lottery choices with mixed prospects,
35The study used a non-incentivised “chicken game” to elicit risk-taking.
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mainly driven by those who coordinate their choices.
Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics for Estimated Individual Parameters
mean median 5th 25th 75th 95th p-value
σ¯i
CON 0.828 0.650 0.150 0.500 1.125 1.625 0.004
RAN 0.761 0.600 0.150 0.350 1.125 1.625 0.001
FRI 0.727 0.650 0.100 0.550 0.900 1.625 0.000
λ¯i
CON 2.579 1.985 0.458 1.548 2.499 7.490 0.000
RAN 3.407 2.094 0.879 1.875 3.592 10.517 0.000
FRI 2.724 1.981 0.791 1.541 2.975 10.371 0.000
Note: Full sample included; p-values from t-tests of H0: σ = 1 or λ = 1 respectively
Result 5: Risk preferences in the communication treatments
Communication with a random classmate increases loss aversion among adoles-
cents, especially among coordinating peers.
To summarise, peer interaction increases choice similarity in both gains and mixed lot-
teries, and regardless of the type of peer. In addition, the fraction of peers who make
identical choices increases substantially. Coordination with a less close peer follows “ratio-
nal” signal extraction criteria, meaning that individuals with higher own financial literacy
are less likely to coordinate their choice with a peer, while peer similarity in publicly ob-
served numeracy increases the likelihood of coordination (although neither classmates
nor friends match assortatively on numeracy). In contrast, we find that coordination of
choices between friends varies only by gender – with female pairs being more likely to co-
ordinate. Finally, interaction with a random classmate leads to more loss averse choices.
While lottery choices of classmate pairs who make non-coordinated choices are similar to
those in the control group, statistically significantly more loss averse choices are made
among classmates who coordinate. We speculate that this may suggest a social insurance
motive among random classmates, who make very loss averse choices for fear of ending
up loosing more of their initial endowment relative to their peer. This motive may be
stronger among classmates than friends due to differences in the level of trust. However,
more research is needed to shed light on the mechanisms behind these peer-specific effects.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied peer effects in risk and loss-taking among adolescents. We
developed an experimental strategy that uses naturally occurring peers – in our case
classmates and friends – to study choices in gains and mixed lotteries. We randomised
subjects into experimental conditions with and without social interaction, and explored
differences between social interaction with randomly allocated classmates and mutually
chosen friends. We recognised the influence of pre-existing relations among natural peers,
and bridged the gap between experimental and non-experimental approaches by collecting
additional information about such relationships. We used this information to analyse
assortative matching on risk preferences (in the absence of social interaction).
Although friends assortatively match on socio-economic characteristics like age and gen-
der, and on family background characteristics, we found no evidence that adolescents
match on their preferences regarding risk or loss. In contrast, we found strong peer effects
on incentivised risky choices that work through social interaction in the choice situation.
Both treatment groups – randomly paired classmates and mutual friends – display in-
creased choice similarity in lotteries with positive as well as with mixed prospects when
they are allowed to communicate in pairs. In fact, a large fraction coordinates their
choices perfectly.
One potential driver of increased choice similarity among pairs is social learning. We
explore this mechanism using a private and a public signal of financial competency. We
find that high own financial competency appears to make teenagers less prone to peer
influence, i.e. less likely to coordinate choices. Differences in the public signal of financial
competency, reduce the likelihood of choice coordination among peers. However, evidence
in favour of the social learning hypothesis is found for randomly paired classmates, but
not for friends. This may reflect channels of peer effects depending on the nature of the
relationship.
We also find mixed results regarding the direction in which these strong effects of peer
interaction affect teenagers’ choices. Teenagers make more loss averse choices under peer
influence, but do not seem to systematically change their risk-taking. Like the social
learning result, increasingly loss averse choices are only found among communicating
classmates, i.e. they may depend on the nature of the peer relation.
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Finally, we find that more than half of adolescents are risk averse and over two-thirds are
loss averse. As a reference sample, university students displayed more risk aversion than
adolescents in the same choice task. This confirms existing evidence on how risk aversion
varies with age. Additionally, we also show weakly declining loss aversion by age. To our
knowledge we are the first to explore loss aversion among adolescents.
Overall, we draw important conclusions on the nature of peer influences: our results
suggest that adolescents are on average risk and loss averse. Their risky choices are
strongly influenced by their peers. Peer effects do not arise from assortative matching
but from social interaction, so that social learning or social utility considerations may be
main drivers. We re-examine the hypothesis of Carrell et al. (2013) that the nature of the
peer relation matters, and find evidence in its favour (in our two treatment conditions).
We suggest the following avenues for further research: First, with the exception of Gardner
and Steinberg (2005), drivers of risky decision making among adolescents remain relatively
unexplored. This study provides new evidence. Peer closeness may shape the nature of
peer effects, especially in adolescence. For example, social learning may be more relevant
in interaction with less close peers. We developed an experimental design for the study
of such effects. Experimental variation in private and public signals of task competency
could be used to investigate social learning effects in more detail.
Appendices

APPENDIX A
Unleashing Animal Spirits – Self-Control and
Overpricing in Experimental Asset Markets
A.1 Period-specific Price Comparisons
Looking at single periods, it is possible to get a more precise picture of when the price dif-
ferences between conditions arise. Table A.1 reports the per-period differences of volume-
adjusted mean prices, trade-adjusted mean prices, RAD and RD between LOWSC and
HIGHSC. The z-values from Mann-Whitney tests testing the equality of the respective
measures across the two conditions are displayed in parentheses with significance levels in-
dicated by asterisks. While in the first periods we see almost no price differences, starting
from period five, markets in LOWSC exhibit significantly higher mean prices, mispricing,
and overpricing, with the peak in period 8. There are no significant differences between
the two conditions in the ultimate period. By definition, this implies a more pronounced
bubble and burst pattern in LOWSC markets than in HIGHSC markets.
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Table A.1: Period-specific Effects
Period
∆volume-adjusted ∆trade-adjusted
∆RAD ∆RDmean price mean price
1
-0.67 -0.85 0.0143 -0.0245
(0.84) (0.735) (-0.63) (0.84)
2
0.73 2.87 -0.0749 0.0266
(0.105) (-0.21) (0.21) (0.105)
3
4.53 3.38 0.0006 0.1646
(-0.84) (-0.525) (-0.105) (-0.84)
4
7.18 7.64* 0.1720 0.2612
(-1.47) (-1.89) (-1.26) (-1.47)
5
9.24* 9.03* 0.2523 0.3359*
(-1.785) (-1.785) (-1.47) (-1.785)
6
12.27** 12.01** 0.4186** 0.4461**
(-2.205) (-2.31) (-2.205) (-2.205)
7
15.90** 15.84** 0.5703** 0.5781**
(-2.521) (-2.415) (-2.521) (-2.521)
8
18.40** 19.00** 0.6573** 0.6693**
(-2.521) (-2.521) (-2.521) (-2.521)
9
11.69** 11.78** 0.4249** 0.4249**
(-2.1) (-1.995) (-2.1) (-2.1)
10
6.13 6.48 0.2007 0.2228
(-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.05) (-1.26)
Note: Differences between LOWSC and HIGHSC and z-values (in parentheses) for
Mann-Whitney tests. Volume-adjusted mean prices denote the average price per
asset, while trade-adjusted mean prices denote average price per trade.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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A.2 Additional Regression Results
Table A.2: Determinants of Trading Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average quantity traded
LOWSC -0.120 -0.0503 -2.915 -3.038
(2.079) (2.032) (4.235) (4.562)
CRT -0.0287 -1.310* -1.328*
(0.842) (0.700) (0.716)
CE 0.685 0.558 0.542
(0.802) (0.820) (0.868)
CRT × LOWSC 2.881* 2.874*
(1.525) (1.537)
CE × LOWSC 0.278 0.335
(1.700) (1.922)
Female -0.295
(1.942)
Constant 12.52*** 11.06*** 12.42*** 12.69***
(1.025) (2.173) (2.280) (3.313)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.000 0.006 0.035 0.036
Note: OLS regression, dependent variable is individual average number
of trades. LOWSC is a dummy where 1 stands for LOWSC and 0 for
HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent. CRT denotes the
number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects who indicated they knew
one or more of the CRT questions before were excluded. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at market level in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
110 Animal Spirits
Table A.3: Determinants of Trading Activity (MIXED)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average quantity traded
MIXLO -0.424 -0.828 -0.573 -0.586
(2.252) (2.157) (5.110) (5.143)
CRT -1.309 0.579 0.541
(0.807) (1.429) (1.462)
CE 1.653 1.217 1.161
(0.973) (1.191) (1.289)
CRT × MIXLO -3.984* -3.950*
(1.903) (1.885)
CE × MIXLO 1.211 1.205
(2.265) (2.258)
Female -0.422
(1.602)
Constant 12.09*** 9.805*** 9.266*** 9.691***
(1.155) (1.517) (2.189) (3.124)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R2 0.001 0.040 0.084 0.085
Note: OLS regression, dependent variable is individual average num-
ber of trades. MIXLO is a dummy where 1 stands for MIXLO and 0
for MIXHI. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent. CRT denotes
the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects who indicated
they knew one or more of the CRT questions before were excluded.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at market level
in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: Ratings of Emotions in MIXED Markets
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
Excitement1 4.200 4.500 0.400
Fear1 2.100 2.175 0.395
Surprise1 3.600 4.050 0.103
Anger1 1.800 2.025 0.440
Relief1 2.825 3.250 0.161
Sadness1 1.525 1.725 0.324
Joy1 3.625 4.375 0.058*
Excitement2 3.425 4.200 0.042**
Fear2 1.900 2.575 0.014**
Surprise2 2.450 3.400 0.030**
Anger2 2.025 2.000 0.723
Relief2 3.275 4.150 0.233
Sadness2 1.950 1.725 0.622
Joy2 3.375 4.125 0.207
Emotion intensity 2.720 3.163 0.025**
Emotion valence 1.464 1.969 0.208
Emotion intensity1 2.811 3.157 0.123
Emotion valence1 1.754 2.069 0.123
Emotion intensity2 2.629 3.168 0.025**
Emotion valence2 1.604 1.944 0.400
Note: p-values from Wilcoxon-Signed Rank tests collapsing
data on the market level by MIXLO and MIXHI respectively;
emotion intensity is the average score over all emotion ques-
tions, emotion valence is the average score over all positive
emotions minus the score over all negative emotions; variables
ending in 1 or 2 relate to questions at the beginning (1) or
the end (2) of the asset market, respectively; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: Changes of ex-post Emotion Ratings in MIXED Markets
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
Diff excitement -0.775 -0.300 0.232
Diff fear -0.200 0.400 0.029**
Diff surprise -1.150 -0.650 0.288
Diff anger 0.225 -0.025 0.575
Diff relief 0.450 0.900 0.441
Diff sadness 0.425 0.000 0.290
Diff joy -0.250 -0.250 1.000
Note: p-values from Wilcoxon-Signed Rank tests collapsing
data on the market level by MIXLO and MIXHI respectively;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6: Determinants of Individual RD Based on Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndRDsales
LOWSC 0.355** 0.350** 0.605** 0.648**
(0.146) (0.143) (0.243) (0.221)
CRT -0.0488 -0.0774 -0.0712
(0.0395) (0.0613) (0.0608)
CE 0.00173 0.0584 0.0639
(0.0551) (0.0617) (0.0634)
CRT × LOWSC 0.0684 0.0709
(0.0800) (0.0782)
CE × LOWSC -0.146 -0.167
(0.109) (0.106)
Female 0.103
(0.0655)
Constant 0.172 0.210 0.111 0.0164
(0.106) (0.147) (0.104) (0.110)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.227 0.241 0.269 0.283
Note: OLS regression, dependent variable is Individual Relative Deviation
(IndRD) for sales, an individual equivalent to market level Relative Devi-
ation (RD) restricted to sales only. LOWSC is a dummy where 1 stands
for LOWSC and 0 for HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty equiva-
lent. CRT denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects
who indicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions before were
excluded. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at market
level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.7: Determinants of Individual Miscpricing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IndRD
LOWSC 0.383** 0.375** 0.723*** 0.760***
(0.138) (0.134) (0.160) (0.147)
CRT -0.0593 -0.0775 -0.0722
(0.0349) (0.0574) (0.0568)
CE -0.0155 0.0553 0.0600
(0.0457) (0.0461) (0.0475)
CRT × LOWSC 0.0461 0.0483
(0.0722) (0.0728)
CE × LOWSC -0.182** -0.200**
(0.0784) (0.0774)
Female 0.0884
(0.0584)
Constant 0.119 0.203 0.0648 -0.0159
(0.0979) (0.125) (0.0713) (0.0774)
Observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.299 0.326 0.370 0.382
Note: OLS regression, dependent variable is Individual Relative De-
viation (IndRD), an individual equivalent to market level Relative
Deviation (RD). LOWSC is a dummy where 1 stands for LOWSC
and 0 for HIGHSC. CE is an individual’s certainty equivalent. CRT
denotes the number of correct answers on the CRT. Subjects who in-
dicated they knew one or more of the CRT questions before were ex-
cluded. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at mar-
ket level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.8: Second-Period Differences in Trading Behavior
Group Mean
MIXHI MIXLO p-value
pbid 29.400 31.803 0.510
pask 50.383 55.751 0.039**
qbid 15.441 15.407 0.659
qask 13.291 11.687 0.796
timebid 54.392 49.446 0.470
timeask 48.067 45.576 0.587
firsttimebid 42.484 40.912 0.683
firsttimeask 28.344 28.591 0.717
Note: Variables starting with a p denote prices, q quan-
tities and time variables refer to the time passed in the
current period, thus lower values indicate behavior earlier
on. bid and ask refer to posted bids and asks, p-values
from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with data collapsed on
market and treatment level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table A.9: Determinants of Trading Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trading Profits
MIXLO 1.036 1.040 4.342* 4.301*
(0.770) (0.795) (2.222) (2.215)
CRT 1.084** 1.882*** 1.757**
(0.497) (0.621) (0.691)
CE 0.473 0.867 0.685
(0.550) (0.768) (0.753)
CRT × MIXLO -1.660** -1.547**
(0.642) (0.690)
CE × MIXLO -1.031 -1.051
(1.125) (1.098)
Female -1.381
(0.888)
Constant 7.035*** 5.302*** 3.936*** 5.326***
(0.441) (1.097) (1.323) (1.638)
Observations 88 88 88 88
R2 0.016 0.079 0.120 0.145
Note: OLS regression, dependent variable is average trading profit
from asset market in e ˙ CRT denotes the number of correct an-
swers in the CRT. Subjects who indicated they knew one or more of
the CRT questions before were excluded. CE is the individual cer-
tainty equivalent, robust standard errors clustered on market level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.3 Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task
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Figure A.1: Correct Stroop responses in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Figure A.2: Stroop Trials in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Figure A.3: Errors in the Stroop Task in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
Table A.10: Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task
HIGHSC Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 192.65 22.61
Trials 194.55 23.56
Errors 1.9 1.88
LOWSC Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 171.3125 20.68
Trials 174.45 20.97
Errors 3.14 2.97
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Figure A.4: Correct Stroop Responses in MIXED by Condition
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Figure A.5: Stroop Trials in MIXED by Condition
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Figure A.6: Errors in the Stroop Task in MIXED by Condition1
Table A.11: Distribution of Answers in the Stroop Task (MIXED)
MIXHI Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 179.23 24.11
Trials 182.65 24.60
Errors 2.425 1.45
MIXLO Mean Standard deviation
Correct Answers 164.05 39.94
Trials 178.3 25.48
Errors 13.25 36.44
1Two outliers were dropped from this display in the MIXLO group, both of whom apparently did not
fully understand the task. One had 123 errors and the other had 205 errors.
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A.4 Distribution of Subjective Measures
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Figure A.7: Strain in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Figure A.8: Tiredness in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Table A.12: Distribution of Subjective Measures
HIGHSC Mean Standard deviation
Strain 2.64 0.98
Tiredness 2.80 1.16
LOWSC Mean Standard deviation
Strain 3.18 0.99
Tiredness 2.99 1.21
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Figure A.9: Strain in MIXED by Condition
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Figure A.10: Tiredness in MIXED by Condition
Table A.13: Distribution of Subjective Measures (MIXED)
MIXHI Mean Standard deviation
Strain 2.375 1.15
Tiredness 3.15 1.08
MIXLO Mean Standard deviation
Strain 3.275 1.15
Tiredness 3.35 1.19
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A.5 Distribution of Answers in the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test
0
.2
.4
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
HIGHSC LOWSC
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
CRT: Number of Correct Answers
Figure A.11: Correct CRT Answers in HIGHSC vs. LOWSC
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Figure A.12: Correct CRT Answers in MIXED by Condition
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Table A.14: Distribution of Answers in the Cognitive Reflection Test
Mean Standard deviation
HIGHSC 1.05 .97
LOWSC 1.14 1.09
MIXED Mean Standard deviation
MIXHI 1.00 .96
MIXLO .98 1.00
A.6 Distribution of Certainty Equivalents
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Figure A.13: Individual Certainty Equivalents in HIGHSC vs LOWSC
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Figure A.14: Individual Certainty Equivalents in MIXED by Condition
Table A.15: Distribution of Individual Certainty Equivalents
Mean Standard deviation
HIGHSC 2.20 .85
LOWSC 2.15 .70
MIXED Mean Standard deviation
MIXHI 2.16 .68
MIXLO 2.24 .55
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A.7 Instructions
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on
General information on the procedure
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate economic decision making. You can earn
money during the experiment, which will be paid to you individually and in cash after
the experiment has ended.
The whole experiment takes about 1.5 hours and consists of 3 parts. At the beginning
you will receive detailed instructions for all parts of the experiment. If you have any
questions after reading the instructions or at any time during the experiment please raise
your hand. One of the experimenters will then come to you and answer your question in
private.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked to make decisions.
In some parts, you will interact with other participants. Thus both your own decisions
and the decisions of other participants can determine your payoffs. Your payoffs are
determined according to the rules which are explained in the following. As long as you
can make your decisions, a countdown will be displayed in the upper right corner of the
screen which is intended to give you an orientation for how much time you should use
to make your choices. In most parts you can exceed the time limit if needed; in some
parts, however, you can only act within the time limit (You will be informed about this
beforehand). Information screens not requiring any decisions will disappear after the
time-out.
Payment
In some parts of the experiment we will not refer points instead of Euros. Points will
be converted to Euros at the end of the experiment. You will be informed about the
exchange rate at the beginning of the respective part.
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For your timely arrival you will receive 4 e additionally to the income earned during the
experiment.
Anonymity
We evaluate the data from the experiment only in aggregate and never connect personal
information to data from the experiment. At the end of the experiment you have to sign
a receipt, which we need for our sponsor. The sponsor does not receive any further data
from the experiment.
Aid
On your desk you will find a pen. Please leave it on there after the experiment.
A.7 Instructions 129
Part I
Task
The first part of the experiment consists of a task that will last 5 minutes. You will see a
black screen on which words in different colors will appear. Here you can see an example:
You will be asked to click one of the buttons at the bottom of the screen. You will be
asked to choose the button corresponding to the color the word is written in (not the
word itself). In the example you should click on “yellow”.
After clicked a button, the screen disappears and another word in another color
appears. Please try to solve as many word/color combinations as possible within 5
minutes.
After 5 minutes the first part ends automatically and the second part begins.
Payment
You receive 3 e for part I.
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Part II
Task
In the second part you first have to answer three questions. For each question answered
correctly you receive 0.5 e = 50 Cents.
Afterwards, you will be shown 10 decision problems. In each of these problems you
can choose between a lottery and a safe amount of money. The lottery remains
unchanged within a period, whereas the safe amount of money increases with every addi-
tional decision problem. As the safe amount of money is strictly increasing from row to
row, you should stay with the safe amount of money after you have switched to it once.
Your decision is only valid after you have made a choice for each problem and then
confirmed it by clicking the OK-button on the bottom right of the screen. Take enough
time for your decisions, as your choice – as described in the following – will determine
your payoff from this part.
Here you can see what your screen will look like:
Your profit will be determined according to the following rules: First, the computer
chooses randomly and with equal probability one of the ten decision problems
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for payment. If you selected the lottery in the relevant problem, the computer will
simulate the outcome and you will receive it as payment. If you selected the safe amount
in the relevant problem, you will receive it for sure.
For example: Assume the computer randomly chooses the first decision problem and you
chose the lottery. Then the computer will simulate the outcomes of this lottery and you
either receive 0.2 e (50% probability) or 4.2 e (50% probability).
Payment
The sum of your payoffs from the questions answered correctly at the beginning and your
payoff from the decision problem chosen by the computer are your payment for part II of
the experiment.
Please note: The computer will directly calculate the result. However, you will only learn
about this at the end of the experiments, i.e. how many questions you answered correctly
and which decision problem with which outcome the computer selected for you. That
information will be presented to you on a separate screen at the end of the experiment.
After the end of part II, part III begins automatically.
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Part III
Payment
In the third part of the experiment we refer to points rather than Euros. Points are
converted to Euros at the end of the experiment according to the following exchange rate
500 points = 1 Euro (1 point = 0.002 Euros = 0.2 Cents)
Short Description
The third part of the experiment consists of a simulated stock market. The stock market
lasts for 10 consecutive periods. Within these periods you can buy or sell shares of a
single firm.
At the end of each period for every share that you own you receive either a dividend of
10 points (probability 50%) or 0 points (probability 50%).
During the 2 minutes trading period you can either offer to sell or buy shares or accept
existing buying or selling offers by other participants.
Detailed description: Trading Period
At the beginning of the first trading period you will receive an endowment of shares and
points. Every participant receives either 20 shares and 3000 points or 60 shares and 1000
points. The distribution of endowments is random with a 50% probability of receiving
each endowment.
Each period lasts exactly 120 seconds (= 2 minutes) and all screens disappear after the
time out. You cannot make any trades or offers until he next trading period starts. During
a trading period neither your amount of shares nor your amount of points can fall below
zero.
During a trading period your screen will look like the following.
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In the upper box you see the current period and how much time you have left in the
current period. Below it to the left the box displays how many shares you currently own
and how large your current wealth is expressed in points. Additionally the current share
price and the amount of available shares and points are displayed.
Available shares are those of your shares that you have not offered for sale yet. If you
offer to sell shares, you still own them, but they will be subtracted from your account as
soon as someone else accepts your offer. Hence, you can only make sale offers that do not
exceed your current amount of available shares.
Available points are those of your points that you have not used for buying offers yet. If
you make an offer to buy shares, you still own the points, but they will be subtracted
from your account as soon as someone else accepts your offer. Hence, you can only make
buying offers that do not exceed your current amount of available points.
On the bottom left you can see a graph that shows the evolution of share prices in the
current period. On the horizontal axis (the x-axis) you can see the time in seconds at
which a trade was made. On the vertical axis (the y-axis) you can see the corresponding
price.
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In the upper part of the screen you see two lists that have the headlines “Previous Sales”
and “Previous Purchases”. Here, every trade that you made is listed. For each trade
where you bought shares, price and quantity will be listed in “Previous Purchases”. For
each trade where you sold shares, price and quantity will be listed in “Previous Sales”.
Below you find two lists with the headlines “Current Selling Offers” and “Current Buying
Offers”.
Accepting Selling Offers
In the list “Current Selling Offers” you find price and quantity of each offer, in which a
participant offers to sell shares. Your own selling offers will also appear in this list. You
can accept every offer in this list (except for your own offers) by marking the corresponding
entry in the list, entering the quantity you want to buy into the field “quantity”, and then
confirming by clicking on the button “Buy”. If you accept a selling offer, you will receive
the number of shares that you have entered from the seller and the seller receives the
corresponding price for each share he sold to you.
Please note: You can also buy less than the number of shares stated in the offer. In that
case the offer of the seller will remain on display in the list after the trade, but the number
of shares on offer will be reduced by your purchase. Example: A seller makes an offer
to sell 10 shares at the price of 60 points each. A buyer buys 6 of those shares. Then
an offer to buy 4 shares at the price of 60 points each will continue to be available to all
other participants.
Please note that the computer automatically marks the best selling offer (i.e. the one
with the lowest price) with a blue bar. You can recognize your own offers, as they are not
displayed in black but in blue font.
Accepting offers to buy
In the list “Current Buying Offers” you find price and quantity of each offer, in which
a participant offers to buy shares. Your own buying offers will also appear in this list.
You can accept every offer in this list (except for you own offers) by marking the corre-
sponding entry in the list, entering the quantity you want to sell into the field “quantity”,
and then confirming by clicking on the button “Sell”. If you accept a buying offer, the
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other participant will receive the number of shares that you entered and you receive the
corresponding price for each share you sold.
Please note: You can also sell less than the number of shares the buyer offers to buy. In
that case the offer of the buyer will remain on display in the list after the trade, but the
number of shares demanded will be reduced by your sale.
Please note that the computer automatically marks the best buying offer (i.e. the one
with the highest price) with a blue bar. You can recognize your own offers according to
their blue font.
Creating Selling or Buying Offers
In the bottom part of the screen you have the possibility to create your own selling or
buying offers. If you want to create an offer to sell, enter the quantity of shares that you
want to sell and the price per share which you demand for each unit in the field below
“You Want to Sell” . After clicking the button “Create Selling Offer”, your selling offer
will show up in the list “Current offers to sell”. Example: You want to sell 10 shares at a
price of 55 points per share. Then you enter 10 into the field “Quantity” and 55 into the
field “Price”.
If you want to create a buying offer, enter the quantity that you want to buy in the field
below “You Want to Buy” and the price per share for which you are willing to buy that
quantity. After clicking the button “Make Buying Offer” your offer will show up in the
list “Current Buying Offers”. Example: You want to buy 20 shares at a price of 45 points
per share. Then you enter 20 into the field “amount” and 45 into the field “price”.
Please note: An offer to buy or to sell that has been made cannot be cancelled. Only if
no one accepts an offer during the course of a trading period, it will not be displayed in
the next period of trade.
Dividends
After the end of a trading period the following screen displays a summary of the previous
period showing you how many shares and points you own, whether a dividend has been
paid and if so, how large your overall dividend payments were.
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In each period the dividend per share either amount to 10 points (with a probability of
50%) or to 0 points (with a probability of 50%) and is the same for all shares. After the
end of period 10, all shares are worthless. All participants learn the realization of the
dividend simultaneously on a separate screen at the end of the corresponding period.
The following table displays the value pattern of a share, i.e. the expected value of the
remaining dividends. The first column indicates the current period, in the second column
you find the number of remaining dividend payments. The third column shows the average
expected dividend per share and period. The last column shows the average of remaining
dividends per share in the corresponding period.
Current Remaining dividend x Average dividend = Average remaining
period payments value per period dividends per share
(0 or 10 with equal probability) that you own
1 10 5 50
2 9 5 45
3 8 5 40
4 7 5 35
5 6 5 30
6 5 5 25
7 4 5 20
8 3 5 15
9 2 5 10
10 1 5 5
Assume for example that four trading periods remain. As the dividend per share is either
0 or 10 points with a probability of 50% each, this yields an expected dividend of 5
points per share and period. Assume you only own one single share which you intend to
hold until the market closes. Then you can expect a total dividend payment for the four
remaining periods of ‘4 remaining periods’ x ‘5 points’ = ‘20 points’.
Payoff
At the end of part III the shares no remaining value. Only your amount of points will be
converted to Euros according to the exchange rate stated above of 1 point = 0.002 Euros
= 0.2 Cents.
Afterwards, you will see a screen displaying your payoffs from the second part.
In the following, we will ask you to completely and honestly answer some questions con-
cerning your person. On leaving the laboratory, we will pay you your profit privately and
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in cash. Please remain seated until we call you up in a random order. Please leave the
instructions and the pen at your desk and take your numbered seat card with you.
Practice Period
Before you start today’s experiment with part I, you will first play a practice period of part
III to become familiar with the stock market. The payoff from this practice period will
not influence your final payoff. Please note that the realization of the dividend and your
endowment are not necessarily identical to the first period of part III as the realization is
random and endowments will be randomly assigned.
After completion of the practicing period part I of the experiment begins.
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APPENDIX B
The Impact of Self-Control on Investment Decisions
B.1 Appendix for Experiment 1
Additional Measures
Here, I explain the additional measures collected in experiment 1 in more detail and also
outline the rationale for including them. After the end of part 2, participants first had
to answer the three CRT questions, which have been shown to be correlated with risk
and time preferences (Frederick, 2005) and to be predictive of trading performance in
experimental asset markets (Corgnet et al., 2014; Noussair et al., 2014; Kocher et al.,
2016a). Since subjects have been shown to overcome the effect of lowered self-control
if the monetary incentives are high enough (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003) and Kocher
et al. (2016a) found no effect of an ego depleting task on incentivized CRT performance,
subjects received no incentivization for giving correct responses.
Secondly, participants received two choice lists to elicit risk preferences and loss attitude
adapted from Tanaka et al. (2010). In order to save time and to reduce complexity, we
abstracted from obtaining measures of probability weighting. All lottery choices thus
only involved 50:50 lotteries. To identify loss and risk aversion, we therefore only required
two screens rather than the three sheets in Tanaka et al. (2010). The experimental task
consisted of 18 binary lottery choices on two separate screens. On the first screen, each
choice was made between two lotteries with positive payoffs, while lotteries on the second
screen involved both gains and losses. This design enables us to assign parameters of
prospect theory utility according to a participant’s switching points (cf. Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992) or we can use “raw” switches as proxies for risk preferences and loss
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attitude. In the following analysis, I will use the latter method.1 The 11 choices on the first
screen involve only gains. The first lottery option (option A) is the same across choices
on the first screen. Option B has a lower payoff in the adverse state than option A, while
we increase its higher payoff from row to row thus making it increasingly attractive. An
individual’s switching point in these 11 choices identifies risk aversion with later switches
implying higher degrees of risk aversion. The 7 choices on the second screen involve only
mixed lotteries, with either option A deteriorating from row to row or option B improving
from row to row, while option B always involved a higher possible loss than option A.
Later switches to option B on the second screen given a certain switch on the first screen
imply higher degrees of loss aversion. Participants were allowed at most one switch from
option A to option B on each screen, but were allowed to choose option A or option B
throughout all choices. After the experiment, one of the eighteen choice situations was
randomly selected for payout and the outcome of the lottery selected by the participant
was randomly determined. Participants learned about their lottery outcome at the end
of the experiment.
After the elicitation of risk and loss attitudes, participants answered five financial literacy
questions adapted from Van Rooij et al. (2011)2 receiving e 0.20 for each correct response.
The reason for including this measure was on the one hand to see whether financial literacy
or financial sophistication, which have been found to be predictive of the tendency to
display the disposition effect in real world stock markets (e.g. Feng and Seasholes, 2005),
also predicts the size of the disposition effect in our laboratory task and on the other hand
to reduce noise by controlling for it in regressions.
Finally, participants replied to the 13 items of the brief self-control scale on a 7-point
Likert scale (Tangney et al., 2004) before answering a number of socio-economic ques-
tions. The rationale for including the self-control scale was twofold: On the one hand,
we wanted to evaluate whether it had a similar impact on the outcome measure as our
self-control manipulation as previously shown in e.g. Schmeichel and Zell (2007). On the
other hand, we wanted to include it as a possible explanatory variable for heterogeneity in
the treatment effect, since treatment effects have been shown to depend on the underlying
tendency of a participant to control herself or fall prey to impulses (Hofmann et al., 2009).
1The results are not sensitive to using switching points or inferred parameters as measures of risk
preferences and loss attitudes. Details of how to assign preference parameters based on switches on the
two screens can be found in appendix B.1.
2The exact wording of the questions can be found in appendix B.1
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Assigning Preference Parameters from Lottery Choices
All lottery choices only involved 50:50 lotteries. To identify loss and risk aversion, we
hence require two decision sheets (rather than three as in Tanaka et al. (2010)). In
determining individuals’ utility parameters we assume a prospect theory value function
of the form
v(x) =
 x
σ for x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)σ for x < 0

where σ is the concavity parameter measuring the degree of risk aversion and λ denotes
the loss aversion parameter, i.e. the kink of the value function at payoffs of 0. To determine
prospect theory values of a lottery, each payoff x is inserted into the value function v(x)
and then weighted by the objective probability of 0.5. The 11 choices on the first screen
involve only gains. The first lottery option (option A) is the same across choices on the
first screen, while we vary increase the high payoff in the second lottery across choices.
The individual’s switching point in these 11 choices identifies the risk aversion parameter
σ. Later switches to the second lottery imply lower σ, i.e. higher risk aversion. The
7 choices on the second screen involve only mixed lotteries, with either the first lottery
(option A) deteriorating from row to row or the second lottery (option B) improving from
row to row. These 7 choices enable us to assign a loss aversion parameter λ to each
participant, given her choices over the 11 gains lotteries. Later switches to option B on
the second screen imply higher loss aversion λ.
Financial Literacy Questions
1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year.
After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the
money to grow?
(a) More than $102 (correct)
(b) Exactly $102
(c) Less than $102
(d) I don’t knoww.
142 Self-Control and Investment Decisions
2. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation
was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money
int his account?
(a) More than today
(b) Exactly the same
(c) Less than today (correct)
(d) I don’t know
3. Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single company
stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.”
(a) False (correct)
(b) True
(c) I don’t know
4. Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market?
(a) The stock market helps to predict stock earnings
(b) The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks
(c) The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those
who want to sell stocks (correct)
(d) None of the above
(e) I don’t know
5. Which of the following statements is correct?
(a) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first
year
(b) Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for exampe invest in both stocks and
bonds (correct)
(c) Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past
performance
(d) None of the above
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(e) I don’t know
Note: Questions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 correspond to questions 1, 2, 15, 7 and 8 from Van Rooij
et al. (2011) respectively.
Effect on Additional Measures
Here I check the effect of the self-control manipulation on the additional measures that
were collected after the disposition effect task. Table B.1 reports mean CRT scores,
switching points from the two choice lists and the associated parameters of risk attitude
σ and loss attitude λ by treatment condition. The last column displays p-values from
MWU-tests testing equality of medians between the two groups.
First of all, CRT scores are not affected by the self-control manipulation (MWU, p =
0.485), which is in line with the results in Kocher et al. (2016a) who also found no
direct effect of their self-control manipulation on the CRT score. Note however, that
unlike in Kocher et al. (2016a), in this experiment correct responses on the CRT were not
incentivized, as incentivizing effort can make people overcome the negative effects of ego
depletion (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003). Therefore, this result can be taken as evidence
that incentivization was not the reason for the null effect on the CRT scores in Kocher
et al. (2016a).
Secondly, again in line with Kocher et al. (2016a) and in line with the mixed results in
the psychology literature (Bruyneel et al., 2009; Unger and Stahlberg, 2011), I do not
find an effect of the self-control manipulation on risk aversion (MWU, p = 0.616 and
p = 0.834 for switches in the gains list and the inferred σ parameter respectively). I
also find no significant effect of the self-control manipulation on the two measures of loss
aversion (MWU, p = 0.352 and p = 0.569 for switches in the mixed list and the inferred
λ parameter respectively).
Thus, the manipulation seems to have had no impact on the background measures col-
lected in this study.
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Table B.1: Effect of Treatment on Background Measures
High SC Low SC p-value
CRT score 1.493 1.366 0.485
switch gains 5.845 5.620 0.616
σ 0.613 0.629 0.834
switch mixed 3.563 3.296 0.352
λ 2.949 2.797 0.569
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-
tests; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Additional Tables and Figures
Table B.2: Starting Times of the Sessions of Experiment 1
Session Date Weekday Time Treatments
1 December 12, 2014 Friday 4:30 PM High SC, Low SC
2 January 9, 2015 Friday 10:00 AM High SC, Low SC
3 January 9, 2015 Friday 12:30 PM High SC, Low SC
4 January 9, 2015 Friday 3:00 PM High SC, Low SC
5 January 12, 2015 Monday 1:00 PM High SC, Low SC
6 January 12, 2015 Monday 3:00 PM High SC, Low SC
7 February 4, 2015 Wednesday 3:00 PM Low SC×No Exp. No Wait
8 February 4, 2015 Wednesday 4:30 PM Low SC×No Exp. No Wait
Table B.3: Manipulation Checks for Experiment 1
Task Performance High SC Low SC p-value
correct letters 149.085 138.817 0.000***
Questions asked directly after letter-e-task
strain 2.690 3.704 0.000***
difficult 1.268 2.958 0.000***
tired immediate 3.803 4.127 0.208
frustrated 1.662 2.690 0.000***
Questions asked in the questionnaire
general mood 3.507 3.394 0.360
experiment mood 3.310 3.282 0.746
tired end 3.493 3.479 0.851
effort end 2.986 3.225 0.271
Note: Variables “strain”-“frustrated” were answered by par-
ticipants on a 7 point Likert scale “general mood” and “ex-
periment mood” on a 5 point Likert scale and “tired end” and
“effort end” on a 6 point Likert scale; p-values from two-sided
Mann-Whitney U-tests; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure B.1: Disposition Effect Measure by Treatment and Comparison with Weber and
Welfens (2007)
Table B.4: Randomization Checks for Experiment 1
High SC Low SC p-value
age 23.648 23.521 0.724
known CRT 1.070 0.718 0.116
risk 3.845 3.676 0.460
math 2.338 2.662 0.170
financial knowledge 4.085 4.070 0.987
stock experience 5.056 4.761 0.219
self-control score 53.099 55.676 0.184
FLQ score 3.451 3.408 0.965
study subject 3.761 4.099 0.625
female 0.634 0.521 0.174
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; for
study and female p-values from Chi2 tests; *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.5: Regressions of Disposition Effect Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DE
Low SC 0.0308 0.0378 0.0132 0.272 0.275 0.288
(0.0455) (0.0450) (0.0887) (0.318) (0.320) (0.326)
female 0.0847 0.0683 0.0646 0.0555 0.0568
(0.0648) (0.0676) (0.0686) (0.0710) (0.0723)
ln(age) 0.315 0.281 0.301 0.290 0.275
(0.204) (0.215) (0.219) (0.221) (0.231)
CRT -0.0360 -0.0335 -0.0282 -0.0324
(0.0421) (0.0428) (0.0441) (0.0465)
CRT × Low SC 0.0123 0.00810 0.00458 0.00594
(0.0538) (0.0549) (0.0556) (0.0579)
Self-Control Score (SCS) 0.00189 0.00230 0.00234
(0.00394) (0.00404) (0.00414)
SCS × Low SC -0.00464 -0.00467 -0.00490
(0.00549) (0.00552) (0.00564)
FLQ score -0.0117 -0.0113
(0.0217) (0.0223)
switch LA 0.0106
(0.0255)
switch RA -0.00233
(0.0122)
Constant 0.0186 -1.020 -0.890 -1.023 -1.002 -0.956
(0.189) (0.643) (0.672) (0.709) (0.714) (0.733)
Price Path Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139
R-squared 0.588 0.614 0.620 0.624 0.626 0.627
Note: Missing observations due to missingDE variable, standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.6: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Self-Control Manipulation on the Disposition
Effect by Cognitive (Ir)Reflection
High SC Low SC p-value
impulsive 0.017 0.099 0.445
residual 0.104 0.132 0.776
reflective 0.061 0.076 0.994
Note: Impulsive individuals had at least 2 im-
pulsively wrong responses, reflective individuals
had at least 2 correct responses; p-values from
two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.7: Heterogeneity of the Effect of Self-Control Manipulation on the Disposition
Effect by Self-Control Score Tercile
High SC Low SC p-value
low score 0.040 0.117 0.481
medium score 0.076 0.157 0.248
high score 0.074 0.038 0.485
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Optimal Trade Clustering
Since a risk neutral Bayesian investor would always shift all her wealth to the asset with
the highest price, if she executes a trade, she should have one distinct trade in the first
trading period (when she buys the most expensive asset) and then always exactly two
trades (when she shifts her assets to the most expensive assets). Therefore the optimal
TC for each price path can be calculated as follows:
TC∗ = 1− # of changes at the top + 1# changes at the top× 2 + 1 (B.1)
Therefore, I can introduce a measure how far the actual trade clustering differed from the
optimal level of trade clustering.
|∆TC| = |TC − TC∗| (B.2)
It turns out that treatment effects between Low SC and High SC disappear when looking
at |∆TC|, details are available upon request.
Since risk neutrality seems to be an extreme assumption in the data, the theoretically
optimal level for a risk-neutral agent will be a lower bound for the optimal level TC of
a risk-averse agent. Modelling a risk-averse agent would be necessary, since the results
from part 3 of the experiment suggest that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in risk
attitudes, but makes the analysis untractable. Therefore, I refrain from going further in
this direction and only compare the actual TC parameter in the data.
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B.2 Appendix for Experiment 2
Additional Measures
Following the computation questions, participants fill out the loss aversion task from
Trautmann and Vlahu (2013) which is based on the simple task in Fehr and Goette
(2007). The task consists of 6 binary choices that are displayed on one screen. Subjects
have to accept or reject one binary lottery in each row. In each lottery, there is a 50%
chance of winning e 4.50 while there is a possible loss that increases from row to row by
e 1.00, starting at e 0.50 in the first row and finishing at a potential loss of e 5.50 in the
last row. Thus the expected value from accepting the lottery drops from row to row by
e 0.50 and becomes negative in the last row. For each participant, one of these rows is
randomly selected at the end of the experiment and if the participant has accepted the
respective lottery, the lottery outcome is simulated. Subjects learn about the outcome of
this task at the end of the experiment. The number of accepted lotteries in this task can
serve as a proxy for loss aversion (Fehr and Goette, 2007; Trautmann and Vlahu, 2013).
I decided to use this task rather than the longer parametric task used in experiment 1
for two reasons: first, I wanted to reduce the time participants spend on this task to
avoid waiting times and thus rest. Second, I wanted to reduce the complexity of the task
measuring loss aversion.
Directly following the loss aversion task, participants are given the original CRT ques-
tions (Frederick, 2005) plus the four CRT extension questions from Toplak et al. (2014).
Participants receive a flat payment of e 2.50 for answering these questions.3 I decided to
include the extended version of the CRT for two reasons: first of all, once a participant has
seen the CRT questions they might have learned the answers. ‘Thinking fast and slow’ by
Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011) has by now spread knowledge of the original CRT
questions to a wide audience. Thus, some the CRT questions might be known to many
participants, which might make finding a treatment effect in these questions harder due
to added noise. Secondly, the extended CRT offers a finer-grained measure of cognitive
abilities, making it easier to detect a possible treatment effect.
Before learning about their payouts, participants filled out the abbreviated version of the
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) (Spinella, 2007; Stanford et al., 2009), which according
3Refer to the design of experiment 1 for the reasons why these questions were not incentivized.
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to Hilgers and Wibral (2014) can account for heterogeneity in the impact of the MLA
framing. Finally, participants filled out a number of socio-economic background measures.
Computation Questions
1. Imagine you throw two fair-sided coins. You win e 2.00 every time you throw heads,
while you lose e 1.00 every time you throw tails. How many e do you expect to
win? (Correct: e 1.00)
2. If you repeat the game above 8 times, on average how often will you win money?
(Correct: 6 times)
3. If you throw three fair dice at once and you win e 5.00 for every 5 or 6 you roll, while
you lose e 2.00 for any other number, how much money will you win on average?
(Correct: e 1.00)
4. If you repeat the game above 27 times, in how many games will you lose money?
(Correct: 8 times)
Effect on Additional Measures
Table B.8 displays the means of the background measures for High SC and Low SC
participants and p-values from MWU tests comparing these two treatment dimensions.
From these tests it is obvious that the self-control manipulation had no effect on the two
subsets of the seven CRT questions that were included in the study and neither on the
four computation questions that were asked directly following the MLA task. The results
for the number of accepted lotteries indicate a slight increase in loss aversion in the Low
SC participants who accepted about 0.2 lotteries less on average. However, this effect
marginally fails to reach significance (MWU, p = 0.103).
These tests replicate the results from experiment 1 and from Kocher et al. (2016a) that
the self-control reducing treatment does not impact cognitive abilities significantly.
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Table B.8: Effect of Ego Depletion on CRT scores, Computation Scores and Accepted
Lotteries
High SC Low SC p-value
CRT7 4.021 4.147 0.702
CRT 1.615 1.674 0.711
CRT4 2.406 2.474 0.783
computation score 1.156 1.337 0.335
lotteries accepted 2.854 2.653 0.103
Note: CRT7 scores encompass the original CRT scores plus
the extension, CRT4 scores refers to just the 4 extension
questions; p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests
comparing columns; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Additional Tables and Figures
Table B.9: Starting Times of the Sessions of Experiment 2
Session Date Weekday Time Treatment
1 July 21, 2015 Tuesday 10:00 AM High SC×Broad
2 July 21, 2015 Tuesday 12:00 PM High SC×Narrow
3 July 28, 2015 Tuesday 9:30 AM Low SC×Narrow
4 July 28, 2015 Tuesday 11:30 AM High SC×Narrow
5 July 28, 2015 Tuesday 1:00 PM Low SC×Broad
6 July 28, 2015 Tuesday 3:00 PM Low SC×Narrow
7 July 29, 2015 Wednesday 2:30 PM Low SC×Broad
8 July 29, 2015 Wednesday 4:00 PM High SC×Broad
Table B.10: Manipulation Checks for Experiment 2
Task Performance High SC Low SC p-value
correct letters 148.042 141.579 0.000***
Questions asked directly after letter-e-task
strain 2.542 3.758 0.000***
difficult 1.375 2.832 0.000***
tired immediate 3.917 3.989 0.737
frustrated 1.917 2.221 0.011**
Questions asked in the questionnaire
general mood 3.344 3.400 0.867
experiment mood 3.406 3.516 0.442
tired end 3.156 3.000 0.484
effort end 2.646 2.779 0.369
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.11: Randomization Checks for Experiment 2
D=0,B=0 D=0,B=1 D=1,B=0 D=1,B=1 p-value
age 23.688 24.625 24.957 25.063 0.327
known CRT 1.604 1.458 1.532 1.188 0.425
known CRT4 0.146 0.438 0.213 0.125 0.744
risk 3.542 3.521 3.660 3.479 0.912
math 2.417 2.188 2.255 2.188 0.875
financial knowledge 3.313 3.563 3.511 3.458 0.805
stock exp 4.583 5.042 4.957 4.646 0.375
BIS 32.146 31.500 31.277 29.854 0.348
BIS extend 34.500 33.438 33.660 32.000 0.346
income relative 1.813 2.146 1.979 1.896 0.404
math 2.417 2.188 2.255 2.188 0.875
meal 3.542 3.104 2.872 2.604 0.045**
money available 1.188 0.771 0.809 0.750 0.346
working hours 9.760 13.172 9.809 9.490 0.585
study subject 4.083 4.521 4.702 3.833 0.452
female 0.604 0.646 0.574 0.604 0.916
native german 0.729 0.771 0.723 0.792 0.841
making ends meet 0.542 0.583 0.787 0.833 0.382
money origin1 1.250 0.771 0.766 0.896 0.336
money origin2 0.542 1.083 0.532 0.792 0.192
previous depletion experiment 0.563 0.583 0.468 0.479 0.585
previous MLA experiment 0.750 0.604 0.681 0.813 0.130
Note: each column represents one cell of the 2×2 design, where D = 0 and D = 1 stand for High SC and
Low SC and B = 0 and B = 1 for narrow and broad frames respectively; p-values until working hours
from two-sided Kruskall-Wallis tests, from study subject to previous MLA experiment from Chi2 tests
comparing all columns to each other; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Heterogeneity – BIS
Table B.12: Average Investment over all Periods by Treatments for Participants with
below median BIS
Narrow Broad
mean N mean N p-value (CvC)
High SC 44.058 23 42.679 27 0.977
Low SC 41.364 25 53.250 30 0.148
p-value (RvR) 0.664 0.139
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; RvR stands
for tests comparing rows i.e. depletion effect within frame, CvC stands
for tests comparing columns i.e. comparing framing effect withing
self-control manipulation
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,* p < 0.1
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Table B.13: Average Investment over All Periods by Treatments for Participants with
above median BIS
Narrow Broad
mean N mean N p-value (CvC)
High SC 37.169 25 58.595 21 0.038*
Low SC 29.076 22 52.731 18 0.028**
p-value (RvR) 0.417 0.701
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; RvR stands
for tests comparing rows i.e. depletion effect within frame, CvC stands
for tests comparing columns i.e. comparing framing effect withing
self-control manipulation
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Heterogeneity – CRT
Table B.14: Average Investment by Treatment for low CRT Participants
Narrow Broad
mean N mean N p-value (CvC)
High SC 32.273 22 40.635 16 0.359
Low SC 32.577 18 50.921 19 0.055*
p-value (RvR) 0.913 0.289
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; RvR stands
for tests comparing rows i.e. depletion effect within frame, CvC stands
for tests comparing columns i.e. comparing framing effect withing
self-control manipulation
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table B.15: Average Investment by Treatment for medium CRT Participants
Narrow Broad
mean N mean N p-value (CvC)
High SC 27.419 11 51.696 17 0.109
Low SC 24.348 11 42.853 17 0.043**
p-value (RvR) 0.429 0.641
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; RvR stands
for tests comparing rows i.e. depletion effect within frame, CvC stands
for tests comparing columns i.e. comparing framing effect withing
self-control manipulation
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.16: Average Investment by Treatment for high CRT Participants
Narrow Broad
mean N mean N p-value (CvC)
High SC 62.063 15 56.922 15 0.882
Low SC 45.531 18 70.889 12 0.050**
p-value (RvR) 0.226 0.125
Note: p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests; RvR stands
for tests comparing rows i.e. depletion effect within frame, CvC stands
for tests comparing columns i.e. comparing framing effect withing
self-control manipulation
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Tobit Regressions by Frame
Table B.17: Tobit Panel Regressions of Lottery Investment in the Narrow Frame
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
investment
Low SC -21.98 -21.81 -34.47 -32.52 -26.57 -12.21
(14.43) (13.65) (31.54) (30.31) (29.28) (29.89)
female -58.66*** -46.68*** -40.21** -37.38** -41.63**
(16.16) (17.33) (16.89) (16.33) (16.59)
ln(age) -67.58 -62.65 -48.38 -57.71 -60.85
(50.83) (52.33) (51.14) (49.45) (50.16)
CRT7 6.051 6.661 3.856 3.042
(5.611) (5.413) (5.319) (5.392)
CRT7 × Low SC 2.446 2.571 3.419 4.462
(7.318) (7.052) (6.805) (6.901)
BIS 3.042* 3.714** 3.653**
(1.587) (1.555) (1.576)
BIS × Low SC -6.015*** -6.202*** -6.313***
(2.274) (2.195) (2.226)
accepted lotteries 18.16** 17.97**
(7.085) (7.178)
previous wins 3.350
(2.893)
previous wins × Low SC 10.20**
(4.401)
wins last 3 -7.185***
(2.432)
wins last 3 × Low SC -7.156**
(3.564)
wealth -0.00931
(0.00923)
wealth × Low SC -0.0476***
(0.0144)
Constant 60.35* 320.8* 271.8 125.5 89.20 115.2
(34.95) (166.4) (176.2) (178.6) (172.6) (175.1)
Price Path Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
σu 67.57*** 62.80*** 61.22*** 58.69*** 56.43*** 57.33***
(6.312) (5.855) (5.718) (5.497) (5.295) (5.370)
σe 39.93*** 39.95*** 39.94*** 39.93*** 39.92*** 38.50***
(1.130) (1.130) (1.130) (1.129) (1.129) (1.086)
Observations 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710 1,710
Number of Subject 95 95 95 95 95 95
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
B.2 Appendix for Experiment 2 155
Table B.18: Tobit Panel Regressions of Lottery Investment in the Broad Frame
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
investment
Low SC 3.859 1.466 8.653 2.536 0.639 1.504
(9.482) (8.718) (23.32) (23.62) (23.14) (23.62)
female -42.70*** -39.55*** -39.92*** -35.37*** -35.87***
(11.13) (11.73) (11.63) (11.56) (11.63)
ln(age) 47.40 56.75* 66.70* 52.10 54.87
(33.95) (33.74) (34.47) (34.33) (34.59)
CRT7 6.218* 5.677* 5.911* 5.828*
(3.332) (3.431) (3.360) (3.384)
CRT7 × Low SC -1.531 0.541 1.123 1.120
(5.394) (5.543) (5.438) (5.477)
BIS 0.349 0.0167 0.0494
(1.052) (1.043) (1.050)
BIS × Low SC 1.237 1.380 1.376
(1.517) (1.491) (1.501)
accepted lotteries 14.27** 14.12**
(6.519) (6.556)
previous wins 1.611
(3.444)
previous wins × Low SC 7.240
(5.474)
wins last 3 -1.211
(2.603)
wins last 3 × Low SC -2.839
(3.713)
wealth 0.00378
(0.0107)
wealth × Low SC -0.0196
(0.0169)
Constant 48.45** -59.60 -116.2 -154.0 -141.8 -157.8
(23.12) (111.0) (112.1) (114.3) (112.1) (113.1)
Price Path Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
σu 43.86*** 39.82*** 38.81*** 38.37*** 37.44*** 37.81***
(4.192) (3.851) (3.758) (3.715) (3.630) (3.656)
σe 26.07*** 26.06*** 26.06*** 26.07*** 26.08*** 25.30***
(1.084) (1.084) (1.084) (1.085) (1.085) (1.054)
Observations 576 576 576 576 576 576
Number of Subject 96 96 96 96 96 96
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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B.3 Instructions
Disposition Effect: Instructions (translated from German)
Note that the additional measures from this experiment correspond to parts III and IV
in the instructions.
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on
General information on the procedure
This experiment is conducted to investigate economic decision making. You can earn
money during the experiment. This will be paid to you privately and in cash right after
the experiment. Your financial payoff depends on the decisions you make. Therefore, it
is very important to read the instructions carefully.
The whole experiment takes about 90 minutes and consists of 4 parts. At the beginning
you receive the instructions in detail for all parts of the experiment, which we will read
aloud in two blocks. If you have further questions after the instructions are read or during
the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and
answer your questions in private. Due to linguistic simplicity, we only use male names.
You will make multiple decisions. While you make your decisions a clock is running down
on the right top of the screen. This is for your orientation on how much time you should
take for your decisions. Mostly you can exceed this countdown, if you need more time for
your decisions. However, in some parts you will be limited to act within the time limit
(We will point that out before). Information screens, where you do not need to make any
decision will be faded out after the countdown.
Payment
In one part of the experiment we do not talk about Euros but points. At the end of the
experiment they will be converted to Euros. The exchange rate will be announced at the
beginning of this part.
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For your arriving on schedule and the answering of the questionnaires you get 4 Euros
extra on top of your income that you can earn during the experiment.
Video recording
During the experiment we will record you with the camera at your screen.
Anonymity
None of the other participants get any information on how much you have earned in the
experiment. We never connect names with data from the experiments. Even the data
from the video recording will be made anonymous and be only used in aggregation. At
the end of the experiment you need to sign a receipt about your earnings, which is only
used for our accounting and does not allow any conclusions about your decisions.
Devices
At your place you will find a pen. Please leave it on the table after the experiment.
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Part I
Task
The first part of this experiment is a word recognition task. You will see 1 word in black
letters for 3 seconds on the screen.
Within these 3 seconds, you need to classify the shown word into 2 categories according
to a certain rule. The exact rule will be shown to you on the screen at the beginning.
Please take your time to read the rule carefully, as it will not be displayed again later.
If the displayed word satisfies the rule, you can classify the word into the first category
by pressing the “e” key on your keyboard. If the displayed word does not satisfy the rule,
do not press any key. Hence, it will be classified into the second category. After 3 seconds
the next word will be displayed automatically.
For your classification you have 3 seconds. As soon as the time runs out a new word
will be displayed. Even if you have chosen a categorization right at the beginning of the
period, e.g. after 1 second by pressing the “e” key, you must wait for the next word until
the period time is expired.
Please note, that your entry is ultimate. If you press the “e” key by mistake, you cannot
correct your decision. Therefore, a focused approach is essential.
After all 150 words have been displayed the first part will end automatically and the
second part starts.
Trial phase
Before the task begins, there will be displayed 3 words on trial, which you need to cate-
gorize. In the trial phase there is no time limit of 3 seconds. You have an extended time
limit of 10 seconds.
If you choose the wrong categorization in the trial periods, the computer shows you the
right solution with an appropriate justification. Please note that you need to wait the 10
seconds either way. After a wrong answer you get a feedback or the next test word will
be displayed. After you have read your feedback (if any), please click on “OK” to proceed
to the next test word. Please note that you will not get any feedback on your answers
during the actual tasks.
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After the trial phase you have one last chance to ask questions about this task. If you
have a question, please raise your hand.
Payoff
For your concentrated machining in part I you get 3 Euros.
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Part II
Payoff
In the second part of the experiment we do not talk about Euros but of points. At the
end of the experiment they will be converted into Euros. The exchange rate is:
200 points =e 1.00
2 points =e 0.01= 1 cent
General description
The second part of the experiment is a replica of a goods market. In this part you can buy
and sell 6 different goods: Good 1 to good 6. The game consists of 18 periods (periods -3
to 14). During the first 3 periods (-3 to -1) you cannot trade goods, i.e. buy or sell, but
only observe the price development of all 6 goods. In the last period (14) you also cannot
trade, as all remaining goods will be sold automatically at the end of this period.
In period -3 you get an endowment of 2,000 points, but no goods. With these points you
can buy goods in periods 0 to 13. Furthermore you can sell goods from your possession.
Determining the prices of goods
In the starting period (-3) all 6 goods have the same price of 100 points. The price of
every good will change in the following period: Either the price increases 6% or it drops
down 5%. Hence, the price never stays constant from one period to the following.
Every of the 6 goods has his own probability for a price increase or price decrease. The
probabilities are constant for every good and for all 18 periods. The probability for a
price increase is for one of the goods 35% (−−), for one good 45% (−), for two goods
50% (0), for one good 55% (+) and for one good 65% (++). With the counter probability
the prices of the goods decrease, for example, the price of good “−−” decreases with
probability 65%.
Here you can see an overview of the distribution of probabilities for a price increase:
Description – - 0 + ++
Probability of a price increase 35% 45% 50% 55% 65%
Number 1 1 2 1 1
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You will not know what good has what probability for a price increase, but you may find
this out with the price history. The computer determines before the start of period -3,
which good is associated with what probability randomly.
Price changes in one period are independent from price changes in other periods, i.e.
the probability of a price increase of a certain good stays constant within all periods.
In addition the price changes between two different goods are independent. Furthermore
neither you nor other participants can influence the development of prices by your actions.
Period
The first three periods (-3 to -1) take 20 seconds each, as you cannot trade, but you
can observe the prices of the goods. A regular trading period (periods 0 to 13) takes 40
seconds. If there is an allocation of goods in a period (more on this in the section after
the next), you get 90 seconds additionally. After the countdown you will succeed into the
next period automatically.
Trading periods
During a trading period your screen will look like this:
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At the top of the screen you can see in which period you are. Besides that the countdown
of the period is shown.
Underneath you can see a table which displays the development of prices of the 6 goods
up to the current period (here as example until period 1). The remaining cells of this
period will be filled with each period. The respective price is the top number in the cell.
The price in this example for good 1 in period 1 is 126,3 points. Directly below this figure
your sales activities are reported: a positive number below the price means, that you have
bought units of this good. A negative number means, that you have sold units of these
goods. In the example you can see, that in period 0 ten units of good 1 and eight units
of good 4 were bought. In period 1 five units of good 1 were sold.
The table below shows you how many units of goods you currently hold (“Anzahl im
Besitz”) and the current price of the goods (“Preis pro Einheit”). You can also read your
current balance in the last line. In this example there are five units of good 1 and eight
units of 4 in your possession and the remaining balance is 674.9 points.
To the right you find 12 buttons. These are 6 buy buttons (left column) and 6 sale
buttons (right column). These buttons appear from period 0, as you can only trade from
this period on.
By clicking on the respective buy button you can bring one unit of the good in your
possession, as long as your credit is sufficient. By pressing the sell button you can sell
units of the corresponding good, the corresponding price will be credited in your balance.
You cannot sell goods that you do not own and you can only buy goods as long as your
point balance is sufficient. That is, neither your stock nor your balance may fall below
zero. Moreover, it is only possible to buy or sell whole units.
Allocation of goods to probabilities of a price increase
At the beginning of periods 0, 7 and 14 you will be asked for an allocation of probabilities
of a price increase to the single goods. For the rating of the goods you get additional
90 seconds in the corresponding periods, after the expiry of 90 seconds the field for the
ranking is hidden.
Specifically, you should assign all 6 goods with one of the 5 descriptions (“−−”, “−”,
“0”, “+”, “++”). You can only assign one description to one good and you should use
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every description except “0” only ones and the description “0” two times. The description
“++” you should assign to the good from which you think it has the highest probability
for a price increase (65%). Proceed accordingly to the other goods, e.g. for “−−” you
should assign the good from which you think that it has the lowest probability for a price
increase (35%).
In the corresponding periods you will see the following illustration in the lower right corner
of your screen:
By clicking the appropriate fields, you assign the goods to the corresponding description.
For example, if you want to assign good 2 to the term “+”, select the fourth opportunity
in the line of good 2. If you have made all your assignments, please confirm your decision
by clicking on the “Eingeben” button on the bottom of the screen. You still have to wait
for the expiration of the 90 seconds. If you do not click “Eingeben”, the computer will
not count your entry and you will not make money for the allocation of goods. After 90
seconds the field to enter the descriptions disappears and you can trade (in period 0 and
7), respectively after the expiry of the remaining time part II ends (in period 14, the final
period).
For every correct assignment you have made, you get 20 points at the end of part II
(they will not be credited directly to your balance). Since you will be asked in three peri-
ods to make 6 assignments, you can earn up to 360 points with your assignments of goods.
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Payoff
At the end of period 14 all goods are sold at the displayed price. This sale is added to your
points account. Furthermore you get 20 points for each correct allocation of a probability.
At the end of the experiment your payoff will be converted, displayed and then paid in
cash.
Trial market and comprehension questions (BEFORE PART I!)
After the instructions are read aloud and before you start with part I of the experiment,
you get the opportunity to familiarize yourself with the surface of the goods market.
Please follow the instructions displayed in red in the upper part of the screen. These are
small tasks to give you an understanding of the goods market. The price development
of the sample periods differs from the subsequent price development, that is you cannot
make any conclusions about the price development of the goods in part II. Please note
that in this sample periods as opposed to the later main tasks the timeout is not binding,
so you can exceptionally exceed the time in the upper right corner of the screen if you do
not comply with the instructions in time.
After this you get 7 questions on your screen, which make sure if you have understood fully
the rules of the goods market. Your answers to the control questions have no influence on
the payment at the end of the experiment. As we said, we want you to understand how
the goods market works as good as possible. Therefore, all questions are displayed until
you have answered all questions correctly. If you are in doubt, please raise your hands.
An experimenter can answer your questions in private.
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Part III
Part III consists of two sections.
Section 1
In the first section we will ask you questions. You will see all 3 questions at once on your
screen. In total you have 4 minutes to write your responses in the fields provided. If you
have not made an entry after 4 minutes, the questions are faded out.
Section 2
The second section consists of two screens. On both screens, you get a certain number of
decision problems. On the first screen there are 11 decision problems and on the second 7.
Thereby, you are not connected with another person; hence you decide only for yourself.
In each decision problem you can choose between two alternative options, each either
resulting in a high or a low payment. The probability of occurrence of a high or a low
payment is each 50%. By clicking on your preferred options (Option A or Option B) you
make your decision. By clicking on the OK-button you confirm your entries. You can
only once jump from option A to option B. Afterwards you need to stay at option B for
all following situations. However, it is possible that you choose consistently option A or
option B. For example it is not possible if you have opted in decision problem 1 for option
A, in decision problem 2 for B and in decision problem 3 again for A. Take your time for
your decision, because your choice – as described below – determines your payout from
part III.
Here are examples for each screen:
Screen I: 1st Decision Problem
Screen II: 2nd Decision Problem
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Payout
Your profit is determined as follows: The computer randomly chooses with the same
probability one of the 18 decision problems (11 on screen I and 7 on screen II). The
lottery that you have chosen in your decision problem is then simulated by the computer
by drawing a number between 0 and 10. You get the high payout, if the randomly drawn
number is less than or equal to 5 (50% probability) and the low payout, if the random
number is greater than 5 (50% probability).
Example: Assume the computer randomly selects the first decision problem on screen I.
Suppose you have chosen option B. Then the computer simulates option B and you either
get 0.20 EUR (with probability 50%) or you get 2.40 EUR (also with probability 50%) as
payment for part III of the experiment.
The result of this part will be provided at the end of the experiment. After the end of
part III part IV starts automatically.
Part IV & end of the experiment
In the last part we present 5 multiple-choice questions about your financial knowledge. For
each correct answer you get 20 cent (e 0.20), which will be paid to you at the experiment
in connection. For incorrect answers you get nothing.
In the following, please answer some questions on your person complete and honest, as they
are very important for our investigation. After answering the questions your payments
for all parts of the experiment will be displayed.
Finally, we will pay you your earnings in cash and in private. Please stay seated until we
call you at random order. Please leave the pen and the instructions at your place and
take your place card with you.
Good luck and thank you for your participation in today’s experiment!
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Myopic Loss Aversion: Instructions (translated from German)
Note that what is referred to in the main part of the paper as part 1 and part 2 correspond
to Part I and Part II – Part III of the instructions, while part 3 refers to Part IV – Part
V of the instructions.
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on
General information on the procedure
This experiment is conducted to investigate economic decision making. You can earn
money.
Today’s experiment takes about 1 hour and consists of 5 parts. Before every part you
get detailed instructions. If you have any questions after the instructions or during the
experiment, please raise your hand or push the red button, if no experimenter is in the
room. One of the experimenters will come to you and answer your questions in private.
During the experiment you will be asked to make decisions. Only your own decisions
determine your payoff. This results in accordance with the rules, which are explained
below.
While you make your decisions, a clock is running down on the right top of the screen.
This offers you an orientation, how much time you should need for your decisions. Mostly
you can also exceed this time, if you need more time for your decision. If you cannot
exceed the predetermined time, we will inform you explicitly.
Payment
In part II your income is expressed in thalers. Here the exchange rate is 100 talers =
e 0.5. The remuneration for the remaining parts will be directly indicated in Euros.
For your punctuality and answering the questionnaire at the end of the experiment you
get e 4 in addition to the income you can earn during the experiment. Every part is rele-
vant for your payment. Your earnings from this experiment will be paid at the end in cash.
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Anonymity
We evaluate all the data of the experiment only anonymous and do never connect names
with the data from the experiment. At the end of the experiment you need to sign a
receipt for the payment, which serves for the accounting. Devices
At your place you will find a pen. Please leave it on the table after the experiment.
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Part I
Task
This part of the experiment is a task about letters. You will see exactly 1 word in black
letters for 3 seconds on the screen.
Within the 3 seconds, it is your task to classify the displayed word into 2 categories
according to a certain rule. The exact rule will be shown to you on the screen at the
beginning. Please take your time to read the rule carefully, as it will not be displayed
again later!
If the displayed word satisfies the rule, you can classify the word into the first category
by pressing the “e” key on your keyboard.
If the displayed word does not satisfy the rule, do not press any key. That is, it will
be classified into the second category. After 3 seconds the next word will be displayed
automatically.
For your classification you have 3 seconds. As soon as the time runs out a new word
will be displayed. Even if you have chosen a categorization right at the beginning of the
period, e.g. after 1 second by pressing the “e” key, you must wait for the next word until
the countdown is expired.
Please note, that your entry is ultimate. If you press the “e” key by mistake, you cannot
correct your decision. Therefore, a focused approach is essential.
After all 150 words have been displayed – after 7 minutes and 30 seconds – the first part
will end automatically and the second part starts.
Trial phase
Before the task begins, there will be displayed 3 words on trial, which you need to cate-
gorize. In the trial phase there is no time limit of 3 seconds. You have an extended time
limit of 10 seconds.
If you choose the wrong categorization in the trial periods, the computer shows you the
right solution with an appropriate justification. Please note that you need to wait the 10
seconds either way. After a wrong answer you get a feedback or the next test word will
be displayed. After you have read your feedback (if any), please click on “OK” to proceed
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to the next test word. Please note that you will not get any feedback on your answers
during the actual tasks.
After the trial phase you have one last chance to ask questions about this task. If you
have a question, please raise your hand or press the red key on your keyboard.
Payoff
For your concentrated work in part I you get e 3.
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Part II
Part II consists of 18 rounds. In each round you get an endowment of 100 thalers (100
talers = 50 Cent = e 0.5). In every round you have to decide how many thalers (X) of
your endowment (from 0 to 100 talers) you want to set in the subsequent lottery.
If you choose to set the amount X in the lottery, then
• You lose this amount X with probability of two thirds (66.67%) and get a payment
of 100−X at the end of the round
• You win with a probability of one third (33.33%) 2.5-times the amount of X. Then
you get a payment of 100 + 2.5 ∗X at the end of the round.
The decision on the outcome of the lottery is dependent on a random number that is
drawn new in each round. The computer simulates a single-shot with a six-sided dice, in
which each number has the same probability of 1/6 = 16, 67%. You win every time the
computer tosses the dice with numbers 1 or 2. You lose, if the computer tosses the dice
with numbers 3, 4, 5 or 6. The computer plays every round a random and independent
toss.
Therefore the probability to win 2.5 × X is one third. With two thirds probability you
lose the amount X.
Determination of the amount X for 3 rounds each
At the beginning of the 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th, 13th and 16th round you have to define an
amount X for the lottery, which is fixed in every of the subsequent 3 rounds (so in rounds
1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-12, 13-15 respectively 16-18). During the random number is drawn new
for every round you set the same amount X for each of 3 rounds. After you have set in
your amount X, you learn the random numbers of the 3 rounds and how often you have
won or lost on an extra screen.
This determines your earnings for the round. You will also see your whole earnings on
the screen. For the payoff of this round the earnings of all rounds will be added.
Please note, that you cannot use the earnings from earlier rounds for the lottery. That
is, that your input X is 100 talers maximum in every round. However, the input has to
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be identical for 3 rounds each (1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-12, 13-15 respectively 16-18).
(Narrow:
Part II consists of 18 rounds. In each round you get an endowment of 100 talers (100
talers = 50 Cent = e 0.5). In every round you have to decide how many thalers (X) of
your endowment (from 0 to 100 talers) you want to set in the subsequent lottery. If you
choose to set the amount X in the lottery, then
• You lose this amount X with probability of two thirds (66.67%) and get an payment
of 100−X at the end of the round
• You win with a probability of one third (33, 33%) 2.5-times the amount of X. Then
you get an payment of 100 + 2.5 ∗X at the end of the round.
The decision of on the outcome of the lottery depends on a random number that is drawn
new in each round. The computer simulates a single-shot with a six-sided dice, in which
each number has the same probability of 1/6 = 16.67%. You win every time the computer
tosses the dice with numbers 1 or 2. You lose, if the computer tosses the dice with numbers
3, 4, 5 or 6. The computer plays every round a random and independent toss. Therefore
the probability to win 2.5 ∗ X is one third. With two thirds probability you lose the
amount X.
After you have set in your decision about the amount X you get the information about
the random number of this round and of you have won or lost on an extra screen.
This constitutes your round payment. You will also see your whole payment. For the
payment in this part, payments from all rounds are added.
Please note, that your payment from earlier rounds cannot be used in the current round
as input for the lottery. That is, in each round your amount X cannot exceed 100 talers.)
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Part III
After part II has ended part III begins automatically. You will see the instructions for
part III on your screen.
Part IV
Task
Part IV consists out of 6 decision making situations. In each situation you have to decide
if you accept or decline a lottery. Every lottery results either in a win or in a loss. The
probability of winning or losing is 50% each. By choosing your favored option (accept or
decline) you make your decision. You confirm your decision by clicking the button “zu
Teil V”-Button ultimately. Take your time for your decisions as your decision determines
your payoff from part IV.
Payment
Your payment is determined as follows: The computer chooses randomly and with same
probability one of the 6 decision making situations and simulates a fair coin toss. If you
have accepted the lottery in the decision making situation you get the win with heads
(with 50% probability) and the loss with tails (with 50% probability). If you have declined
the lottery your payment is 0 Euro in this part.
Possible losses from part IV will be charged with the earnings of the other parts of the
experiment. The result of this part will be provided at the end of the experiment.
After the end of part IV automatically part V begins.
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Part V
Task
You are asked 7 questions in part V. You will get these displayed on two screens in suc-
cession. On the first screen you get 4 questions, on the second 3 questions. For the first
4 questions you have 4 minutes to enter your answers in the fields provided. For the
following 3 questions you have 3 minutes. Please click on OK at the end of each timeout,
so your input is saved and the experiment can be continued.
Payment
For answering the 7 questions you get e 2.50.
End of the experiment
We please you to answer a questionnaire honest and complete, as these information are
very important for our investigation.
Afterwards your earnings from the experiment will be displayed on a separate screen.
Finally, you have the opportunity to give us feedback about today’s experiment. Then
your payment is paid to you private and in cash. Please stay seated at your place as we
will call you at random order. Please leave the pens and instructions at your place and
take your place card with you.
APPENDIX C
Peer Effects in Risk Preferences among Adolescents
C.1 Additional Summary Statistics
Table C.1 reports descriptive statistics of the whole sample and separately for each treat-
ment. The last column reports p-values from χ2 tests.
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics Full Sample
TOTAL CONTROL RANDOM FRIENDS p-value
students 235 77 59 99
classes 14 5 4 5
schools 7 4 4 4
contact 2.536 2.750 2.250 2.516 0.004
training 0.371 0.295 0.383 0.424 0.204
grade 7.785 7.795 7.717 7.818 0.367
age 14.117 13.937 14.077 14.281 0.138
male 0.586 0.636 0.544 0.571 0.520
relmath 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
sum m correct 0.797 0.705 0.750 0.899 0.246
Risk 3.144 3.143 3.152 3.140 0.770
singleparent 0.273 0.328 0.327 0.200 0.122
hh size 3.072 2.973 3.111 3.128 0.116
language2 0.366 0.293 0.434 0.386 0.232
books 2.532 2.699 2.679 2.319 0.250
Note: p-values are from χ2 tests
C.2 Switching Points and Estimated Preference Pa-
rameters
Table C.2 shows the distribution of switching points in the three treatment conditions. We
find that while individuals switch on average later on sheets A and B in both treatments,
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most of the effect comes from late switchers delaying their switch as the median remains
similar. The last column reports p-values from t-tests comparing the mean switching
point on the first (second) choice list to the average switching point under risk (loss)
neutrality for each treatment. Switching points on list A (B) are significantly different
from risk (loss) neutrality according to these tests.
Table C.2: Distribution of Switching Points by Treatment
mean median 5th 25th 75th 95th p-value
CON 5.359 6.0 1.0 3.0 7.5 11.0 0.000
RAN 6.037 6.5 1.0 3.0 9.0 11.0 0.000
FRI 5.888 6.0 1.0 4.0 7.0 11.5 0.000
switch B
CON 3.859 4.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 7.0 0.000
RAN 4.463 4.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 8.0 0.000
FRI 3.950 4.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 8.0 0.000
Note: Full sample included; p-values from t-tests of H0: switch A = 3.5 or
switch B = 2 respectively
Using prospect theory, we estimate preference parameters from the choices in the lotteries
with positive and mixed payoffs. The estimates represent estimates of loss and risk-
aversion parameters for teenagers in the control group as these decide independently of
their peers. As we show in this paper, the assumption of independent choices is violated
in the social interaction treatments. Therefore, our estimates of σ and λ do not represent
preference parameters but rather as if estimates under the independence assumption.
Furthermore, these parameters are identified from the two decision sheets as combinations
(σ, λ), hence they are identified conditional on each other. For this reason, we present
our results on the nature of choices in terms of switching points as well as changes in the
estimated σ and λ parameters. Our results are robust to both outcome dimensions.
C.3 Differences in Parameters between Matched Par-
ticipants
Table C.3 displays the absolute parameter differences between matched participants, i.e.
in the RANDOM and FRIENDS treatments absolute parameter differences between dis-
cussion partners. In the CONTROL treatment, we report two alternative possibilities for
‘matched’ partners: in the ‘vs. RoC’ column we ‘match’ participants with the rest of their
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class, i.e. with everyone else but themselves and in the ‘vs. Fri’ column we match partic-
ipants with the person with whom they exchanged stickers. For the comparison of these
parameter differences between FRIENDS and CONTROL, we use the ‘vs. Fri’ difference,
as pairs of non-interacting friends are the suitable comparison group to FRIENDS. For the
comparison between RANDOM and CONTROL, we use the ‘vs ROC’ difference, as pairs
of non-interacting random classmates are the suitable comparison group to RANDOM.
For both of these comparisons we find that interacting pairs make significantly more
similar choices both in the pure as well as in the mixed lotteries, while when we compare
RANDOM and FRIENDS (i.e. pairs of interacting friends and interacting random pairs),
we find no significant differences in similarity in either dimension.
Table C.3: Differences in Parameters between matched Participants per Treatment
CONTROL p-values
vs. ROC vs. Fri Mean RAN Mean FRI RAN vs. CON FRI vs. CON RAN vs. FRI
∆ij(σ) 0.274 0.382 0.165 0.146 0.198 0.000 0.518
∆ij(λ) 1.760 2.180 1.008 0.281 0.428 0.000 0.854
Note: Data collapsed on the dyad level; p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests; CON-
TROL vs. ROC differences as comparison for RAN vs. CON tests, for other tests differences to
matched participant; CON stands for CONTROL, RAN for RANDOM and FRI for FRIENDS
In Table C.4 we report robustness checks to the dyadic regressions based on Fafchamps
and Gubert (2007) displayed in Table 3.4. Here we include the observations from our
FRIENDS treatment in columns (2) and (4). Naturally, in interacting pairs of friendsthe
preference parameters are endogenous to the interaction therefore we cannot include them
as explanatory variables. The results indicate that the correlation between age, gender
and the family characteristics and the probability of being friends is robust to including
the observations from the FRIENDS treatment.
In Table C.5 we report robustness checks to the dyadic regressions displayed in Table 3.5.
Here we again include the observations from our FRIENDS treatment in columns (2) and
(4). Naturally, in interacting pairs of friends the preference parameters are endogenous
to the treatment, as some classmates in FRIENDS were interacting with each other,
therefore we cannot include them as explanatory variables. The results indicate that the
correlation between age and the probability of being classmates is robust to including the
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observations from the FRIENDS treatment. However, the correlation between the gender
and being classmates disappears.
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Table C.4: Logit Regressions of Being Friends on Dyad Level Explanatory Variables
within CONTROL and FRIENDS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P (friends = 1) P (friends = 1) P (friends = 1) P (friends = 1)
DIFFERENCES
σ 0.288 0.416
(0.550) (0.890)
λ -0.0542 -0.0642
(0.183) (0.161)
rel. math grade 0.130 -0.0400 0.157 0.0169
(0.291) (0.148) (0.261) (0.147)
age -0.613** -0.449** -0.761** -0.445**
(0.263) (0.205) (0.304) (0.223)
male -2.517*** -2.181*** -2.526** -2.197***
(0.972) (0.479) (1.110) (0.525)
household size -0.158 -0.126*
(0.175) (0.0755)
single parent -1.751*** -0.960**
(0.601) (0.387)
migrant -0.0728 -0.385
(0.286) (0.276)
low SES -0.357*** -0.340*
(0.0887) (0.199)
SUMS
σ 0.151 0.212
(0.300) (0.426)
λ 0.0748 0.0982
(0.129) (0.123)
rel. math grade 0.0629 0.0269 -0.00710 0.0252
(0.163) (0.0547) (0.221) (0.0599)
age 0.0353 -0.0568 0.0804 -0.0775**
(0.0658) (0.0347) (0.133) (0.0352)
male -0.334* -0.352*** -0.348 -0.321***
(0.203) (0.0832) (0.285) (0.0871)
household size 0.0889* 0.0564
(0.0463) (0.0466)
single parent 0.460* 0.507***
(0.251) (0.177)
migrant -0.0466 -0.126
(0.360) (0.0846)
low SES -0.216 0.0165
(0.328) (0.0747)
Constant -2.956 0.262 -4.128 0.965
(2.963) (0.870) (5.332) (0.968)
Observations 335 705 335 705
Note: Dependent variable is exchanged which is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for pairs of
participants who are classmates; columns 3 and 5 contain observations from FRIENDS treatment;
Robust standard errors clustered at the class level in parentheses; relmath refers to the math grade
of each individual subtracted by the class average. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
180 Peer Effects in Risk Preferences
Table C.5: Logit Regressions of Being Classmates on Dyad Level Explanatory Variables
within CONTROL and FRIENDS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P (classmates = 1) P (classmates = 1) P (classmates = 1) P (classmates = 1)
DIFFERENCES
σ -0.699 -0.688
(0.583) (0.498)
λ 0.00426 0.0146
(0.0715) (0.0429)
rel. math grade -0.108 -0.118 -0.107 -0.111
(0.140) (0.0748) (0.111) (0.0808)
age -0.612*** -0.382*** -0.615*** -0.385***
(0.156) (0.143) (0.166) (0.128)
male 0.163*** 0.0117 0.163*** 0.0133
(0.0557) (0.0900) (0.0560) (0.0864)
household size -0.0117 -0.0461
(0.0420) (0.0345)
single parent 0.0859 -0.155
(0.0725) (0.267)
migrant 0.0385 -0.313
(0.0835) (0.324)
low SES -0.0466 -0.0226
(0.130) (0.0740)
SUMS
σ 0.00422 -0.00239
(0.495) (0.453)
λ -0.0121 -0.0214
(0.0444) (0.0700)
rel. math grade 0.0223 0.00450 -0.00352 -0.00639
(0.0793) (0.0255) (0.143) (0.0416)
age 0.189 0.0617 0.207 0.0714
(0.335) (0.206) (0.384) (0.224)
male -0.101 0.0121 -0.110 0.00191
(0.120) (0.119) (0.151) (0.102)
household size 0.0371 0.0280
(0.112) (0.0546)
single parent -0.0760 0.0389
(0.216) (0.143)
migrant -0.00896 -0.0506
(0.250) (0.152)
low SES -0.0797 -0.0613
(0.263) (0.213)
Constant -5.273 -2.601 -5.888 -2.689
(7.967) (5.813) (9.997) (6.470)
Observations 1,378 3,269 1,378 3,269
Note: Dependent variable is exchanged which is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for pairs of
participants who are classmates; columns 3 and 5 contain observations from FRIENDS treatment;
Robust standard errors clustered at the class level in parentheses; relmath refers to the math grade
of each individual subtracted by the class average. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.4 Assigning Parameter Values
Table C.6 and C.7 display the lotteries on the two , including their payoffs and the
differences in expected payoffs. Additionally, Table C.6 demonstrates how σ is assigned
according to the row of the switch to the right option. Table C.7 demonstrates with an
example how λ is assigned based on a σ of 0.65 (switch on sheet A to the right option in
the 6th row).
Table C.6: Assigning σ Parameters
Option L Option R ∆LR(EV )
σ range Assigned σ
Switch Low High Low High Min Max
1 1.00 2.00 0.20 2.41 0.20 1.50 n/a 1.63
2 1.00 2.00 0.20 2.56 0.12 1.25 1.50 1.38
3 1.00 2.00 0.20 2.80 0.00 1.00 1.25 1.13
4 1.00 2.00 0.20 3.09 -0.14 0.80 1.00 0.90
5 1.00 2.00 0.20 3.29 -0.24 0.70 0.80 0.75
6 1.00 2.00 0.20 3.54 -0.37 0.60 0.70 0.65
7 1.00 2.00 0.20 3.87 -0.53 0.50 0.60 0.55
8 1.00 2.00 0.20 4.31 -0.76 0.40 0.50 0.45
9 1.00 2.00 0.20 4.93 -1.07 0.30 0.40 0.35
10 1.00 2.00 0.20 5.85 -1.53 0.20 0.30 0.25
11 1.00 2.00 0.20 7.33 -2.27 0.10 0.20 0.15
Never n/a 0.1 0.05
Note: Switch in first rows corresponds to choosign option R in all rows; σ for switch
in row 1 and for never assigend by extrapolating distance from neighboring category’s
midpoint to respective category
Table C.7: Assigning λ Parameters (σ = 0.65)
Option L Option R ∆LR(EV )
λ range Assigned λ
Switch Low High Low High Min Max
1 -0.40 2.50 -2.10 3.00 0.60 0.21 n/a 0.06
2 -0.40 0.40 -2.10 3.00 -0.45 1.40 0.21 0.80
3 -0.40 0.10 -2.10 3.00 -0.60 1.70 1.40 1.55
4 -0.40 0.10 -1.60 3.00 -0.85 2.26 1.70 1.98
5 -0.80 0.10 -1.60 3.00 -1.05 3.69 2.26 2.97
6 -0.80 0.10 -1.40 3.00 -1.15 4.79 3.69 4.24
7 -0.80 0.10 -1.10 3.00 -1.30 9.14 4.79 6.97
Never n/a 9.14 9.69
Note: Switch in first rows corresponds to choosign option R in all rows; λ for switch
in row 1 and for never assigend by extrapolating distance from the two neighboring
category’s midpoints to respective category
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Table C.8: Determinants of Switching Points
SwitchA SwitchB
RAN RAN FRI RAN RAN FRI
& FRI & FRI
fin. lit. -0.025 0.038 -0.046 -0.057 -0.120 -0.031
(1.21) (1.00) (1.85)* (2.33)** (2.49)** (1.02)
∆(fin.lit.) < 0 -0.149 -0.164 -0.145 -0.193 -0.246 -0.179
(1.59) (1.06) (1.21) (1.72)* (1.33) (1.23)
math 0.156 0.218 0.148 0.046 0.061 0.009
(3.37)*** (2.14)** (2.68)*** (0.82) (0.52) (0.13)
∆(math) < 0 0.174 0.279 0.130 0.060 -0.113 0.122
(1.84)* (1.49) (1.11) (0.53) (0.51) (0.86)
male 0.058 0.274 0.007 -0.107 -0.270 -0.001
(0.61) (1.13) (0.07) (0.95) (0.98) (0.01)
∆(male) 0.023 -0.145 0.144 0.100 0.122 0.028
(0.26) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) (0.69) (0.15)
single parent -0.383 -0.494 -0.470 -0.319 -0.444 -0.250
(3.08)*** (2.09)** (2.78)*** (2.13)** (1.59) (1.27)
∆(singlep.) 0.158 0.211 0.213 0.164 0.189 0.175
(1.69)* (1.41) (1.58) (1.46) (1.07) (1.09)
cons 2.057 1.538 2.234 2.068 2.834 1.709
(9.98)*** (4.10)*** (8.74)*** (8.54)*** (6.22)*** (5.53)***
N 114 40 74 114 40 74
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table C.8 reports the results from OLS regressions of the switching point on sheet A
and sheet B on several explanatory variables for RANDOM and FRIENDS pooled and
individually.
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C.5 Instructions (translated from German)
Part 1 – Risk Game
Welcome to today’s survey. Our survey consists of two parts. Please raise your hand
if you did not hand in a parents’ consent!
[CONTROL
In part 1 it is very important that you make your decisions on your own. There
are no right or wrong decisions. We would only like to know what you prefer. As soon as
we have finished the explanation, we ask you to be absolutely quiet for 5 minutes.]
[RANDOM
In part 1 you can discuss your decisions with another person in the classroom.
We prepared a bag with numbers. Each number exists twice. Please draw a number and,
as soon as everyone has drawn, look for the person that has drawn the same number and
sit together in pairs. Please take a pen with you! You are allowed to discuss your decisions
with your partner quietly, but you decide only for yourself! If no one else has drawn your
number, you can fill in the first part alone! In the lower part of your questionnaires you
find red stickers with your questionnaire number. Please remove the sticker from your
own questionnaire and put it on your partner’s questionnaire, so we know who you worked
with!]
[FRIENDS
In part 1 you can discuss your decisions with another person in the classroom.
Please stand up and take a pen with you! Choose a friend with whom you would like
to discuss your choices and sit together in pairs. You are allowed to discuss your deci-
sions with your partner quietly, but you decide only for yourself! [with odd number of
participants: the person that does not find a partner can fill in the first part alone!] In
the lower part of your questionnaires you find red stickers with your questionnaire num-
ber. Please remove the sticker from your own questionnaire and put it on your partner’s
questionnaire, so we know who you worked with!]
We will now go through the first part of the survey. We will have breaks in between,
so you can ask questions. Please raise your hand in case you have a question.
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Part 1
In the first part you can earn money. The money will be paid out to you at the end of
this lesson. For your participation you receive 3.10 Euros right now.
The amount of money you will have in the end depends on your decisions and on chance.
There are no right or wrong answers! It is important that you fully understand the
rules. In the first part you have to make 18 decisions. We will randomly select one of the
decisions and actually pay it to you at the end of the lesson. You will not know which
decision this will be before you have finished the part 1! Therefore, you have to think
carefully about all your decisions, because every decision might be drawn.
One of you will draw a chip from this bag later on. In this bag there are 5 blue and 5
red chips. You have to decide how much money you receive if a blue chip or a red chip
is drawn. Part 1 consists of two sheets with several decisions. You always have to decide
between two options – option L (for left) and option R (for right).
Let’s start with the first sheet! Here is an example. In the upper part of the sheet you
can see how many chips of each color are in the bag. We take a look at the first decision
you have to make.
Option L Option R
A1 e 2.00 for •  or  e 2.41 for •
e 1.00 for • e 0.20 for •
If you choose option L, you receive 2.00 Euros if a blue chip is drawn and 1.00 Euro if a
red chip is drawn. If you choose option R, you receive 2.41 Euros for a blue chip, but only
0.20 Euros for a red chip. If you prefer option L in A1, tick the left box. If you prefer
option R, tick the right box. Please do only tick one box per line!
The other decision on the first sheet are similar. You have to make a decision for each
line.
In the second line you again decide between L and R. In this line, however, you can win
either 2.56 Euros or 0.20 Euros in option R. As you can see here, the amount of money
you can win if a blue chip is drawn increases for option R. Option L always stays the
same in this sheet.
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After you have made all your decisions in a sheet, you have to summarize your decisions
in the bottom part of the sheet.
Assuming that you want to coose option L for all decisions, you should tick the left box
in each line. Then, you state that you choose option L for lines A1 to A11 in the bottom
part of the sheet and cross out the line for option R.
It works the same way if you only want choose option R. You cross out the line for option
L to indicate that you never want to choose L.
Assume that you choose option L for lines A1 to A4 and then option R from line A5 on.
Then you write A4 into the empty box in the upper line and A5 in the lower line.
Please pay close attention now!
Most people only switch from option L to option R once at some point between the first
line and the last line. As soon as you have ticked a box on the right side, you should stay
with option R for all following lines.
Why is this the case?
Let’s look at the second and third line. If you have chosen right in a previous line, it does
not make sense to switch back to the left side in the following lines. Option L is equal in
both lines. In option R the amount for a red chip is the same in both lines, but in the
third line you receive 2.80 Euros for a blue chip. This is more than in the second line,
where you only receive 2.56 Euros for a blue chip. Therefore, option R is better in the
third line than in the seond line. Thus, if you alreday choose right in the second line, you
should all the more choose option R is the third line! It is always the same if you compare
two consecutive lines – the further you go down, the better option R gets. Therefore, you
should tick option R if you have already chosen option R earlier!
Is this clear to everyone?
Sheet 2 is similar to sheet 1, only the numbers are different. If a red chip is drawn, you
loose money in both options. In case this happens, you have to return money to us.
Additonally, sometimes also the left option changes from line to line.
Let’s look at the second sheet!
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Option L Option R
B1 e 2.50 for •  or  e 3.00 for •
e -0.40 for • e -2.10 for •
The decisions work the same way as in the first sheet. You decide how you want to receive
or pay money for the chips. If you choose option L, you receive 2.50 Euros if a blue chip
is drawn, but you have to return 0.40 Euros to us if a red chip is drawn. It works the
same way with option R: for a blue chip you receive 3.00 Euros. If a red chip is drawn,
you have to return 2.10 Euros to us.
As in sheet 1, we ask you to make a decision for each line. As before, you have to transfer
your decisions into the summary in the end. As in sheet 1, cross out the lower line if you
only want to shoose option L. Cross out the upper line if you only want to choose R.
If you choose option L to line B3, for example, and option R from line B4 onwards, then
please indicate it in the bottom part of the sheet.
It works the same as in the first sheet!
Most people switch from left to right only once. As soon as you have ticked a box on the
right side, you should stay with option R in all following lines.
Why is it like that?
Let’s look at the third and the fourth line. It does not make sense to switch back to the
left side in the lower lines if you have already chosen right before. Option L is equal in
both lines. In option R the payment for a blue chip is equal in both lines. In line 3,
however, you loose 2.10 euros for a red chip, which is more than in the fourth line, where
you only loose 1.60 Euros. Thus, option R is definitely better in the fourth line than in
the third line. If you have already chosen option R over option L in the third line, then
you should all the more tick option R in the fourth line. It is always like that if you
compare two consecutive lines. Thus, if you have chosen option R once, you should also
choose option R in all following lines.
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Is this clear to everyone?
Now we have to explain to you how you get your money. In the end of part 1 you have
made 18 decisions, 11 in the first sheet and 7 in the second sheet.
When all of you have finished part 1, one of you can draw a card from these 18 cards.
There is one card for each of your decisions – A1 to A11 and B1 to B7. The card that
will be drawn counts for all of you. If you draw A1, the decision A1 is actually paid out
to all of you.
Then one of you draws a chip from the bag. This chip determines the payment
for all of you. If you draw A1 and blue, the ones who have chosen option L in A1 get
2.00 Euros and the ones who have chosen option R get 2.41 Euros. If you draw red, some
get 1.00 Euro and others get 0.20 Euros.
As each of your 18 decisions can be drawn, you should think carefully for each
line about whether you want to choose option L or option R!
Before you are allowed to start with part 1, you have to fill in the comprehension check
on the first page. Please work on your own! We will go through the rows and check
whether you have filled in the correct answers. Please do not start before we have given
you [DISCUSSION : and your partner] the start signal. Remember that we have already
given you 3.10 Euros!
[TREATMENT : You are allowed to discuss your decisions with your partner, but you
choose for yourself and the money is only for you. Therefore, you do not have to make
the same decision.]
[CONTROL: It is very important that you make the decisions on your own. This takes
only a few minutes in part 1. Please be absolutely quiet now.]
Please raise your hand as soon as you have finished part 1, so we can collect it.
Part 2
Those of you who are done can start with part 2. Part 2 is a questionnaire about
yourself. We are very interested in your own opinion, so please answer all questions on
your own – without talking to your neighbours. Please try to answer every question as
good as you can.
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You have time for this until [5 minutes to the end of the lesson]. Do not take too long for
a single question – at most one minute.
[Towards the end of part 2 in CONTROL: In the bottom of your sheets you find red
stickers with your questionnaire number. We would like to look at your decsions and the
decisions of one of your friends later. Please choose a friend and exchange your stickers!]
[5 minutes to end] You have three minutes left to answer the remaining questions. Please
answer the questions on the sticker in any case, as we are specifically interested in these
questions!
Thank you for your participation!
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C.6 Decision Sheets
Part I
Your decisions around money
Prof. Dr. Joachim Winter
Ludwig-Maximilans-University, Munich
Comprehension Check
Here we ask you to answer four questions to check whether you have understood the rules.
Imagine that the following decision has benn drawn and that you have decided as ticked
here:
Z6 e 1.50 for •  or  e 2.50 for •
e 0.50 for • e 0.10 for •
1. How much money do you receive additionally if • is drawn? . . . Euros
2. How much money do you receive additionally if • is drawn? . . . Euros
3. Inculding our thank-you, how much money do you have in total
in the end if • is drawn?
. . . Euros
4. Inculding our thank-you, how much money do you have in total
in the end if • is drawn?
. . . Euros
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Which option do you choose?
Your payment for both options is determined by the draw of the chip from the bag,
which contains 5 red and 5 blue chips:
••••• •••••
Option L Option R
A1 2.00 Euros for •  or  2.41 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A2 2.00 Euros for •  or  2.56 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A3 2.00 Euros for •  or  2.80 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A4 2.00 Euros for •  or  3.09 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A5 2.00 Euros for •  or  3.29 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A6 2.00 Euros for •  or  3.54 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A7 2.00 Euros for •  or  3.87 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A8 2.00 Euros for •  or  4.31 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A9 2.00 Euros for •  or  4.93 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A10 2.00 Euros for •  or  5.85 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
A11 2.00 Euros for •  or  7.33 Euros for •
1.00 Euros for • 0.20 Euros for •
Your choices
I choose option L for questions A1 to
I choose option R for questions to A11
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Which option do you choose?
Your payment for both options is determined by the draw of the chip from the bag,
which contains 5 red and 5 blue chips:
••••• •••••
Option L Option R
B1 2.50 Euros for •  or  3.00 Euros for •
-0.40 Euros for • -2.10 Euros for •
B2 0.40 Euros for •  or  3.00 Euros for •
-0.40 Euros for • -2.10 Euros for •
B3 0.10 Euros for •  or  3.00 Euros for •
-0.40 Euros for • -2.10 Euros for •
B4 0.10 Euros for •  or  3.00 Euros for •
-0.40 Euros for • -1.60 Euros for •
B5 0.10 Euros for •  or  3.00 Euros for •
-0.80 Euros for • -1.60 Euros for •
B6 0.10 Euros for •  or  3.00 Euros for •
-0.80 Euros for • -1.40 Euros for •
B7 0.10 Euros for •  or  3.00 Euros for •
-0.80 Euros for • -1.10 Euros for •
Your choices
I choose option L for questions B1 to
I choose option R for questions to B7
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C.7 Additional Measurements
The following is a translation of the financial literacy questions that were asked in part
2 of the study. The financial literacy score is constructed by adding up the number of
correct responses. A maximum of 13 points can be reached. For the verbal responses
in situation 1, we had two research assistants independently judge the correctness of the
response. Contradictory judgements were then settled by one of the authors.
Situation 1
Martin can buy tomatoes individually or in crates. 1 kilo of tomatoes individually cost
2.75 Euros. One crate with 10 kilos costs 22 Euros. Martin thinks: “The crate with
tomatoes offers a better cost-benefit-ratio than the individual tomatoes.”
Give one reason for this:
Buying one crate of tomatoes (10 kilos) could be a bad idea for some people. What could
be the reason for this?
Situation 2
Imagine your grandmoter would like to save money. Potentially she needs to use the
money on short notice, if her car breaks down and she needs to pay the repair. Which of
the following investments would you recommend to her? (Please only mark one answer)
2 Real estate (e.g. a house or apartment)
2 Stocks
2 Savings book
Situation 3
Chrstina wants to invest her savings and to take as little risk as possible. Which of the
following investments would you recommend to her? (Please only mark one answer)
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2 Real estate (e.g. a house or apartment)
2 Stocks
2 Savings book
Situation 4
Anna wants to take up a new mobile plan. She can choose from two plans. Each month,
she never sends more than 100 text messages, talks for a maximum of 100 minutes on the
phone and surfs at most 100 minutes online. She has to pay the phone costs from her
own money. Which alternative would you recommend to her?
2 Alternative A (flatrate contract): For 40 Euros a month Anna can phone, text
and surf online without limit.
2 Alternative B (prepaid card to top-up): Anna gets a SIM card for free. With this
plan, she can talk for 10 cents a minute, surf for 10 cents a minute and send texts
for 10 cents per text.
Situation 5
Which of the following statements is correct? If you buy a stock of company B...
2 ... you own a par of company B.
2 ... you have lent money to company B.
2 ... you are liable for the debt of company B.
2 I don’t know.
Situation 6
Marie has 100 Euros in her savings account. She gets 2% interest a year. Marie asks
you, how much money she will have in her account after five years, if she leaves the full
amount in the account for the whole time. What do you think?
2 More than 102 Euros
2 Exactly 102 Euros
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2 Less than 102 Euros
2 I don’t know.
Situation 7
If you buy 5 stocks from a single company, you get a safer return (profit) than if you
invest the same amount of money into 5 different stocks (e.g. into an investment fund).
Right or wrong?
2 Right
2 Wrong
2 I don’t know.
Situation 8
(Please mark the possibility that seems the most important to you) Buying something on
credit...
2 ... allows me to afford everything today that I want.
2 ... gives me the freedom to decide myself what I can afford when.
2 ... means getting into debt now in order to buy something now that I cannot afford
right now.
Situation 9
Which ones are one-off costs and which are recurring costs in sports?
Tennis racket 2one-off 2recurring costs
Monthly fee at the sports club 2one-off 2recurring costs
10er ticketbook at the swimming pool 2one-off 2recurring costs
Situation 10
Why do companies advertise?
2 To sell their products better.
2 Because the employees like to see their company on TV, in magazines etc..
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2 They produce funny advertisements in order to thank their customers.
2 I don’t know.
Furthremore, participants were asked about the degree of contact they have with the
person they exchanged stickers with using the following question:
Degree of Contact
You and your best friend in your class (your current discussion partner), how often do
you see each other outside of school?
2 Daily
2 Several times a week
2 Once a week
2 Less than once a week
2 Never
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